From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=66.187.233.73; helo=mx1.redhat.com; envelope-from=lersek@redhat.com; receiver=edk2-devel@lists.01.org Received: from mx1.redhat.com (mx3-rdu2.redhat.com [66.187.233.73]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9C9DB2255D6EB for ; Thu, 1 Mar 2018 15:58:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F29368182D2E; Fri, 2 Mar 2018 00:04:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lacos-laptop-7.usersys.redhat.com (ovpn-120-4.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.120.4]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1860B10B0F24; Fri, 2 Mar 2018 00:04:36 +0000 (UTC) From: Laszlo Ersek To: edk2-devel-01 Cc: Ard Biesheuvel , Brijesh Singh , Jordan Justen Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 01:04:08 +0100 Message-Id: <20180302000408.14201-21-lersek@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20180302000408.14201-1-lersek@redhat.com> References: <20180302000408.14201-1-lersek@redhat.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.78 on 10.11.54.3 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.8]); Fri, 02 Mar 2018 00:04:38 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: inspected by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.11.55.8]); Fri, 02 Mar 2018 00:04:38 +0000 (UTC) for IP:'10.11.54.3' DOMAIN:'int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com' HELO:'smtp.corp.redhat.com' FROM:'lersek@redhat.com' RCPT:'' Subject: [PATCH 20/20] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: decrypt the pages of the initial SMRAM save state map X-BeenThere: edk2-devel@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: EDK II Development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2018 23:58:30 -0000 Based on the following patch from Brijesh Singh : [PATCH v2 1/2] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Clear the C-bit from SMM Saved State http://mid.mail-archive.com/20180228161415.28723-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2018-February/022016.html Original commit message from Brijesh: > When OVMF is built with SMM, SMMSaved State area (SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE + > SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP_OFFSET) contains data which need to be accessed by > both guest and hypervisor. Since the data need to be accessed by both > hence we must map the SMMSaved State area as unencrypted (i.e C-bit > cleared). > > This patch clears the SavedStateArea address before SMBASE relocation. > Currently, we do not clear the SavedStateArea address after SMBASE is > relocated due to the following reasons: > > 1) Guest BIOS never access the relocated SavedStateArea. > > 2) The C-bit works on page-aligned address, but the SavedStateArea > address is not a page-aligned. Theoretically, we could roundup the > address and clear the C-bit of aligned address but looking carefully we > found that some portion of the page contains code -- which will causes a > bigger issue for the SEV guest. When SEV is enabled, all the code must > be encrypted otherwise hardware will cause trap. Changes by Laszlo: - separate AmdSevDxe bits from SmmCpuFeaturesLib bits; - spell out PcdLib dependency with #include and in LibraryClasses; - replace (SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE + SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP_OFFSET) calculation with call to new MemEncryptSevLocateInitialSmramSaveStateMapPages() function; - consequently, pass page-aligned BaseAddress to MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask(); - zero the pages before clearing the C-bit; - pass Flush=TRUE to MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask(); - harden the treatment of MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask() failure. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Brijesh Singh Cc: Jordan Justen Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek --- OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf | 6 +++ OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+) diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf index 3aff7e292053..b7e7da002d5e 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf @@ -15,28 +15,34 @@ # #**/ [Defines] INF_VERSION = 1.25 BASE_NAME = AmdSevDxe FILE_GUID = 2ec9da37-ee35-4de9-86c5-6d9a81dc38a7 MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER VERSION_STRING = 1.0 ENTRY_POINT = AmdSevDxeEntryPoint [Sources] AmdSevDxe.c [Packages] MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec MdePkg/MdePkg.dec OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec [LibraryClasses] + BaseLib + BaseMemoryLib DebugLib DxeServicesTableLib MemEncryptSevLib MemoryAllocationLib + PcdLib UefiDriverEntryPoint [Depex] TRUE + +[FeaturePcd] + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmmSmramRequire diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c index 8f02d0627e02..c697580ad5b8 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c @@ -1,42 +1,45 @@ /** @file AMD Sev Dxe driver. This driver is dispatched early in DXE, due to being list in APRIORI. It clears C-bit from MMIO and NonExistent Memory space when SEV is enabled. Copyright (c) 2017, AMD Inc. All rights reserved.
This program and the accompanying materials are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. **/ +#include +#include #include #include #include #include +#include EFI_STATUS EFIAPI AmdSevDxeEntryPoint ( IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable ) { EFI_STATUS Status; EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *AllDescMap; UINTN NumEntries; UINTN Index; // // Do nothing when SEV is not enabled // if (!MemEncryptSevIsEnabled ()) { return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; } @@ -51,22 +54,72 @@ AmdSevDxeEntryPoint ( if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { for (Index = 0; Index < NumEntries; Index++) { CONST EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *Desc; Desc = &AllDescMap[Index]; if (Desc->GcdMemoryType == EfiGcdMemoryTypeMemoryMappedIo || Desc->GcdMemoryType == EfiGcdMemoryTypeNonExistent) { Status = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask ( 0, Desc->BaseAddress, EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (Desc->Length), FALSE ); ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); } } FreePool (AllDescMap); } + // + // When SMM is enabled, clear the C-bit from SMM Saved State Area + // + // NOTES: The SavedStateArea address cleared here is before SMBASE + // relocation. Currently, we do not clear the SavedStateArea address after + // SMBASE is relocated due to the following reasons: + // + // 1) Guest BIOS never access the relocated SavedStateArea. + // + // 2) The C-bit works on page-aligned address, but the SavedStateArea + // address is not a page-aligned. Theoretically, we could roundup the address + // and clear the C-bit of aligned address but looking carefully we found + // that some portion of the page contains code -- which will causes a bigger + // issues for SEV guest. When SEV is enabled, all the code must be encrypted + // otherwise hardware will cause trap. + // + // We restore the C-bit for this SMM Saved State Area after SMBASE relocation + // is completed (See OvmfPkg/Library/SmmCpuFeaturesLib/SmmCpuFeaturesLib.c). + // + if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdSmmSmramRequire)) { + UINTN MapPagesBase; + UINTN MapPagesCount; + + Status = MemEncryptSevLocateInitialSmramSaveStateMapPages ( + &MapPagesBase, + &MapPagesCount + ); + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + + // + // Although these pages were set aside (i.e., allocated) by PlatformPei, we + // could be after a warm reboot from the OS. Don't leak any stale OS data + // to the hypervisor. + // + ZeroMem ((VOID *)MapPagesBase, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (MapPagesCount)); + + Status = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask ( + 0, // Cr3BaseAddress -- use current CR3 + MapPagesBase, // BaseAddress + MapPagesCount, // NumPages + TRUE // Flush + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask(): %r\n", + __FUNCTION__, Status)); + ASSERT (FALSE); + CpuDeadLoop (); + } + } + return EFI_SUCCESS; } -- 2.14.1.3.gb7cf6e02401b