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From: "Michael Brown" <mcb30@ipxe.org>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io, ardb@kernel.org, dougflick@microsoft.com
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 07/14] NetworkPkg:: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45237
Date: Wed, 8 May 2024 22:52:56 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0102018f5a68ec53-d70f69e1-53bf-41b2-96d2-be9dd12a1399-000000@eu-west-1.amazonses.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXHEknMENkh77dYNOT98rmGrw5VHKSZKen6MONQnH9qGfA@mail.gmail.com>

On 08/05/2024 22:19, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> I've always found that logic rather bizarre - there is no way the
> implementation of the raw protocol can ensure that the caller uses it
> correctly, and so enforcing a minimum read size is pointless and
> arbitrary. And as you note, it has no basis in the UEFI spec either.
> 
> So this should just be removed imo.

For what it's worth, I agree that it should be removed.

iPXE has the following comment:

/** Minimum number of bytes to request from RNG
  *
  * The UEFI spec states (for no apparently good reason) that "When a
  * Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) is used on the output of
  * a (raw) entropy source, its security level must be at least 256
  * bits."  The EDK2 codebase (mis)interprets this to mean that the
  * call to GetRNG() should fail if given a buffer less than 32 bytes.
  *
  * Incidentally, nothing in the EFI RNG protocol provides any way to
  * report the actual amount of entropy returned by GetRNG().
  */
#define EFIRNG_LEN 32

Michael



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  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-08 22:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-08 15:29 [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 00/14] NetworkPkg: CVE-2023-45236 and CVE-2023-45237 Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 01/14] EmulatorPkg: : Add RngDxe to EmulatorPkg Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 02/14] EmulatorPkg: : Add Hash2DxeCrypto " Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-10  3:10   ` Ni, Ray
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 03/14] OvmfPkg:PlatformCI: Support virtio-rng-pci Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 04/14] OvmfPkg: : Add Hash2DxeCrypto to OvmfPkg Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 05/14] ArmVirtPkg:PlatformCI: Support virtio-rng-pci Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 06/14] ArmVirtPkg: : Add Hash2DxeCrypto to ArmVirtPkg Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 07/14] NetworkPkg:: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45237 Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 16:20   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-08 16:47     ` Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 16:58       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-08 18:05         ` Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 20:40           ` Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 21:19             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-08 22:52               ` Michael Brown [this message]
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 08/14] NetworkPkg: TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 09/14] OvmfPkg: Disable NIST Algorithms NetworkPkg Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 10/14] ArmVirtPkg: : Disables NIST algorithms NetworkPkg Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 11/14] MdePkg: : Add MockUefiBootServicesTableLib Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 12/14] MdePkg: : Adds Protocol for MockRng Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 13/14] MdePkg: Add MockHash2 Protocol for testing Doug Flick via groups.io
2024-05-08 15:29 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 14/14] NetworkPkg: Update the PxeBcDhcp6GoogleTest due to underlying changes Doug Flick via groups.io

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