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From: "Dandan Bi" <dandan.bi@intel.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
	Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>,
	Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 11:05:55 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190918030557.55256-4-dandan.bi@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190918030557.55256-1-dandan.bi@intel.com>

For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.

But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.

This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the policy to defer
the execution of the image.

Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
---
 MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c      |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c         | 11 ++++++++++-
 MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c      | 11 ++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
index 952033fc82..760d7647b8 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
@@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot (
     if (FilePath != NULL) {
       FreePool (FilePath);
     }
 
     if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+      //
+      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+      //
+      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+      }
       //
       // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure to load boot option
       //
       BmReportLoadFailure (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status);
       BootOption->Status = Status;
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
index 07592f8ebd..af47b787d1 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /** @file
   Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing load options.
 
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
 (C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
 SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
 
 **/
 
@@ -1409,10 +1409,19 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption (
                     FileSize,
                     &ImageHandle
                     );
     FreePool (FileBuffer);
 
+    //
+    // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+    // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+    // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+    // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+    //
+    if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+      gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+    }
     if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
       Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo);
       ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
 
       ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize = LoadOption->OptionalDataSize;
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
index 6b8fb4d924..833e38c6fe 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /** @file
   Misc library functions.
 
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
 (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
 SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
 
 **/
 
@@ -491,10 +491,19 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages (
         ImageDevicePath,
         NULL,
         0,
         &ImageHandle
       );
+      //
+      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+      //
+      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+      }
       if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
         LoadCount++;
         //
         // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for
         // a 5 Minute period
-- 
2.18.0.windows.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-09-18  3:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-18  3:05 [patch v2 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:27   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 2/5] MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:23   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:35   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` Dandan Bi [this message]
2019-09-18  5:28   ` [edk2-devel] [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: " Gao, Zhichao
2019-09-24 10:34   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:49   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:37   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 5/5] ShellPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:30   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
     [not found] ` <15C569713949E871.11658@groups.io>
2019-09-24  1:28   ` [edk2-devel] [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi

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