* [PATCH 0/4] ArmPkg, ArmVirtpkg ARM: enable strict memory protection
@ 2017-03-01 14:42 Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 1/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid splitting page table sections unnecessarily Ard Biesheuvel
` (3 more replies)
0 siblings, 4 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-03-01 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: edk2-devel, leif.lindholm, lersek; +Cc: Ard Biesheuvel
This series makes the prerequisite modifications to the ARM version of
the CpuDxe driver so we can enable PE/COFF image and NX memory protection
for ARM platforms, including ArmVirtPkg (#4)
Patch #1 refactors CpuSetMemoryAttributes() so it no longer splits section
mappings into page mappings unnecessarily.
Patch #2 removes some unnecessary cache/TLB maintenance, which becomes very
costly when CpuSetMemoryAttributes() is used in anger as is the case with
memory protections enabled.
Patch #3 wires up the EFI_MEMORY_RO/EFI_MEMORY_XP attributes, which were
ignored before.
Patch #4 enables the protection features for ArmVirtPkg platforms when
built for 32-bit ARM.
Ard Biesheuvel (4):
ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid splitting page table sections unnecessarily
ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid unnecessary cache/TLB maintenance
ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes()
ArmVirtPkg: enable PE/COFF image and memory protection for ARM
platforms
ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c | 209 ++++++++++----------
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 9 +-
2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid splitting page table sections unnecessarily
2017-03-01 14:42 [PATCH 0/4] ArmPkg, ArmVirtpkg ARM: enable strict memory protection Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-03-01 14:42 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 2/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid unnecessary cache/TLB maintenance Ard Biesheuvel
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-03-01 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: edk2-devel, leif.lindholm, lersek; +Cc: Ard Biesheuvel
Currently, any range passed to CpuArchProtocol::SetMemoryAttributes is
fully broken down into page mappings if the start or the size of the
region happens to be misaliged relative to the section size of 1 MB.
This is going to hurt when we enable strict memory permissions, given
that we remap the entire RAM space non-executable (modulo the code
bits) when the CpuArchProtocol is installed.
So refactor the code to iterate over the range in a way that ensures
that all naturally aligned section sized subregions are not broken up.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
index 89e429925ba9..046620f79185 100644
--- a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
+++ b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
@@ -679,6 +679,7 @@ SetMemoryAttributes (
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT64 ChunkLength;
//
// Ignore invocations that only modify permission bits
@@ -687,14 +688,44 @@ SetMemoryAttributes (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
- if(((BaseAddress & 0xFFFFF) == 0) && ((Length & 0xFFFFF) == 0)) {
- // Is the base and length a multiple of 1 MB?
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_PAGE, "SetMemoryAttributes(): MMU section 0x%x length 0x%x to %lx\n", (UINTN)BaseAddress, (UINTN)Length, Attributes));
- Status = UpdateSectionEntries (BaseAddress, Length, Attributes, VirtualMask);
- } else {
- // Base and/or length is not a multiple of 1 MB
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_PAGE, "SetMemoryAttributes(): MMU page 0x%x length 0x%x to %lx\n", (UINTN)BaseAddress, (UINTN)Length, Attributes));
- Status = UpdatePageEntries (BaseAddress, Length, Attributes, VirtualMask);
+ while (Length > 0) {
+ if ((BaseAddress % TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE == 0) &&
+ Length >= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE) {
+
+ ChunkLength = Length - Length % TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE;
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_PAGE | DEBUG_INFO,
+ "SetMemoryAttributes(): MMU section 0x%lx length 0x%lx to %lx\n",
+ BaseAddress, ChunkLength, Attributes));
+
+ Status = UpdateSectionEntries (BaseAddress, ChunkLength, Attributes,
+ VirtualMask);
+ } else {
+
+ //
+ // Process page by page until the next section boundary, but only if
+ // we have more than a section's worth of area to deal with after that.
