From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>,
devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, erdemaktas@google.com, jiewen.yao@intel.com,
min.m.xu@intel.com, jordan.l.justen@intel.com,
ard.biesheuvel@arm.com,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] SEV Live Migration support for OVMF.
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 12:45:15 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1bb32459-a44d-290a-c257-30c6c07d8d71@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <dffa37d8-9139-4d55-18c1-e88bc081def4@redhat.com>
Hi Ashish,
I have queue'd to review this series for later part of the week.
Just curious, did you run CI on this series ? A quick glance hints that this
series may fail to build on some platforms and additionally have formatting
error.
P.S: If you don't know how to use EDK2 CI then buzz me off-list.
thanks
On 6/22/2021 12:20 PM, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> Hi Ashish,
>
> (+Dave, +Paolo)
>
> On 06/21/21 15:56, Ashish Kalra wrote:
>> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>>
>> By default all the SEV guest memory regions are considered encrypted,
>> if a guest changes the encryption attribute of the page (e.g mark a
>> page as decrypted) then notify hypervisor. Hypervisor will need to
>> track the unencrypted pages. The information will be used during
>> guest live migration, guest page migration and guest debugging.
>>
>> The patch-set adds a new SEV and SEV-ES hypercall abstraction
>> library to support SEV Page encryption/decryption status hypercalls
>> for SEV and SEV-ES guests.
>>
>> BaseMemEncryptSevLib invokes hypercalls via this new hypercall library.
>>
>> The patch-set detects if it is running under KVM hypervisor and then
>> checks for SEV live migration feature support via KVM_FEATURE_CPUID,
>> if detected setup a new UEFI enviroment variable to indicate OVMF
>> support for SEV live migration.
>>
>> A branch containing these patches is available here:
>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fashkalra%2Fedk2%2Ftree%2Fsev_live_migration_v4&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cb6f0cd9ca0cb4203327908d935a21cb3%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792656890122%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=zwiAg6jzSPYtUA8UARYE6K39Q3VCJkhm9Ey00aGYC10%3D&reserved=0
>>
>> Changes since v3:
>> - Fix all DSC files under OvmfPkg except X64 to add support for
>> BaseMemEncryptLib and add NULL instance of BaseMemEncryptLib
>> for 32 bit platforms.
>> - Add the MemEncryptHypercallLib-related files to Maintainers.txt,
>> in section "OvmfPkg: Confidential Computing".
>> - Add support for the new KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall interface.
>> - Add patch for SEV live migration support.
>
> I have absolutely zero context in my mind about this work.
>
> By v1 / v2 / v3, are you referring to the following patch series (from December 2020):
>
> - [PATCH v1 0/2] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flistman.redhat.com%2Farchives%2Fedk2-devel-archive%2F2020-December%2Fmsg00081.html&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cb6f0cd9ca0cb4203327908d935a21cb3%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792656890122%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=QkZUdYyeWREfXyx2%2B32chbp7dMzEVfBb78dEsecduFw%3D&reserved=0
>
> - [PATCH v2 0/3] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flistman.redhat.com%2Farchives%2Fedk2-devel-archive%2F2020-December%2Fmsg00198.html&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cb6f0cd9ca0cb4203327908d935a21cb3%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792656900118%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=TH%2BbYo%2B2CZyOunhIpegEjqQkdXlBuZsiyWz1k%2BGXtQc%3D&reserved=0
>
> - [PATCH v3 0/3] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flistman.redhat.com%2Farchives%2Fedk2-devel-archive%2F2020-December%2Fmsg00202.html&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Cb6f0cd9ca0cb4203327908d935a21cb3%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792656900118%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=css90wZ%2BFgbYm%2FQjvCLIFZwwozZz3dfzaVPDpsQsCsk%3D&reserved=0
>
> We certainly need a new TianoCore BZ for tracking this feature; I only found the above patch set versions because I have full text search for my complete email traffic on my laptop. Sending v4 after half a year hiatus is like sending it in the next century. :)
>
> Anyway, where I'm particularly lost is that I (very vaguely) recall conflicting approaches from AMD and IBM on migration. Has an agreement been reached there?
>
> I certainly apologize for missing the context here; had someone asked me if I had seen any version of this patch set before, I would have *sworn* that I hadn't.
>
> I'm basically incapable of tracking this volume of development around confidential computing; sorry.
>
> Laszlo
>
>>
>> Changes since v2:
>> - GHCB_BASE setup during reset-vector as decrypted is marked explicitly
>> in the hypervisor page encryption bitmap after setting the
>> PcdSevEsIsEnabled PCD.
>>
>> Changes since v1:
>> - Mark GHCB_BASE setup during reset-vector as decrypted explicitly in
>> the hypervisor page encryption bitmap.
>> - Resending the series with correct shallow threading.
>>
>> Ashish Kalra (3):
>> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptHypercallLib: add library to support SEV hypercalls.
>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Mark SEC GHCB page as unencrypted via hypercall
>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe: Add support for SEV live migration.
>>
>> Brijesh Singh (1):
>> OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptLib: Support to issue unencrypted hypercall
>>
>> Maintainers.txt | 2 +
>> OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/MemEncryptLib.h | 20 ++++
>> .../Include/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib.h | 43 +++++++
>> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 1 +
>> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 1 +
>> .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 22 ++++
>> .../Ia32/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c | 37 ++++++
>> .../MemEncryptHypercallLib.inf | 42 +++++++
>> .../X64/AsmHelperStub.nasm | 28 +++++
>> .../X64/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++
>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 1 +
>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 +
>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 1 +
>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 1 +
>> OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 1 +
>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/AmdSev.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++
>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.c | 5 +
>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf | 2 +
>> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/PlatformConfig.h | 5 +
>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 10 ++
>> 20 files changed, 436 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/MemEncryptLib.h
>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib.h
>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/Ia32/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c
>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/MemEncryptHypercallLib.inf
>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/X64/AsmHelperStub.nasm
>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/X64/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c
>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/AmdSev.c
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-22 17:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-21 13:56 [PATCH v4 0/4] SEV Live Migration support for OVMF Ashish Kalra
2021-06-21 13:56 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptHypercallLib: add library to support SEV hypercalls Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 19:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-22 19:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-22 22:47 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-22 23:20 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 23:38 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-23 1:47 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-23 15:02 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-21 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptLib: Support to issue unencrypted hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 22:50 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-21 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Mark SEC GHCB page as unencrypted via hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 20:35 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-21 13:57 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe: Add support for SEV live migration Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 23:06 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-06-24 16:29 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-22 17:20 ` [PATCH v4 0/4] SEV Live Migration support for OVMF Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-22 17:45 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-06-22 17:46 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-23 13:18 ` [edk2-devel] " Dov Murik
2021-06-23 16:42 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-23 16:49 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-06-23 17:03 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-30 9:11 ` Ashish Kalra
2021-06-30 16:25 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
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