From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=192.55.52.115; helo=mga14.intel.com; envelope-from=hao.a.wu@intel.com; receiver=edk2-devel@lists.01.org Received: from mga14.intel.com (mga14.intel.com [192.55.52.115]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 313852114844E for ; Wed, 19 Sep 2018 23:41:15 -0700 (PDT) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga004.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.38]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 19 Sep 2018 23:41:15 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.53,397,1531810800"; d="scan'208";a="234436658" Received: from shwdeopenpsi014.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.239.9.19]) by orsmga004.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 19 Sep 2018 23:41:13 -0700 From: Hao Wu To: edk2-devel@lists.01.org Cc: Hao Wu , Jiewen Yao , Star Zeng Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 14:41:02 +0800 Message-Id: <20180920064103.14600-5-hao.a.wu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.12.0.windows.1 In-Reply-To: <20180920064103.14600-1-hao.a.wu@intel.com> References: <20180920064103.14600-1-hao.a.wu@intel.com> Subject: [PATCH v1 4/5] MdeModulePkg/Variable: [CVE-2017-5753] Fix bounds check bypass X-BeenThere: edk2-devel@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: EDK II Development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 06:41:15 -0000 REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1194 Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the processor may speculate as to what will be executed. If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not otherwise be accessed. This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the Variable\RuntimeDxe driver and insert LoadFence API to mitigate the bounds check bypass issue. For SMI handler SmmVariableHandler(): Under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE:", 'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' can be a potential cross boundary access of the 'CommBuffer' (controlled external input) during speculative execution. This cross boundary access is later used as the index to access array 'SmmVariableHeader->Name' by code: "SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1]" One can observe which part of the content within array was brought into cache to possibly reveal the value of 'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize'. Hence, this commit adds a LoadFence after the boundary/range checks of 'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution. And there are 2 similar cases under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:" and "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_GET:" as well. This commits also handles them. Also, under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:", '(UINT8 *)SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' points to the 'CommBuffer' (with some offset) and then passed as parameter 'Data' to function VariableServiceSetVariable(). Within function VariableServiceSetVariable(), there is a sanity check for EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor for the data pointed by 'Data'. If this check is speculatively bypassed, potential cross-boundary data access for 'Data' is possible to be revealed via the below function calls sequence during speculative execution: AuthVariableLibProcessVariable() ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek() Within function ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek(), for the code "PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);", 'AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data)' can be a cross boundary access during speculative execution. Then, 'PayloadSize' is possible to be revealed by the function call sequence: AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp() mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable() VariableExLibUpdateVariable() UpdateVariable() CopyMem() Hence, this commit adds a LoadFence after the sanity check for EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor upon 'Data' within function VariableServiceSetVariable() to prevent the speculative execution. A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the 'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation And the document at: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf Cc: Jiewen Yao Cc: Star Zeng Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Hao Wu --- MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c | 1 + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c index 1ea2f84dda..52af56c4c0 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c @@ -3198,6 +3198,7 @@ VariableServiceSetVariable ( ((EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) Data)->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength < OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData)) { return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; } + LoadFence (); PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data); } else { PayloadSize = DataSize; diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c index e495d971a0..0bbed71a76 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.c @@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ SmmVariableHandler ( goto EXIT; } + LoadFence (); if (SmmVariableHeader->NameSize < sizeof (CHAR16) || SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1] != L'\0') { // // Make sure VariableName is A Null-terminated string. @@ -631,6 +632,7 @@ SmmVariableHandler ( goto EXIT; } + LoadFence (); if (SmmVariableHeader->NameSize < sizeof (CHAR16) || SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1] != L'\0') { // // Make sure VariableName is A Null-terminated string. @@ -766,6 +768,7 @@ SmmVariableHandler ( goto EXIT; } + LoadFence (); if (CommVariableProperty->NameSize < sizeof (CHAR16) || CommVariableProperty->Name[CommVariableProperty->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1] != L'\0') { // // Make sure VariableName is A Null-terminated string. -- 2.12.0.windows.1