From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=missing; spf=pass (domain: redhat.com, ip: 209.132.183.28, mailfrom: lersek@redhat.com) Received: from mx1.redhat.com (mx1.redhat.com [209.132.183.28]) by groups.io with SMTP; Fri, 26 Apr 2019 17:53:54 -0700 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx05.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.15]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 242B0C04959E; Sat, 27 Apr 2019 00:53:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lacos-laptop-7.usersys.redhat.com (ovpn-121-104.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.121.104]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB5AA5D71A; Sat, 27 Apr 2019 00:53:51 +0000 (UTC) From: "Laszlo Ersek" To: edk2-devel-groups-io Cc: Anthony Perard , Ard Biesheuvel , Jordan Justen , Julien Grall Subject: [PATCH 06/16] OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys: clean up global variable name prefixes Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2019 02:53:18 +0200 Message-Id: <20190427005328.27005-7-lersek@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20190427005328.27005-1-lersek@redhat.com> References: <20190427005328.27005-1-lersek@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.15 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.31]); Sat, 27 Apr 2019 00:53:54 +0000 (UTC) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In edk2, we should start the names of module-global variables with "m". Rename the "RedHatPkKek1", "MicrosoftKEK", "MicrosoftPCA", "MicrosoftUefiCA" variables accordingly, with the following command: sed --regexp-extended --in-place \ --expression=3D's,\<(RedHatPkKek1|Microsoft(KEK|PCA|UefiCA))\>,m\1,g'= \ OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c Cc: Anthony Perard Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Jordan Justen Cc: Julien Grall Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1747 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek --- OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c b/OvmfPkg/Enro= llDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c index aa827ac6aa81..fb30f4906df7 100644 --- a/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c +++ b/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c @@ -17,17 +17,17 @@ =20 // // We'll use the certificate below as both Platform Key and as first Key // Exchange Key. // // "Red Hat Secure Boot (PK/KEK key 1)/emailAddress=3Dsecalert@redhat.co= m" // SHA1: fd:fc:7f:3c:7e:f3:e0:57:76:ad:d7:98:78:21:6c:9b:e0:e1:95:97 // -STATIC CONST UINT8 RedHatPkKek1[] =3D { +STATIC CONST UINT8 mRedHatPkKek1[] =3D { 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xa0, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x88, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01= , 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf5, 0x88, 0xe8, 0xf3, 0x96, 0xc0, 0xf1, 0x30= , 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05= , 0x00, 0x30, 0x51, 0x31, 0x2b, 0x30, 0x29, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13= , 0x22, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x48, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x53, 0x65, 0x63, 0x75= , 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x20, 0x28, 0x50, 0x4b, 0x2f, 0x4b= , 0x45, 0x4b, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x31, 0x29, 0x31, 0x22, 0x30, 0x20= , 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x13= , 0x73, @@ -98,17 +98,17 @@ STATIC CONST UINT8 RedHatPkKek1[] =3D { }; =20 // // Second KEK: "Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011". // SHA1: 31:59:0b:fd:89:c9:d7:4e:d0:87:df:ac:66:33:4b:39:31:25:4b:30 // // "dbx" updates in "dbxtool" are signed with a key derived from this KE= K. // -STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftKEK[] =3D { +STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKEK[] =3D { 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xd0, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01= , 0x02, 0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x0a, 0xd1, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03= , 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b= , 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x91, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04= , 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04= , 0x08, 0x13, 0x0a, 0x57, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6e= , 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x13, 0x07, 0x52, 0x65= , 0x64, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04= , 0x0a, @@ -225,17 +225,17 @@ STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftKEK[] =3D { =20 // // First DB entry: "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011" // SHA1: 58:0a:6f:4c:c4:e4:b6:69:b9:eb:dc:1b:2b:3e:08:7b:80:d0:67:8d // // Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 R2 boot loaders are signed with a c= hain // rooted in this certificate. // -STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftPCA[] =3D { +STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPCA[] =3D { 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xd7, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xbf, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01= , 0x02, 0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x07, 0x76, 0x56, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08= , 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b= , 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x88, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04= , 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04= , 0x08, 0x13, 0x0a, 0x57, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6e= , 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x13, 0x07, 0x52, 0x65= , 0x64, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04= , 0x0a, @@ -350,17 +350,17 @@ STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftPCA[] =3D { }; =20 // // Second DB entry: "Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011" // SHA1: 46:de:f6:3b:5c:e6:1c:f8:ba:0d:e2:e6:63:9c:10:19:d0:ed:14:f3 // // To verify the "shim" binary and PCI expansion ROMs with. // -STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftUefiCA[] =3D { +STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCA[] =3D { 0x30, 0x82, 0x06, 0x10, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01= , 0x02, 0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04= , 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b= , 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x91, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04= , 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04= , 0x08, 0x13, 0x0a, 0x57, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6e= , 0x31, 0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x13, 0x07, 0x52, 0x65= , 0x64, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04= , 0x0a, @@ -938,18 +938,18 @@ ShellAppMain ( return 1; } } =20 Status =3D EnrollListOfCerts ( EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, &gEfiCertX509Guid, - MicrosoftPCA, sizeof MicrosoftPCA, &mMicrosoftOwnerGu= id, - MicrosoftUefiCA, sizeof MicrosoftUefiCA, &mMicrosoftOwnerGu= id, + mMicrosoftPCA, sizeof mMicrosoftPCA, &mMicrosoftOwner= Guid, + mMicrosoftUefiCA, sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCA, &mMicrosoftOwner= Guid, NULL); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { return 1; } =20 Status =3D EnrollListOfCerts ( EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, @@ -959,28 +959,28 @@ ShellAppMain ( if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { return 1; } =20 Status =3D EnrollListOfCerts ( EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &gEfiCertX509Guid, - RedHatPkKek1, sizeof RedHatPkKek1, &gEfiCallerIdGuid, - MicrosoftKEK, sizeof MicrosoftKEK, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid, + mRedHatPkKek1, sizeof mRedHatPkKek1, &gEfiCallerIdGuid, + mMicrosoftKEK, sizeof mMicrosoftKEK, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid, NULL); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { return 1; } =20 Status =3D EnrollListOfCerts ( EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &gEfiCertX509Guid, - RedHatPkKek1, sizeof RedHatPkKek1, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, + mRedHatPkKek1, sizeof mRedHatPkKek1, &gEfiGlobalVariableGui= d, NULL); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { return 1; } =20 Settings.CustomMode =3D STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE; Status =3D gRT->SetVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnab= leGuid, EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_A= CCESS, --=20 2.19.1.3.g30247aa5d201