From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io, thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>,
Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>, Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>,
Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v3 00/15] SEV-ES security mitigations
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 20:41:34 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0c3c91a6-68cb-a0d6-8fee-c85039e328c3@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
On 01/07/21 19:48, Lendacky, Thomas wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> This patch series provides security mitigations for SEV-ES to protect
> against some attacks identified in the paper titled "Exploiting Interfaces
> of Secure Encrypted Virtual Machines" at:
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.07094.pdf
>
> The mitigations include:
>
> - Validating the encryption bit position provided by the hypervisor.
> Additionally, once validated use the validated value throughout the
> code.
>
> - Validating that SEV-ES has been advertised to the guest if a #VC has
> been taken to prevent the hypervisor from pretending that SEV-ES is
> not enabled.
>
> - Validate that MMIO is performed to/from unencrypted memory addresses
> to prevent the hypervisor try to inject data or expose secrets within
> the guest.
>
> And a change separate from the above paper:
>
> - When checking #VC related per-vCPU values, make checks for explicit
> values vs non-zero values so that a hypervisor can't write random data
> to the location to alter guest processing behavior.
>
> Also, as part of creating these mitigations:
> - MemEncryptSevLib is updated to now be available during SEC
> - #VC now supports a single nested invocation
>
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
>
> ---
>
> These patches are based on commit:
> 7785b38ac977 ("ArmPkg: Fix Ecc error 5007 in DefaultExceptionHandlerLib")
>
> All modified DSC files successfully built.
>
> Changes since v2:
> - Updated source file order in DSC package changes
> - Updated two commit subjects
>
> Changes since v1:
> - Added CLI before HLT in the halt loops
> - Split the encryption mask retrieval interface patch into three
> patches
> - Split out some coding style fixes as a pre-patch in order to pass ECC
> - Implemented an SEC specific version of the
> MemEncryptSevLocateInitialSmramSaveStateMapPagesCreated() interface.
> - Clarified/expanded some commit messages and comments
>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
> Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
> Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>
> Tom Lendacky (15):
> Ovmf/ResetVector: Simplify and consolidate the SEV features checks
> OvmfPkg/Sec: Move SEV-ES SEC workarea definition to common header file
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Validate the encryption bit position for
> SEV/SEV-ES
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Perform a simple SEV-ES sanity check
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Save the encryption mask at boot time
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add an interface to retrieve the encryption
> mask
> OvmfPkg: Obtain SEV encryption mask with the new MemEncryptSevLib API
> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Clear encryption bit on PCIe MMCONFIG range
> OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Check for an explicit DR7 cached value
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Coding style fixes in prep for SEC library
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Make the MemEncryptSevLib available for SEC
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Address range encryption state interface
> OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Support nested #VCs
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Reserve GHCB backup pages if S3 is supported
> OvfmPkg/VmgExitLib: Validate #VC MMIO is to un-encrypted memory
>
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 2 +
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 6 +-
> OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc | 4 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 4 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 4 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 6 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 3 +-
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf | 3 +
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 3 +
> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf | 8 +-
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/{BaseMemEncryptSevLib.inf => DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf} | 16 +-
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 57 ++
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 51 ++
> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf | 45 +
> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf | 6 +-
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 2 +
> OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 90 +-
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 35 +-
> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.h | 53 ++
> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 20 +-
> OvmfPkg/Bhyve/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 12 +-
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 145 +++
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 31 +-
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/MemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 155 ----
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiDxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 63 ++
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 159 ++++
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 155 ++++
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 32 +-
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 893 ++++++++++++++++++
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecVirtualMemory.c | 100 ++
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.c | 954 +++-----------------
> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/PeiDxeVmgExitVcHandler.c | 103 +++
> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitVcHandler.c | 109 +++
> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 130 ++-
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 50 +-
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 5 +
> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 6 +-
> OvmfPkg/XenPlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 12 +-
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm | 118 +++
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm | 110 ++-
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 5 +-
> 41 files changed, 2679 insertions(+), 1086 deletions(-)
> rename OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/{BaseMemEncryptSevLib.inf => DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf} (63%)
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.h
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c
> delete mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/MemEncryptSevLibInternal.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiDxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecVirtualMemory.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/PeiDxeVmgExitVcHandler.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitVcHandler.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm
>
Merged as commit range 55ee36b0c490..85b8eac59b8c, via
<https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/1317>.
Thanks
Laszlo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-07 19:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-07 18:48 [PATCH v3 00/15] SEV-ES security mitigations Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 01/15] Ovmf/ResetVector: Simplify and consolidate the SEV features checks Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 02/15] OvmfPkg/Sec: Move SEV-ES SEC workarea definition to common header file Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 03/15] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Validate the encryption bit position for SEV/SEV-ES Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 04/15] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Perform a simple SEV-ES sanity check Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 05/15] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Save the encryption mask at boot time Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 06/15] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add an interface to retrieve the encryption mask Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 07/15] OvmfPkg: Obtain SEV encryption mask with the new MemEncryptSevLib API Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 08/15] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Clear encryption bit on PCIe MMCONFIG range Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 09/15] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Check for an explicit DR7 cached value Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 10/15] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Coding style fixes in prep for SEC library Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 11/15] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Make the MemEncryptSevLib available for SEC Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 19:08 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 12/15] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Address range encryption state interface Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 13/15] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Support nested #VCs Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 14/15] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Reserve GHCB backup pages if S3 is supported Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 18:48 ` [PATCH v3 15/15] OvfmPkg/VmgExitLib: Validate #VC MMIO is to un-encrypted memory Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-07 19:41 ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2021-01-07 19:50 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v3 00/15] SEV-ES security mitigations Lendacky, Thomas
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