public inbox for devel@edk2.groups.io
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: edk2-devel@lists.01.org, lersek@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes()
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2017 14:48:34 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170306144834.GV16034@bivouac.eciton.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1488450976-16257-4-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:36:15AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Enable the use of strict memory permissions on ARM by processing the
> EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP rather than ignoring them. As before,
> calls to CpuArchProtocol::SetMemoryAttributes that only set RO/XP
> bits will preserve the cacheability attributes. Permissions attributes
> are not preserved when setting the memory type only: the way the memory
> permission attributes are defined does not allows for that, and so this
> situation does not deviate from other architectures.
> 
> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
>  ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c | 151 ++++++++------------
>  1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
> index 26b637e7658f..6dd749dadf8b 100644
> --- a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
> +++ b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
> @@ -374,50 +374,41 @@ UpdatePageEntries (
>  
>    // EntryMask: bitmask of values to change (1 = change this value, 0 = leave alone)
>    // EntryValue: values at bit positions specified by EntryMask
> -  EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
> -  EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE;
> +  EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_MASK | TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_MASK;
> +  if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_XP) != 0) {
> +    EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE_XN;
> +  } else {
> +    EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE;
> +  }
> +
>    // Although the PI spec is unclear on this the GCD guarantees that only
>    // one Attribute bit is set at a time, so we can safely use a switch statement

But the switch statement is going away.

The change effectively introduces a guaranteed priority of
interpretation if the spec is violated. Say something about this order
being arbitrarily decided due to PI spce guarantee instead?

> -  switch (Attributes) {
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_UC:
> -      // modify cacheability attributes
> -      EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> -      // map to strongly ordered
> -      EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
> -      break;
> -
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_WC:
> -      // modify cacheability attributes
> -      EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> -      // map to normal non-cachable
> -      EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
> -      break;
> -
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_WT:
> -      // modify cacheability attributes
> -      EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> -      // write through with no-allocate
> -      EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
> -      break;
> -
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_WB:
> -      // modify cacheability attributes
> -      EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> -      // write back (with allocate)
> -      EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
> -      break;
> -
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_WP:
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_XP:
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_UCE:
> -      // cannot be implemented UEFI definition unclear for ARM
> -      // Cause a page fault if these ranges are accessed.
> -      EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_FAULT;
> -      DEBUG ((EFI_D_PAGE, "SetMemoryAttributes(): setting page %lx with unsupported attribute %x will page fault on access\n", BaseAddress, Attributes));
> -      break;
> +  if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_UC) != 0) {

Or should these be "Attributes & Mask" == "ATTRIBUTE"?

> +    // modify cacheability attributes
> +    EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> +    // map to strongly ordered
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
> +  } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WC) != 0) {
> +    // modify cacheability attributes
> +    EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> +    // map to normal non-cachable
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
> +  } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WT) != 0) {
> +    // modify cacheability attributes
> +    EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> +    // write through with no-allocate
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
> +  } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WB) != 0) {
> +    // modify cacheability attributes
> +    EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> +    // write back (with allocate)
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
> +  }
>  
> -    default:
> -      return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;

Do we not want a fallback handling for the if-form as well?

> +  if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_RO) != 0) {
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_RO_RO;
> +  } else {
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_RW_RW;
>    }
>  
>    // Obtain page table base
> @@ -520,53 +511,42 @@ UpdateSectionEntries (
>    // EntryValue: values at bit positions specified by EntryMask
>  
>    // Make sure we handle a section range that is unmapped
> -  EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_MASK;
> +  EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_MASK | TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_XN_MASK |
> +              TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_MASK;
>    EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_SECTION;
>  
>    // Although the PI spec is unclear on this the GCD guarantees that only
>    // one Attribute bit is set at a time, so we can safely use a switch statement

Repeat of above.

> -  switch(Attributes) {
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_UC:
> -      // modify cacheability attributes
> -      EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> -      // map to strongly ordered
> -      EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
> -      break;
> -
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_WC:
> -      // modify cacheability attributes
> -      EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> -      // map to normal non-cachable
> -      EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
> -      break;
> -
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_WT:
> -      // modify cacheability attributes
> -      EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> -      // write through with no-allocate
> -      EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
> -      break;
> -
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_WB:
> -      // modify cacheability attributes
> -      EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> -      // write back (with allocate)
> -      EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
> -      break;
> -
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_WP:
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_XP:
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_RP:
> -    case EFI_MEMORY_UCE:
> -      // cannot be implemented UEFI definition unclear for ARM
> -      // Cause a page fault if these ranges are accessed.
> -      EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_FAULT;
> -      DEBUG ((EFI_D_PAGE, "SetMemoryAttributes(): setting section %lx with unsupported attribute %x will page fault on access\n", BaseAddress, Attributes));
> -      break;
> +  if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_UC) != 0) {
> +    // modify cacheability attributes
> +    EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> +    // map to strongly ordered
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
> +  } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WC) != 0) {
> +    // modify cacheability attributes
> +    EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> +    // map to normal non-cachable
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
> +  } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WT) != 0) {
> +    // modify cacheability attributes
> +    EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> +    // write through with no-allocate
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
> +  } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WB) != 0) {
> +    // modify cacheability attributes
> +    EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> +    // write back (with allocate)
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
> +  }

(Again, same questions as above.)

>  
> +  if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_RO) != 0) {
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_RO_RO;
> +  } else {
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_RW_RW;
> +  }
>  
> -    default:
> -      return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
> +  if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_XP) != 0) {
> +    EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_XN_MASK;
>    }
>  
>    // obtain page table base
> @@ -693,13 +673,6 @@ SetMemoryAttributes (
>    UINT64        ChunkLength;
>    BOOLEAN       FlushTlbs;
>  
> -  //
> -  // Ignore invocations that only modify permission bits
> -  //
> -  if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_CACHETYPE_MASK) == 0) {
> -    return EFI_SUCCESS;
> -  }
> -
>    FlushTlbs = FALSE;
>    while (Length > 0) {
>      if ((BaseAddress % TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE == 0) &&
> -- 
> 2.7.4
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-06 14:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-02 10:36 [PATCH v2 0/4] ArmPkg, ArmVirtpkg ARM: enable strict memory protection Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid splitting page table sections unnecessarily Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 14:12   ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-06 14:55     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 16:24       ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid unnecessary cache/TLB maintenance Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 14:27   ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-06 15:06     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes() Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 14:48   ` Leif Lindholm [this message]
2017-03-06 15:11     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 16:40       ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] ArmVirtPkg: enable PE/COFF image and memory protection for ARM platforms Ard Biesheuvel

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-list from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170306144834.GV16034@bivouac.eciton.net \
    --to=devel@edk2.groups.io \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox