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From: "Dandan Bi" <dandan.bi@intel.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
	Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>,
	Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: [patch v2 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 11:05:52 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190918030557.55256-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> (raw)

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992

v2:
(1) Just separate the patch in MdeModulePkg into module level, the changes in EmbeddedPkg and ShellPkg are the same with V1.
(2) Drop the update in PciBusDxe module in MdeModulePkg since with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION returned, the image may be used later.


For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.

But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.

This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the callers in edk2 which don't have the policy to defer the
execution of the image.

Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Dandan Bi (3):
  EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
  MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
  MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
  MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on
    EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
  ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION

 .../AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c         |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
 .../Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c         |  9 +++++++++
 MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c     |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c        | 11 ++++++++++-
 MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c     | 11 ++++++++++-
 .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c      | 11 ++++++++++-
 ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c          |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c  | 11 ++++++++++-
 ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c   | 11 ++++++++++-
 10 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

-- 
2.18.0.windows.1


             reply	other threads:[~2019-09-18  3:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-18  3:05 Dandan Bi [this message]
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:27   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 2/5] MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:23   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:35   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  5:28   ` [edk2-devel] " Gao, Zhichao
2019-09-24 10:34   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:49   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:37   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 5/5] ShellPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:30   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
     [not found] ` <15C569713949E871.11658@groups.io>
2019-09-24  1:28   ` [edk2-devel] [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi

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