public inbox for devel@edk2.groups.io
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Dandan Bi" <dandan.bi@intel.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
	Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>,
	Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Subject: [patch 0/3] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Wed,  4 Sep 2019 16:23:58 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190904082401.6868-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> (raw)

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992

For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.

But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.

This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the callers in edk2 which don't have the policy to defer the
execution of the image.

Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Dandan Bi (3):
  EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
  MdeModulePkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
  ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION

 .../AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c         |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
 MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c         |  9 +++++++++
 MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c     |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c        | 11 ++++++++++-
 MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c     | 11 ++++++++++-
 .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c      | 11 ++++++++++-
 ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c          |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c  | 11 ++++++++++-
 ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c   | 11 ++++++++++-
 11 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

-- 
2.18.0.windows.1


             reply	other threads:[~2019-09-04  8:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-04  8:23 Dandan Bi [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-09-04  8:25 [patch 0/3] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-list from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190904082401.6868-1-dandan.bi@intel.com \
    --to=devel@edk2.groups.io \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox