From: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
To: edk2-devel@lists.01.org
Cc: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>, Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 1/2] MdeModulePkg/SmmCorePerfLib: [CVE-2017-5753] Fix bounds check bypass
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 09:37:36 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181116013737.32272-2-hao.a.wu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181116013737.32272-1-hao.a.wu@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1194
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
TBD.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
---
MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmCorePerformanceLib/SmmCorePerformanceLib.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmCorePerformanceLib/SmmCorePerformanceLib.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmCorePerformanceLib/SmmCorePerformanceLib.c
index cd1f1a5d5f..63c1eea3a2 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmCorePerformanceLib/SmmCorePerformanceLib.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmCorePerformanceLib/SmmCorePerformanceLib.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
SmmPerformanceHandlerEx(), SmmPerformanceHandler() will receive untrusted input and do basic validation.
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
This program and the accompanying materials
are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
@@ -538,6 +538,13 @@ SmmPerformanceHandlerEx (
break;
}
+ //
+ // The AsmLfence() call here is to ensure the previous range/content
+ // checks for the CommBuffer have been completed before calling
+ // CopyMem().
+ //
+ AsmLfence ();
+
GaugeEntryExArray = (GAUGE_DATA_ENTRY_EX *) (mGaugeData + 1);
for (Index = 0; Index < NumberOfEntries; Index++) {
@@ -650,6 +657,13 @@ SmmPerformanceHandler (
break;
}
+ //
+ // The AsmLfence() call here is to ensure the previous range/content
+ // checks for the CommBuffer have been completed before calling
+ // CopyMem().
+ //
+ AsmLfence ();
+
GaugeEntryExArray = (GAUGE_DATA_ENTRY_EX *) (mGaugeData + 1);
for (Index = 0; Index < NumberOfEntries; Index++) {
--
2.12.0.windows.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-16 1:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-16 1:37 [PATCH v1 0/2][UDK branches][CVE-2017-5753] Additional Bounds Check Bypass issue in SMI handlers Hao Wu
2018-11-16 1:37 ` Hao Wu [this message]
2018-11-16 3:13 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] MdeModulePkg/SmmCorePerfLib: [CVE-2017-5753] Fix bounds check bypass Zeng, Star
2018-11-16 3:45 ` Wu, Hao A
2018-11-16 1:37 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] SecurityPkg/OpalPWSupportLib: " Hao Wu
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