From: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: edk2-devel@lists.01.org, lersek@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes()
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2017 14:48:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170306144834.GV16034@bivouac.eciton.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1488450976-16257-4-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:36:15AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Enable the use of strict memory permissions on ARM by processing the
> EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP rather than ignoring them. As before,
> calls to CpuArchProtocol::SetMemoryAttributes that only set RO/XP
> bits will preserve the cacheability attributes. Permissions attributes
> are not preserved when setting the memory type only: the way the memory
> permission attributes are defined does not allows for that, and so this
> situation does not deviate from other architectures.
>
> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
> ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c | 151 ++++++++------------
> 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
> index 26b637e7658f..6dd749dadf8b 100644
> --- a/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
> +++ b/ArmPkg/Drivers/CpuDxe/Arm/Mmu.c
> @@ -374,50 +374,41 @@ UpdatePageEntries (
>
> // EntryMask: bitmask of values to change (1 = change this value, 0 = leave alone)
> // EntryValue: values at bit positions specified by EntryMask
> - EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
> - EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE;
> + EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_MASK | TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_MASK;
> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_XP) != 0) {
> + EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE_XN;
> + } else {
> + EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_PAGE;
> + }
> +
> // Although the PI spec is unclear on this the GCD guarantees that only
> // one Attribute bit is set at a time, so we can safely use a switch statement
But the switch statement is going away.
The change effectively introduces a guaranteed priority of
interpretation if the spec is violated. Say something about this order
being arbitrarily decided due to PI spce guarantee instead?
> - switch (Attributes) {
> - case EFI_MEMORY_UC:
> - // modify cacheability attributes
> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> - // map to strongly ordered
> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
> - break;
> -
> - case EFI_MEMORY_WC:
> - // modify cacheability attributes
> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> - // map to normal non-cachable
> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
> - break;
> -
> - case EFI_MEMORY_WT:
> - // modify cacheability attributes
> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> - // write through with no-allocate
> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
> - break;
> -
> - case EFI_MEMORY_WB:
> - // modify cacheability attributes
> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> - // write back (with allocate)
> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
> - break;
> -
> - case EFI_MEMORY_WP:
> - case EFI_MEMORY_XP:
> - case EFI_MEMORY_UCE:
> - // cannot be implemented UEFI definition unclear for ARM
> - // Cause a page fault if these ranges are accessed.
> - EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_TYPE_FAULT;
> - DEBUG ((EFI_D_PAGE, "SetMemoryAttributes(): setting page %lx with unsupported attribute %x will page fault on access\n", BaseAddress, Attributes));
> - break;
> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_UC) != 0) {
Or should these be "Attributes & Mask" == "ATTRIBUTE"?
> + // modify cacheability attributes
> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> + // map to strongly ordered
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WC) != 0) {
> + // modify cacheability attributes
> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> + // map to normal non-cachable
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WT) != 0) {
> + // modify cacheability attributes
> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> + // write through with no-allocate
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WB) != 0) {
> + // modify cacheability attributes
> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> + // write back (with allocate)
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
> + }
>
> - default:
> - return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
Do we not want a fallback handling for the if-form as well?
> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_RO) != 0) {
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_RO_RO;
> + } else {
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_PAGE_AP_RW_RW;
> }
>
> // Obtain page table base
> @@ -520,53 +511,42 @@ UpdateSectionEntries (
> // EntryValue: values at bit positions specified by EntryMask
>
> // Make sure we handle a section range that is unmapped
> - EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_MASK;
> + EntryMask = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_MASK | TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_XN_MASK |
> + TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_MASK;
> EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_SECTION;
>
> // Although the PI spec is unclear on this the GCD guarantees that only
> // one Attribute bit is set at a time, so we can safely use a switch statement
Repeat of above.
> - switch(Attributes) {
> - case EFI_MEMORY_UC:
> - // modify cacheability attributes
> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> - // map to strongly ordered
> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
> - break;
> -
> - case EFI_MEMORY_WC:
> - // modify cacheability attributes
> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> - // map to normal non-cachable
> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
> - break;
> -
> - case EFI_MEMORY_WT:
> - // modify cacheability attributes
> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> - // write through with no-allocate
> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
> - break;
> -
> - case EFI_MEMORY_WB:
> - // modify cacheability attributes
> - EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> - // write back (with allocate)
> - EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
> - break;
> -
> - case EFI_MEMORY_WP:
> - case EFI_MEMORY_XP:
> - case EFI_MEMORY_RP:
> - case EFI_MEMORY_UCE:
> - // cannot be implemented UEFI definition unclear for ARM
> - // Cause a page fault if these ranges are accessed.
> - EntryValue = TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_TYPE_FAULT;
> - DEBUG ((EFI_D_PAGE, "SetMemoryAttributes(): setting section %lx with unsupported attribute %x will page fault on access\n", BaseAddress, Attributes));
> - break;
> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_UC) != 0) {
> + // modify cacheability attributes
> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> + // map to strongly ordered
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_STRONGLY_ORDERED; // TEX[2:0] = 0, C=0, B=0
> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WC) != 0) {
> + // modify cacheability attributes
> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> + // map to normal non-cachable
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_NON_CACHEABLE; // TEX [2:0]= 001 = 0x2, B=0, C=0
> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WT) != 0) {
> + // modify cacheability attributes
> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> + // write through with no-allocate
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_THROUGH_NO_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 0, C=1, B=0
> + } else if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_WB) != 0) {
> + // modify cacheability attributes
> + EntryMask |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_MASK;
> + // write back (with allocate)
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_CACHE_POLICY_WRITE_BACK_ALLOC; // TEX [2:0] = 001, C=1, B=1
> + }
(Again, same questions as above.)
>
> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_RO) != 0) {
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_RO_RO;
> + } else {
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_AP_RW_RW;
> + }
>
> - default:
> - return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
> + if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_XP) != 0) {
> + EntryValue |= TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_XN_MASK;
> }
>
> // obtain page table base
> @@ -693,13 +673,6 @@ SetMemoryAttributes (
> UINT64 ChunkLength;
> BOOLEAN FlushTlbs;
>
> - //
> - // Ignore invocations that only modify permission bits
> - //
> - if ((Attributes & EFI_MEMORY_CACHETYPE_MASK) == 0) {
> - return EFI_SUCCESS;
> - }
> -
> FlushTlbs = FALSE;
> while (Length > 0) {
> if ((BaseAddress % TT_DESCRIPTOR_SECTION_SIZE == 0) &&
> --
> 2.7.4
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-06 14:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-02 10:36 [PATCH v2 0/4] ArmPkg, ArmVirtpkg ARM: enable strict memory protection Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid splitting page table sections unnecessarily Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 14:12 ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-06 14:55 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 16:24 ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: avoid unnecessary cache/TLB maintenance Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 14:27 ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-06 15:06 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] ArmPkg/CpuDxe ARM: honour RO/XP attributes in SetMemoryAttributes() Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 14:48 ` Leif Lindholm [this message]
2017-03-06 15:11 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-03-06 16:40 ` Leif Lindholm
2017-03-02 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] ArmVirtPkg: enable PE/COFF image and memory protection for ARM platforms Ard Biesheuvel
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