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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: edk2-devel@lists.01.org
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] SecurityPkg: make PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy dynamic
Date: Thu,  5 Oct 2017 13:48:47 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171005184848.94432-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)

By default the image verification policy for option ROM images is 0x4
(DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) but the following OvmfPkg commit:

1fea9ddb4e3f OvmfPkg: execute option ROM images regardless of Secure Boot

set it to 0x0 (ALWAYS_EXECUTE). This is fine because typically option
ROMs comes from host-side and most of the time cloud provider (i.e
hypervisor) have full access over a guest anyway. But when secure boot
is enabled, we would like to deny the execution of option ROM when
SEV is active. Having a dynamic Pcd will give us flexibility to set the
security policy at the runtime.

Fixes: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=728
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 24 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
index 01bff01ed50a..4e32d172d7d9 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
@@ -230,18 +230,6 @@
 #
 
 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]
-  ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
-  #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
-  #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>
-  #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>
-  #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
-  #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
-  #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
-  #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
-  # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.
-  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
-  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001
-
   ## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.
   #  Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
   #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
@@ -304,6 +292,18 @@
   gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007
 
 [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
+  ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
+  #  NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
+  #  0x00000000      Always trust the image.<BR>
+  #  0x00000001      Never trust the image.<BR>
+  #  0x00000002      Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+  #  0x00000003      Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+  #  0x00000004      Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+  #  0x00000005      Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
+  # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.
+  # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
+  gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001
+
   ## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.
   #  If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands 
   #  that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>
-- 
2.9.5



             reply	other threads:[~2017-10-05 18:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-05 18:48 Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-10-05 18:48 ` [PATCH 2/2] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-05 19:46   ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-10-05 19:52     ` Brijesh Singh

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