From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: edk2-devel@lists.01.org
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] SecurityPkg: make PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy dynamic
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 13:48:47 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171005184848.94432-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
By default the image verification policy for option ROM images is 0x4
(DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) but the following OvmfPkg commit:
1fea9ddb4e3f OvmfPkg: execute option ROM images regardless of Secure Boot
set it to 0x0 (ALWAYS_EXECUTE). This is fine because typically option
ROMs comes from host-side and most of the time cloud provider (i.e
hypervisor) have full access over a guest anyway. But when secure boot
is enabled, we would like to deny the execution of option ROM when
SEV is active. Having a dynamic Pcd will give us flexibility to set the
security policy at the runtime.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=728
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec | 24 ++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
index 01bff01ed50a..4e32d172d7d9 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
+++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
@@ -230,18 +230,6 @@
#
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule]
- ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
- # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
- # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>
- # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>
- # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
- # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
- # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
- # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
- # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.
- # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
- gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001
-
## Image verification policy for removable media which includes CD-ROM, Floppy, USB and network.
# Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
# NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
@@ -304,6 +292,18 @@
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice|0x010D0000|UINT32|0x00000007
[PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
+ ## Image verification policy for OptionRom. Only following values are valid:<BR><BR>
+ # NOTE: Do NOT use 0x5 and 0x2 since it violates the UEFI specification and has been removed.<BR>
+ # 0x00000000 Always trust the image.<BR>
+ # 0x00000001 Never trust the image.<BR>
+ # 0x00000002 Allow execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000003 Defer execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000004 Deny execution when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # 0x00000005 Query user when there is security violation.<BR>
+ # @Prompt Set policy for the image from OptionRom.
+ # @ValidRange 0x80000001 | 0x00000000 - 0x00000005
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x04|UINT32|0x00000001
+
## Indicates the presence or absence of the platform operator during firmware booting.
# If platform operator is not physical presence during boot. TPM will be locked and the TPM commands
# that required operator physical presence can not run.<BR><BR>
--
2.9.5
next reply other threads:[~2017-10-05 18:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-05 18:48 Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-10-05 18:48 ` [PATCH 2/2] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-10-05 19:46 ` Laszlo Ersek
2017-10-05 19:52 ` Brijesh Singh
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