From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=missing; spf=fail (domain: intel.com, ip: , mailfrom: dandan.bi@intel.com) Received: from mga02.intel.com (mga02.intel.com []) by groups.io with SMTP; Wed, 04 Sep 2019 01:26:13 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga006.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.51]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Sep 2019 01:26:13 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,465,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="187549186" Received: from shwdeopenpsi114.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.239.157.147]) by orsmga006.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 04 Sep 2019 01:26:11 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Jian J Wang , Hao A Wu , Ray Ni , Liming Gao , Laszlo Ersek Subject: [patch 2/3] MdeModulePkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 16:25:54 +0800 Message-Id: <20190904082555.35424-3-dandan.bi@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.18.0.windows.1 In-Reply-To: <20190904082555.35424-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> References: <20190904082555.35424-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in MdeModulePkg which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Jian J Wang Cc: Hao A Wu Cc: Ray Ni Cc: Liming Gao Cc: Laszlo Ersek REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi --- MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c | 9 +++++++++ MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c | 9 +++++++++ MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c | 11 ++++++++++- MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c | 11 ++++++++++- .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c | 11 ++++++++++- 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c index c994ed5fe3..1a8d9811b0 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciOptionRomSupport.c @@ -726,10 +726,19 @@ ProcessOpRomImage ( Buffer, BufferSize, &ImageHandle ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } // // Record the Option ROM Image device path when LoadImage fails. // PciOverride.GetDriver() will try to look for the Image Handle using the device path later. // AddDriver (PciDevice, NULL, PciOptionRomImageDevicePath); diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c index 95aa9de087..74c00ecf9e 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c @@ -1028,10 +1028,19 @@ StartFmpImage ( ImageSize, &ImageHandle ); DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpCapsule: LoadImage - %r\n", Status)); if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } FreePool(DriverDevicePath); return Status; } DEBUG((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpCapsule: StartImage ...\n")); diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c index 952033fc82..c8de7eec03 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c @@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot ( if (FilePath != NULL) { FreePool (FilePath); } if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } // // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure to load boot option // BmReportLoadFailure (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status); BootOption->Status = Status; diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c index 07592f8ebd..233fb43c27 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ /** @file Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing load options. -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
(C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent **/ @@ -1409,10 +1409,19 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption ( FileSize, &ImageHandle ); FreePool (FileBuffer); + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo); ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize = LoadOption->OptionalDataSize; diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c index 6b8fb4d924..cdfc57741b 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ /** @file Misc library functions. -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
(C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent **/ @@ -491,10 +491,19 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages ( ImageDevicePath, NULL, 0, &ImageHandle ); + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { LoadCount++; // // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for // a 5 Minute period diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c index 2d3736b468..e4b6b26330 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ /** @file Implementation of the shared functions to do the platform driver vverride mapping. - Copyright (c) 2007 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2007 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent **/ #include "InternalPlatDriOverrideDxe.h" @@ -1484,10 +1484,19 @@ GetDriverFromMapping ( ); ASSERT (DriverBinding != NULL); DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = ImageHandle; } } else { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } DriverImageInfo->UnLoadable = TRUE; DriverImageInfo->ImageHandle = NULL; } } } -- 2.18.0.windows.1