From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=134.134.136.24; helo=mga09.intel.com; envelope-from=jian.j.wang@intel.com; receiver=edk2-devel@lists.01.org Received: from mga09.intel.com (mga09.intel.com [134.134.136.24]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 21CC521130701 for ; Thu, 13 Sep 2018 22:13:45 -0700 (PDT) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Sep 2018 22:13:45 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.53,372,1531810800"; d="scan'208";a="262519363" Received: from shwdeopenpsi777.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.239.158.27]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 13 Sep 2018 22:13:37 -0700 From: Jian J Wang To: edk2-devel@lists.01.org Cc: Star Zeng , Laszlo Ersek , Ard Biesheuvel , Ruiyu Ni , Jiewen Yao Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 13:13:35 +0800 Message-Id: <20180914051335.2644-1-jian.j.wang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2.windows.1 Subject: [PATCH] MdeModulePkg/DxeIpl: support more NX related PCDs X-BeenThere: edk2-devel@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: EDK II Development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2018 05:13:46 -0000 BZ#1116: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1116 Currently IA32_EFER.NXE is only set against PcdSetNxForStack. This confuses developers because following two other PCDs also need NXE to be set, but actually not. PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy PcdImageProtectionPolicy This patch solves this issue by adding logic to enable IA32_EFER.NXE if any of those PCDs have anything enabled. Due to the fact that NX memory type of stack (enabled by PcdSetNxForStack) and image data section (enabled by PcdImageProtectionPolicy) are also part of PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy, this patch also add more checks to warn (ASSERT) users any unreasonable setting combinations. For example, PcdSetNxForStack == FALSE && (PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy & (1 < Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Ruiyu Ni Cc: Jiewen Yao Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang --- MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/DxeIpl.inf | 2 + MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/Ia32/DxeLoadFunc.c | 4 +- MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/VirtualMemory.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++- MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 33 ++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/DxeIpl.inf b/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/DxeIpl.inf index fd82657404..068e700074 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/DxeIpl.inf +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/DxeIpl.inf @@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ [Pcd.IA32,Pcd.X64,Pcd.ARM,Pcd.AARCH64] gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSetNxForStack ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdImageProtectionPolicy ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES [Depex] gEfiPeiLoadFilePpiGuid AND gEfiPeiMasterBootModePpiGuid diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/Ia32/DxeLoadFunc.c b/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/Ia32/DxeLoadFunc.c index d28baa3615..9a97205ef8 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/Ia32/DxeLoadFunc.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/Ia32/DxeLoadFunc.c @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ ToBuildPageTable ( return TRUE; } - if (PcdGetBool (PcdSetNxForStack) && IsExecuteDisableBitAvailable ()) { + if (ToEnableExecuteDisableFeature ()) { return TRUE; } @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ HandOffToDxeCore ( BuildPageTablesIa32Pae = ToBuildPageTable (); if (BuildPageTablesIa32Pae) { PageTables = Create4GPageTablesIa32Pae (BaseOfStack, STACK_SIZE); - if (IsExecuteDisableBitAvailable ()) { + if (ToEnableExecuteDisableFeature ()) { EnableExecuteDisableBit(); } } diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/VirtualMemory.c b/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/VirtualMemory.c index 496e219913..253fe84223 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/VirtualMemory.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/VirtualMemory.c @@ -106,6 +106,56 @@ IsNullDetectionEnabled ( return ((PcdGet8 (PcdNullPointerDetectionPropertyMask) & BIT0) != 0); } +/** + Check if Execute Disable Bit (IA32_EFER.NXE) should be enabled or not. + + @retval TRUE IA32_EFER.NXE should be enabled. + @retval FALSE IA32_EFER.NXE should not be enabled. + +**/ +BOOLEAN +ToEnableExecuteDisableFeature ( + VOID + ) +{ + if (!IsExecuteDisableBitAvailable ()) { + return FALSE; + } + + // + // Normally stack is type of EfiBootServicesData. Disabling NX for stack + // but enabling NX for EfiBootServicesData doesn't make any sense. + // + if (PcdGetBool (PcdSetNxForStack) == FALSE && + (PcdGet64 (PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy) & STACK_MEMORY_TYPE) != 0) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, + "ERROR: NX for stack is disabled but NX for its memory type is enabled!\r\n")); + ASSERT(!(PcdGetBool (PcdSetNxForStack) == FALSE && + (PcdGet64 (PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy) & STACK_MEMORY_TYPE) != 0)); + } + + // + // Image data section could be type of EfiLoaderData, EfiBootServicesData + // or EfiRuntimeServicesData. Disabling NX for image data but enabling NX + // for any those memory types doesn't make any sense. + // + if (PcdGet32 (PcdImageProtectionPolicy) == 0 && + (PcdGet64 (PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy) & IMAGE_DATA_MEMORY_TYPE) != 0) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, + "ERROR: NX for image data is disabled but NX for its memory type(s) is enabled!\r\n")); + ASSERT (!(PcdGet32 (PcdImageProtectionPolicy) == 0 && + (PcdGet64 (PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy) & IMAGE_DATA_MEMORY_TYPE) != 0)); + } + + // + // XD flag (BIT63) in page table entry is only valid if IA32_EFER.NXE is set. + // Features controlled by Following PCDs need this feature to be enabled. + // + return (PcdGetBool (PcdSetNxForStack) || + PcdGet64 (PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy) != 0 || + PcdGet32 (PcdImageProtectionPolicy) != 0); +} + /** Enable Execute Disable Bit. @@ -755,7 +805,10 @@ CreateIdentityMappingPageTables ( // EnablePageTableProtection ((UINTN)PageMap, TRUE); - if (PcdGetBool (PcdSetNxForStack)) { + // + // Set IA32_EFER.NXE if necessary. + // + if (ToEnableExecuteDisableFeature ()) { EnableExecuteDisableBit (); } diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/VirtualMemory.h b/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/VirtualMemory.h index 85457ff937..9f152e6531 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/VirtualMemory.h +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/VirtualMemory.h @@ -179,6 +179,39 @@ typedef struct { UINTN FreePages; } PAGE_TABLE_POOL; +// +// Bit field repsentations of some EFI_MEMORY_TYPE, for page table initialization. +// +#define STACK_MEMORY_TYPE (1 << EfiBootServicesData) /* 0x10 */ +#define IMAGE_DATA_MEMORY_TYPE ((1 << EfiLoaderData) | /* 0x04 */\ + (1 << EfiBootServicesData) | /* 0x10 */\ + (1 << EfiRuntimeServicesData)/* 0x40 */\ + ) /* 0x54 */ + +/** + Check if Execute Disable Bit (IA32_EFER.NXE) should be enabled or not. + + @retval TRUE IA32_EFER.NXE should be enabled. + @retval FALSE IA32_EFER.NXE should not be enabled. + +**/ +BOOLEAN +ToEnableExecuteDisableFeature ( + VOID + ); + +/** + The function will check if Execute Disable Bit is available. + + @retval TRUE Execute Disable Bit is available. + @retval FALSE Execute Disable Bit is not available. + +**/ +BOOLEAN +IsExecuteDisableBitAvailable ( + VOID + ); + /** Enable Execute Disable Bit. -- 2.16.2.windows.1