From: "David Woodhouse" <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
"Wu, Jiaxin" <jiaxin.wu@intel.com>,
"devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
"Wang, Jian J" <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
Bret Barkelew <Bret.Barkelew@microsoft.com>
Cc: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 0/4] Support HTTPS HostName validation feature(CVE-2019-14553)
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 12:03:09 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1400b3e6c04f3422a1ba0bef844664aa84c6ff33.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5c33b6c2-c8b0-aa64-a85f-06bdc3c69843@redhat.com>
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On Mon, 2019-10-14 at 18:15 +0200, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> My understanding is that a fix purely in edk2 -- that is, without
> advancing our openssl submodule reference at once -- is possible, based
> on your comment
>
> https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=960#c32
>
> Namely, edk2 commit 9396cdfeaa7a ("CryptoPkg: Add new TlsLib library",
> 2016-12-22) added a SSL_set_verify() call (in function TlsSetVerify()).
> The last argument of that call is currently NULL.
>
> We should change that, to a callback function that implements what
> ssl_app_verify_callback() and match_cert_hostname() do, in your source file
>
> http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/openconnect.git/blob/HEAD:/openssl.c
Hm, you are lost in a twisty maze of verify callbacks, all alike.
Actually the one you can set with SSL_set_verify() isn't the one you
want. That's a low-level one, called from within the generic
X509_verify_cert() function.
The "app callback" in my OpenConnect example is set on the SSL_CTX not
the SSL object, and is called from the top-level
ssl_verify_cert_chain() function *instead* of X509_verify_cert().
It is X509_verify_cert() which can do the hostname/IP checks for us, if
we can only tell it that we want it to. But the X509_VERIFY_PARAM
object is private to the SSL.
As discussed, we have the SSL_set1_host() accessor function which lets
us set the hostname. The implementation really is a simple one-liner,
calling X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, …). But there's no way
for use to set the IP address from the outside, without an equivalent
accessor function for that (and without SSL_set1_host() spotting that
the string it's given is an IP address, and doing so).
But what we can do is stash the target string in some ex_data hanging
off the SSL object, then have an app callback — which *can* reach the
underlying X509_VERIFY_PARAM — call X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() or
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc() accordingly, before just calling the
normal X509_verify_cert() function that it has overridden.
Something like this... and instead of calling SSL_set1_host(ssl, host)
your own code now has to call
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, ssl_target_idx, strdup(host));
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsInit.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsInit.c
index f9ad6f6b946c..add5810cc4bd 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsInit.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/TlsLib/TlsInit.c
@@ -9,6 +9,49 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#include "InternalTlsLib.h"
+/* You are lost in a twisty maze of SSL cert verify callbacks, all
+ * alike. All we really wanted to do was call SSL_set1_host() and
+ * have it work for IP addresses too, which OpenSSL PR#9201 will do
+ * for us. But until we update OpenSSL, that doesn't work. And we
+ * can't get at the underlying X509_VERIFY_PARAM to set the IP address
+ * for ourselves.
+ *
+ * So we install an app_verify_callback in the SSL_CTX (which is
+ * different to the per-SSL callback wae can use, because it happens
+ * sooner. All our callback does it set the hostname or IP address in
+ * the X509_VERIFY_PARAM like we wanted to in the first place, and
+ * then call X509_verify_param() which is the default function.
+ *
+ * How does it find the hostname/IP string? It's attached to the SSL
+ * as ex_data, using this index:
+ */
+static int ssl_target_idx;
+
+void ssl_target_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+ int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+ /* Free it */
+}
+
+int ssl_target_dup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from,
+ void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+ /* strdup it */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *dummy)
+{
+ SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+ char *hostname = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, ssl_target_idx);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
+
+ if (hostname && !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(vpm, hostname))
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(vpm, hostname, 0);
+
+ return X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+}
+
/**
Initializes the OpenSSL library.
@@ -40,6 +83,9 @@ TlsInitialize (
return FALSE;
}
+ ssl_target_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "TLS target hosthame/IP", NULL,
+ ssl_target_dup, ssl_target_free);
+
//
// Initialize the pseudorandom number generator.
//
@@ -106,6 +152,10 @@ TlsCtxNew (
//
SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version (TlsCtx, ProtoVersion);
+ /* SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback. Not SSL_CTX_set_verify(), which
+ * we could have done as SSL_set_verify(). Twisty maze, remember? */
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(TlsCtx, app_verify_callback, NULL);
+
return (VOID *) TlsCtx;
}
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-15 11:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-27 3:44 [PATCH v1 0/4] Support HTTPS HostName validation feature(CVE-2019-14553) Wu, Jiaxin
2019-09-27 3:44 ` [PATCH v1 1/4] MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Tls.h: Add the data type of EfiTlsVerifyHost(CVE-2019-14553) Wu, Jiaxin
2019-09-27 3:44 ` [PATCH v1 2/4] CryptoPkg/TlsLib: Add the new API "TlsSetVerifyHost"(CVE-2019-14553) Wu, Jiaxin
2019-09-27 3:44 ` [PATCH v1 3/4] NetworkPkg/TlsDxe: Add the support of host validation to TlsDxe driver(CVE-2019-14553) Wu, Jiaxin
2019-09-27 3:44 ` [PATCH v1 4/4] NetworkPkg/HttpDxe: Set the HostName for the verification(CVE-2019-14553) Wu, Jiaxin
2019-09-29 6:09 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v1 0/4] Support HTTPS HostName validation feature(CVE-2019-14553) Wang, Jian J
2019-09-30 23:21 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-01 9:02 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-08 6:19 ` Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-09 7:53 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-09 20:24 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-09 20:34 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-10 3:11 ` Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-10 8:00 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-10 15:45 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-10 18:03 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-11 2:24 ` Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-11 6:58 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-11 8:04 ` Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-11 10:55 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-11 11:16 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-11 15:36 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-11 16:01 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-14 16:15 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-14 16:20 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-14 16:53 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-15 11:03 ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2019-10-15 11:06 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-15 13:54 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-15 15:29 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-15 16:56 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-15 17:34 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-16 9:40 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-16 10:27 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-15 15:57 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-15 17:28 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-10 2:45 ` Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-09 15:54 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-10 2:46 ` Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-15 23:08 ` [RFC v1 5/4] CryptoPkg/TlsLib: accept peer certs via both DNS names and IP addresses Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-16 5:18 ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-16 7:36 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-16 7:54 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-16 7:56 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-16 8:08 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-16 9:19 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-16 11:41 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-16 13:35 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-16 14:43 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-16 15:25 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-17 15:35 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-17 15:49 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-18 13:25 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-25 2:12 ` Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-25 8:14 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-24 19:47 ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-10-25 2:13 ` Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-25 2:12 ` Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-25 2:12 ` Wu, Jiaxin
2019-10-16 8:45 ` David Woodhouse
2019-10-16 11:01 ` David Woodhouse
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