From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=192.55.52.136; helo=mga12.intel.com; envelope-from=hao.a.wu@intel.com; receiver=edk2-devel@lists.01.org Received: from mga12.intel.com (mga12.intel.com [192.55.52.136]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C0F472257C2DD for ; Tue, 6 Mar 2018 04:05:15 -0800 (PST) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 06 Mar 2018 04:11:29 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.47,431,1515484800"; d="scan'208";a="39601320" Received: from shwdeopenpsi014.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.239.9.10]) by orsmga002.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 06 Mar 2018 04:11:28 -0800 From: Hao Wu To: edk2-devel@lists.01.org Cc: Hao Wu , Jian J Wang , Star Zeng , Eric Dong , Jiewen Yao , Ruiyu Ni Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 20:11:22 +0800 Message-Id: <20180306121122.4704-3-hao.a.wu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.12.0.windows.1 In-Reply-To: <20180306121122.4704-1-hao.a.wu@intel.com> References: <20180306121122.4704-1-hao.a.wu@intel.com> Subject: [PATCH 2/2] MdeModulePkg/Core: Fix feature conflict between NX and Stack guard X-BeenThere: edk2-devel@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: EDK II Development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 06 Mar 2018 12:05:16 -0000 If enabled, NX memory protection feature will mark some types of active memory as NX (non-executable), which includes the first page of the stack. This will overwrite the attributes of the first page of the stack if the stack guard feature is also enabled. The solution is to override the attributes setting to the first page of the stack by adding back the 'EFI_MEMORY_RP' attribute when the stack guard feature is enabled. Cc: Jian J Wang Cc: Star Zeng Cc: Eric Dong Cc: Jiewen Yao Cc: Ruiyu Ni Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Hao Wu --- MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf | 4 +- MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf b/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf index 7334780326..d2e7360ed4 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # # It provides an implementation of DXE Core that is compliant with DXE CIS. # -# Copyright (c) 2006 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+# Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
# This program and the accompanying materials # are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License # which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ gEfiPropertiesTableGuid ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## SystemTable gEfiMemoryAttributesTableGuid ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## SystemTable gEfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Event + gEfiHobMemoryAllocStackGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## SystemTable [Ppis] gEfiVectorHandoffInfoPpiGuid ## UNDEFINED # HOB @@ -198,6 +199,7 @@ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHeapGuardPageType ## CONSUMES gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHeapGuardPoolType ## CONSUMES gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdHeapGuardPropertyMask ## CONSUMES + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuStackGuard ## CONSUMES # [Hob] # RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR ## CONSUMES diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c b/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c index a2ea445eef..a6de22d3af 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Misc/MemoryProtection.c @@ -801,6 +801,11 @@ InitializeDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy ( UINT64 Attributes; LIST_ENTRY *Link; EFI_GCD_MAP_ENTRY *Entry; + VOID *HobList; + EFI_PEI_HOB_POINTERS Hob; + EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION *MemoryHob; + EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS StackBase; + BOOLEAN StackBaseFound; // // Get the EFI memory map. @@ -832,6 +837,45 @@ InitializeDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy ( } while (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); + StackBase = 0; + StackBaseFound = FALSE; + if (PcdGetBool (PcdCpuStackGuard)) { + // + // Get the base of stack from Hob. + // + Status = EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiHobListGuid, &HobList); + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + for (Hob.Raw = HobList; !END_OF_HOB_LIST (Hob); Hob.Raw = GET_NEXT_HOB (Hob)) { + if (GET_HOB_TYPE(Hob) == EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION) { + MemoryHob = Hob.MemoryAllocation; + if (CompareGuid(&gEfiHobMemoryAllocStackGuid, &MemoryHob->AllocDescriptor.Name)) { + DEBUG (( + DEBUG_INFO, + "%a: StackBase = 0x%016lx StackSize = 0x%016lx\n", + __FUNCTION__, + MemoryHob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress, + MemoryHob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryLength + )); + + StackBase = MemoryHob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress; + // + // Ensure the base of the stack is page-size aligned. + // + ASSERT ((StackBase & EFI_PAGE_MASK) == 0); + StackBaseFound = TRUE; + break; + } + } + } + } + + // + // Ensure the base of stack can be found from Hob when stack guard is + // enabled. + // + ASSERT (StackBaseFound); + } + DEBUG (( DEBUG_INFO, "%a: applying strict permissions to active memory regions\n", @@ -864,6 +908,23 @@ InitializeDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy ( EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (1), EFI_MEMORY_RP | Attributes); } + + if (StackBaseFound && + (StackBase >= MemoryMapEntry->PhysicalStart && + StackBase < MemoryMapEntry->PhysicalStart + + LShiftU64 (MemoryMapEntry->NumberOfPages, EFI_PAGE_SHIFT)) && + PcdGetBool (PcdCpuStackGuard)) { + + // + // Add EFI_MEMORY_RP attribute for the first page of the stack if stack + // guard is enabled. + // + SetUefiImageMemoryAttributes ( + StackBase, + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (1), + EFI_MEMORY_RP | Attributes); + } + } MemoryMapEntry = NEXT_MEMORY_DESCRIPTOR (MemoryMapEntry, DescriptorSize); } -- 2.12.0.windows.1