From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=missing; spf=pass (domain: redhat.com, ip: 209.132.183.28, mailfrom: lersek@redhat.com) Received: from mx1.redhat.com (mx1.redhat.com [209.132.183.28]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 21 May 2019 05:34:54 -0700 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EDEE3317915F; Tue, 21 May 2019 12:34:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lacos-laptop-7.usersys.redhat.com (ovpn-120-194.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.120.194]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 997FD101E660; Tue, 21 May 2019 12:34:48 +0000 (UTC) To: openssl-users@openssl.org Cc: edk2-devel-groups-io , Ard Biesheuvel , Jian J Wang , "Lu, XiaoyuX" From: "Laszlo Ersek" Subject: why does RAND_add() take "randomness" as a "double"? Message-ID: <0d949259-3caa-7d9b-60dd-508419fb6593@redhat.com> Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 14:34:47 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.41]); Tue, 21 May 2019 12:34:53 +0000 (UTC) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi OpenSSL Developers, (cross-posting and ,) OpenSSL commit [1] changed the representation of the "entropy amount" -- later renamed to "randomess" in [2] -- from "int" to "double". I've read the commit message: commit 853f757ecea74a271a7c5cdee3f3b5fe0d3ae863 Author: Bodo M=C3=B6ller Date: Sat Feb 19 15:22:53 2000 +0000 Allow for higher granularity of entropy estimates by using 'double' instead of 'unsigned' counters. Seed PRNG in MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/GetHTTPS.cpp. Partially submitted by Yoram Meroz . and also checked "MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/GetHTTPS.cpp" at the same commit. But, I'm none the wiser. Can someone please explain what is gained by using a floating point type here? Is it really a relevant use case that entropy is fed from an external source to OpenSSL such that truncating the amount to a whole number of bits would cause significant lossage? (Admittedly, it could be relevant if the individual randomness bit counts were in the (0, 1) interval, both boundaries exclusive.) Using floating point for randomness representation is a problem for environments that prefer to avoid floating point altogether, such as edk2 ("UEFI") firmware Thanks, Laszlo [1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/853f757ecea7 [2] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f367ac2b2664