From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>, devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: ray.ni@intel.com, Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Allocate SEV-SNP CC blob as EfiACPIReclaimMemory
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2022 10:48:03 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0f3bc82f-0a84-f2f1-6172-cea8da40cc5d@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221221160651.182143-2-michael.roth@amd.com>
On 12/21/22 10:06, Michael Roth wrote:
> The SEV-SNP Confidential Computing blob contains metadata that should
> remain accessible for the life of the guest. Allocate it as
> EfiACPIReclaimMemory to ensure the memory isn't overwritten by the guest
> operating system later.
>
> Reported-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
> Suggested-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c
> index 662d3c4ccb..8dfda961d7 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c
> @@ -21,15 +21,36 @@
> #include <Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h>
> #include <Library/PcdLib.h>
>
> -STATIC CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION mSnpBootDxeTable = {
> - SIGNATURE_32 ('A', 'M', 'D', 'E'),
> - 1,
> - 0,
> - (UINT64)(UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase),
> - FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize),
> - (UINT64)(UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidBase),
> - FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidSize),
> -};
> +STATIC
> +EFI_STATUS
> +AllocateConfidentialComputingBlob (
> + OUT CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION **CcBlobPtr
> + )
> +{
> + EFI_STATUS Status;
> + CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION *CcBlob;
> +
> + Status = gBS->AllocatePool (
> + EfiACPIReclaimMemory,
> + sizeof (CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION),
> + (VOID **)&CcBlob
> + );
> + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> + return Status;
> + }
> +
> + CcBlob->Header = SIGNATURE_32 ('A', 'M', 'D', 'E');
> + CcBlob->Version = 1;
> + CcBlob->Reserved1 = 0;
> + CcBlob->SecretsPhysicalAddress = (UINT64)(UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase);
> + CcBlob->SecretsSize = FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize);
> + CcBlob->CpuidPhysicalAddress = (UINT64)(UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidBase);
> + CcBlob->CpuidLSize = FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidSize);
> +
> + *CcBlobPtr = CcBlob;
> +
> + return EFI_SUCCESS;
> +}
>
> EFI_STATUS
> EFIAPI
> @@ -38,10 +59,11 @@ AmdSevDxeEntryPoint (
> IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
> )
> {
> - EFI_STATUS Status;
> - EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *AllDescMap;
> - UINTN NumEntries;
> - UINTN Index;
> + EFI_STATUS Status;
> + EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *AllDescMap;
> + UINTN NumEntries;
> + UINTN Index;
> + CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION *SnpBootDxeTable;
>
> //
> // Do nothing when SEV is not enabled
> @@ -147,6 +169,18 @@ AmdSevDxeEntryPoint (
> }
> }
>
> + Status = AllocateConfidentialComputingBlob (&SnpBootDxeTable);
> + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> + DEBUG ((
> + DEBUG_ERROR,
> + "%a: AllocateConfidentialComputingBlob(): %r\n",
> + __FUNCTION__,
> + Status
> + ));
> + ASSERT (FALSE);
> + CpuDeadLoop ();
> + }
> +
> //
> // If its SEV-SNP active guest then install the CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SEV_SNP_BLOB.
> // It contains the location for both the Secrets and CPUID page.
> @@ -154,7 +188,7 @@ AmdSevDxeEntryPoint (
> if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
> return gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (
> &gConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlobGuid,
> - &mSnpBootDxeTable
> + SnpBootDxeTable
> );
> }
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-21 16:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-21 16:06 [PATCH 0/4] Fixes for SEV-SNP CC blob and CPUID table handling Roth, Michael
2022-12-21 16:06 ` [PATCH 1/4] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Allocate SEV-SNP CC blob as EfiACPIReclaimMemory Roth, Michael
2022-12-21 16:48 ` Lendacky, Thomas [this message]
2022-12-21 21:26 ` Dov Murik
2023-01-06 9:18 ` [edk2-devel] " Yao, Jiewen
2023-01-06 20:25 ` Dov Murik
2023-01-07 2:01 ` Yao, Jiewen
2023-01-07 16:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-01-12 10:15 ` Yao, Jiewen
2022-12-21 16:06 ` [PATCH 2/4] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Update ConfidentialComputing blob struct definition Roth, Michael
2023-01-06 9:14 ` [edk2-devel] " Yao, Jiewen
2022-12-21 16:06 ` [PATCH 3/4] OvmfPkg/CcExitLib: Fix SEV-SNP XSave area size calculation Roth, Michael
2022-12-21 16:52 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2023-01-06 8:53 ` [edk2-devel] " Yao, Jiewen
2022-12-21 16:06 ` [PATCH 4/4] OvmfPkg/CcExitLib: Use documented XSave area base size for SEV-SNP Roth, Michael
2022-12-21 16:59 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2023-01-06 8:53 ` [edk2-devel] " Yao, Jiewen
2022-12-21 17:41 ` [PATCH 0/4] Fixes for SEV-SNP CC blob and CPUID table handling Roth, Michael
2023-01-18 3:57 ` Yao, Jiewen
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