+ //
+ ChunkLength = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE -
+ (BaseAddress % TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE);
+ if (ChunkLength + TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE > Length) {
+ ChunkLength = Length;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_PAGE | DEBUG_INFO,
+ "SetMemoryAttributes(): MMU page 0x%lx length 0x%lx to %lx\n",
+ BaseAddress, ChunkLength, Attributes));
+
+ Status = UpdatePageEntries (BaseAddress, ChunkLength, Attributes,
+ VirtualMask);
+ }
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ BaseAddress += ChunkLength;
+ Length -= ChunkLength;
}
// Flush d-cache so descriptors make it back to uncached memory for subsequent table walks
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid unnecessary cache/TLB maintenance
2017-03-01 14:42 [PATCH 0/4] ArmPkg, ArmVirtpkg ARM: enable strict memory protection Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 1/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid splitting page table sections unnecessarily Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-03-01 14:42 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 3/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes() Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 4/4] ArmVirtPkg: enable PE/COFF image and memory protection for ARM platforms Ard Biesheuvel
3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-03-01 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: edk2-devel, leif.lindholm, lersek; +Cc: Ard Biesheuvel
Page and section entries in the page tables are updated using the
helper ArmUpdateTranslationTableEntry(), which cleans the page
table entry to the PoC, and invalidates the TLB entry covering
the page described by the entry being updated.
Since we may be updating section entries, we might be leaving stale
TLB entries at this point (for all pages in the section except the
first one), which will be invalidated wholesale at the end of
SetMemoryAttributes(). At that point, all caches are cleaned *and*
invalidated as well.
This cache maintenance is costly and unnecessary. The TLB maintenance
is only necessary if we updated any section entries, since any page
by page entries that have been updated will have been invalidated
individually by ArmUpdateTranslationTableEntry().
So drop the clean/invalidate of the caches, and only perform the
full TLB flush if UpdateSectionEntries() was called.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c | 17 +++++++----------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
index 046620f79185..fe0ddee447b0 100644
--- a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
+++ b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
@@ -680,6 +680,7 @@ SetMemoryAttributes (
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
UINT64 ChunkLength;
+ BOOLEAN FlushTlbs;
//
// Ignore invocations that only modify permission bits
@@ -688,6 +689,7 @@ SetMemoryAttributes (
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+ FlushTlbs = FALSE;
while (Length > 0) {
if ((BaseAddress % TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE == 0) &&
Length >= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE) {
@@ -700,6 +702,8 @@ SetMemoryAttributes (
Status = UpdateSectionEntries (BaseAddress, ChunkLength, Attributes,
VirtualMask);
+
+ FlushTlbs = TRUE;
} else {
//
@@ -728,16 +732,9 @@ SetMemoryAttributes (
Length -= ChunkLength;
}
- // Flush d-cache so descriptors make it back to uncached memory for subsequent table walks
- // flush and invalidate pages
- //TODO: Do we really need to invalidate the caches everytime we change the memory attributes ?
- ArmCleanInvalidateDataCache ();
-
- ArmInvalidateInstructionCache ();
-
- // Invalidate all TLB entries so changes are synced
- ArmInvalidateTlb ();
-
+ if (FlushTlbs) {
+ ArmInvalidateTlb ();
+ }
return Status;
}
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes()
2017-03-01 14:42 [PATCH 0/4] ArmPkg, ArmVirtpkg ARM: enable strict memory protection Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 1/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid splitting page table sections unnecessarily Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 2/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid unnecessary cache/TLB maintenance Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-03-01 14:42 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 4/4] ArmVirtPkg: enable PE/COFF image and memory protection for ARM platforms Ard Biesheuvel
3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-03-01 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: edk2-devel, leif.lindholm, lersek; +Cc: Ard Biesheuvel
Enable the use of strict memory permissions on ARM by processing the
EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP rather than ignoring them. As before,
calls to CpuArchProtocol::SetMemoryAttributes that only set RO/XP
bits will preserve the cacheability attributes. Permissions attributes
are not preserved when setting the memory type only: the way the memory
permission attributes are defined does not allows for that, and so this
situation does not deviate from other architectures.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c | 151 ++++++++------------
1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
index fe0ddee447b0..6322d301060e 100644
--- a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
+++ b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
@@ -373,50 +373,41 @@ UpdatePageEntries (
// EntryMask: bitmask of values to change (1 = change this value, 0 = leave alone)
// EntryValue: values at bit positions specified by EntryMask
- EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
- EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE;
+ EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_MASK | TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_MASK;
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_XP) != 0) {
+ EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE_XN;
+ } else {
+ EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE;
+ }
+
// Although the PI spec is unclear on this the GCD guarantees that only
// one Attribute bit is set at a time, so we can safely use a switch statement
- switch (Attributes) {
- case EFI_MEMORY_UC:
- // modify cacheability attributes
- EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
- // map to strongly ordered
- EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
- break;
-
- case EFI_MEMORY_WC:
- // modify cacheability attributes
- EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
- // map to normal non-cachable
- EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
- break;
-
- case EFI_MEMORY_WT:
- // modify cacheability attributes
- EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
- // write through with no-allocate
- EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
- break;
-
- case EFI_MEMORY_WB:
- // modify cacheability attributes
- EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
- // write back (with allocate)
- EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
- break;
-
- case EFI_MEMORY_WP:
- case EFI_MEMORY_XP:
- case EFI_MEMORY_UCE:
- // cannot be implemented UEFI definition unclear for ARM
- // Cause a page fault if these ranges are accessed.
- EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_FAULT;
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_PAGE, "SetMemoryAttributes(): setting page %lx with unsupported attribute %x will page fault on access\n", BaseAddress, Attributes));
- break;
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_UC) != 0) {
+ // modify cacheability attributes
+ EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
+ // map to strongly ordered
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
+ } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WC) != 0) {
+ // modify cacheability attributes
+ EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
+ // map to normal non-cachable
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
+ } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WT) != 0) {
+ // modify cacheability attributes
+ EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
+ // write through with no-allocate
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
+ } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WB) != 0) {
+ // modify cacheability attributes
+ EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
+ // write back (with allocate)
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
+ }
- default:
- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_RO) != 0) {
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_RO_RO;
+ } else {
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_RW_RW;
}
// Obtain page table base
@@ -515,53 +506,42 @@ UpdateSectionEntries (
// EntryValue: values at bit positions specified by EntryMask
// Make sure we handle a section range that is unmapped
- EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_MASK;
+ EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_MASK | TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_XN_MASK |
+ TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_MASK;
EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_SECTION;
// Although the PI spec is unclear on this the GCD guarantees that only
// one Attribute bit is set at a time, so we can safely use a switch statement
- switch(Attributes) {
- case EFI_MEMORY_UC:
- // modify cacheability attributes
- EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
- // map to strongly ordered
- EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
- break;
-
- case EFI_MEMORY_WC:
- // modify cacheability attributes
- EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
- // map to normal non-cachable
- EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
- break;
-
- case EFI_MEMORY_WT:
- // modify cacheability attributes
- EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
- // write through with no-allocate
- EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
- break;
-
- case EFI_MEMORY_WB:
- // modify cacheability attributes
- EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
- // write back (with allocate)
- EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
- break;
-
- case EFI_MEMORY_WP:
- case EFI_MEMORY_XP:
- case EFI_MEMORY_RP:
- case EFI_MEMORY_UCE:
- // cannot be implemented UEFI definition unclear for ARM
- // Cause a page fault if these ranges are accessed.
- EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_FAULT;
- DEBUG ((EFI_D_PAGE, "SetMemoryAttributes(): setting section %lx with unsupported attribute %x will page fault on access\n", BaseAddress, Attributes));
- break;
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_UC) != 0) {
+ // modify cacheability attributes
+ EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
+ // map to strongly ordered
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
+ } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WC) != 0) {
+ // modify cacheability attributes
+ EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
+ // map to normal non-cachable
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
+ } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WT) != 0) {
+ // modify cacheability attributes
+ EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
+ // write through with no-allocate
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
+ } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WB) != 0) {
+ // modify cacheability attributes
+ EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
+ // write back (with allocate)
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
+ }
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_RO) != 0) {
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_RO_RO;
+ } else {
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_RW_RW;
+ }
- default:
- return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_XP) != 0) {
+ EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_XN_MASK;
}
// obtain page table base
@@ -682,13 +662,6 @@ SetMemoryAttributes (
UINT64 ChunkLength;
BOOLEAN FlushTlbs;
- //
- // Ignore invocations that only modify permission bits
- //
- if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_CACHETYPE_MASK) == 0) {
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
- }
-
FlushTlbs = FALSE;
while (Length > 0) {
if ((BaseAddress % TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE == 0) &&
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4/4] ArmVirtPkg: enable PE/COFF image and memory protection for ARM platforms
2017-03-01 14:42 [PATCH 0/4] ArmPkg, ArmVirtpkg ARM: enable strict memory protection Ard Biesheuvel
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 3/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes() Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-03-01 14:42 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 19:05 ` Laszlo Ersek
3 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2017-03-01 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: edk2-devel, leif.lindholm, lersek; +Cc: Ard Biesheuvel
Like for AARCH64, enable PE/COFF image and NX memory protection for all
32-bit ARM virt platforms.
