From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=missing; spf=pass (domain: intel.com, ip: 192.55.52.151, mailfrom: dandan.bi@intel.com) Received: from mga17.intel.com (mga17.intel.com [192.55.52.151]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:17:08 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2019 06:17:07 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,544,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="189364768" Received: from dandanbi-mobl2.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.249.168.26]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Sep 2019 06:17:00 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Leif Lindholm , Ard Biesheuvel , Jian J Wang , Hao A Wu , Ray Ni , Liming Gao , Zhichao Gao , Laszlo Ersek , Philippe Mathieu-Daude Subject: [patch v3 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 21:16:39 +0800 Message-Id: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.3.windows.1 REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992 v2: Just enahnce the code error handling logic in patch 3. Other patches are the same and pick up the Acked-by and Reviewed-by in other patches. v2: (1) Just separate the patch in MdeModulePkg into module level, the changes in EmbeddedPkg and ShellPkg are the same with V1. (2) Drop the update in PciBusDxe module in MdeModulePkg since with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION returned, the image may be used later. For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in edk2 which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Leif Lindholm Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Jian J Wang Cc: Hao A Wu Cc: Ray Ni Cc: Liming Gao Cc: Zhichao Gao Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude Dandan Bi (3): EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION .../AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c | 12 ++++++++++++ .../Library/DxeCapsuleLibFmp/DxeCapsuleLib.c | 9 +++++++++ MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- .../PlatformDriOverrideDxe/PlatDriOverrideLib.c | 11 ++++++++++- ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c | 11 ++++++++++- ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c | 11 ++++++++++- 10 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.18.0.windows.1