Note that this does not [yet] protect EfiLoaderData regions, due to
compatibility issues with GRUB.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc
index a91b27f13cf2..acfb71d3ff6c 100644
--- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc
+++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ [Defines]
DEFINE TTY_TERMINAL = FALSE
[BuildOptions.common.EDKII.DXE_DRIVER,BuildOptions.common.EDKII.UEFI_DRIVER,BuildOptions.common.EDKII.UEFI_APPLICATION]
- GCC:*_*_AARCH64_DLINK_FLAGS = -z common-page-size=0x1000
+ GCC:*_*_*_DLINK_FLAGS = -z common-page-size=0x1000
[BuildOptions.common.EDKII.DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER]
GCC:*_*_ARM_DLINK_FLAGS = -z common-page-size=0x1000
@@ -373,10 +373,6 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild.common]
gArmVirtTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTerminalTypeGuidBuffer|{0x80, 0x6d, 0x91, 0x7d, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x8c, 0x45, 0xa4, 0x8f, 0xe2, 0x5f, 0xdd, 0x51, 0xef, 0x94}
!endif
-[PcdsFixedAtBuild.ARM]
- gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPrePiCpuMemorySize|40
-
-[PcdsFixedAtBuild.AARCH64]
#
# Enable strict image permissions for all images. (This applies
# only to images that were built with >= 4 KB section alignment.)
@@ -390,6 +386,9 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild.AARCH64]
#
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy|0xC000000000007FD1
+[PcdsFixedAtBuild.ARM]
+ gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPrePiCpuMemorySize|40
+
[Components.common]
#
# Networking stack
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4/4] ArmVirtPkg: enable PE/COFF image and memory protection for ARM platforms
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 4/4] ArmVirtPkg: enable PE/COFF image and memory protection for ARM platforms Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2017-03-01 19:05 ` Laszlo Ersek
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Laszlo Ersek @ 2017-03-01 19:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel, edk2-devel, leif.lindholm
On 03/01/17 15:42, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Like for AARCH64, enable PE/COFF image and NX memory protection for all
> 32-bit ARM virt platforms.
>
> Note that this does not [yet] protect EfiLoaderData regions, due to
> compatibility issues with GRUB.
>
> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc | 9 ++++-----
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc
> index a91b27f13cf2..acfb71d3ff6c 100644
> --- a/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc
> +++ b/ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirt.dsc.inc
> @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ [Defines]
> DEFINE TTY_TERMINAL = FALSE
>
> [BuildOptions.common.EDKII.DXE_DRIVER,BuildOptions.common.EDKII.UEFI_DRIVER,BuildOptions.common.EDKII.UEFI_APPLICATION]
> - GCC:*_*_AARCH64_DLINK_FLAGS = -z common-page-size=0x1000
> + GCC:*_*_*_DLINK_FLAGS = -z common-page-size=0x1000
>
> [BuildOptions.common.EDKII.DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER]
> GCC:*_*_ARM_DLINK_FLAGS = -z common-page-size=0x1000
> @@ -373,10 +373,6 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild.common]
> gArmVirtTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTerminalTypeGuidBuffer|{0x80, 0x6d, 0x91, 0x7d, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x8c, 0x45, 0xa4, 0x8f, 0xe2, 0x5f, 0xdd, 0x51, 0xef, 0x94}
> !endif
>
> -[PcdsFixedAtBuild.ARM]
> - gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPrePiCpuMemorySize|40
> -
> -[PcdsFixedAtBuild.AARCH64]
> #
> # Enable strict image permissions for all images. (This applies
> # only to images that were built with >= 4 KB section alignment.)
> @@ -390,6 +386,9 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild.AARCH64]
> #
> gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy|0xC000000000007FD1
>
> +[PcdsFixedAtBuild.ARM]
> + gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPrePiCpuMemorySize|40
> +
> [Components.common]
> #
> # Networking stack
>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-03-01 19:05 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2017-03-01 14:42 [PATCH 0/4] ArmPkg, ArmVirtpkg ARM: enable strict memory protection Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 1/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid splitting page table sections unnecessarily Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 2/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid unnecessary cache/TLB maintenance Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 3/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes() Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 14:42 ` [PATCH 4/4] ArmVirtPkg: enable PE/COFF image and memory protection for ARM platforms Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-01 19:05 ` Laszlo Ersek
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