From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=missing; spf=pass (domain: intel.com, ip: 192.55.52.136, mailfrom: dandan.bi@intel.com) Received: from mga12.intel.com (mga12.intel.com [192.55.52.136]) by groups.io with SMTP; Tue, 24 Sep 2019 06:20:15 -0700 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2019 06:20:04 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,544,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="189365444" Received: from dandanbi-mobl2.ccr.corp.intel.com ([10.249.168.26]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Sep 2019 06:20:02 -0700 From: "Dandan Bi" To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Ray Ni , Zhichao Gao , Laszlo Ersek , Philippe Mathieu-Daude Subject: [patch v3 5/5] ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 21:16:44 +0800 Message-Id: <20190924131644.10412-6-dandan.bi@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.3.windows.1 In-Reply-To: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> References: <20190924131644.10412-1-dandan.bi@intel.com> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec. But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in ShellPkg which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Ray Ni Cc: Zhichao Gao Cc: Laszlo Ersek Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude --- ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c | 11 ++++++++++- ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c | 11 ++++++++++- 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c index 6909f29441..4d5a5668aa 100644 --- a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c +++ b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c @@ -643,10 +643,19 @@ ProcessManFile( goto Done; } DevPath = ShellInfoObject.NewEfiShellProtocol->GetDevicePathFromFilePath(CmdFilePathName); Status = gBS->LoadImage(FALSE, gImageHandle, DevPath, NULL, 0, &CmdFileImgHandle); if(EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid the resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (CmdFileImgHandle); + } *HelpText = NULL; goto Done; } Status = gBS->OpenProtocol( CmdFileImgHandle, diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c index 1b169d0d3c..5b6cba17f3 100644 --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ /** @file Main file for LoadPciRom shell Debug1 function. (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- Copyright (c) 2005 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2005 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent **/ #include "UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib.h" @@ -332,10 +332,19 @@ LoadEfiDriversFromRomImage ( ImageBuffer, ImageLength, &ImageHandle ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_FAIL), gShellDebug1HiiHandle, L"loadpcirom", FileName, ImageIndex); // PrintToken (STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_IMAGE_ERROR), HiiHandle, ImageIndex, Status); } else { Status = gBS->StartImage (ImageHandle, NULL, NULL); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c index 6a94b48c86..b6e7c952fa 100644 --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ /** @file Main file for attrib shell level 2 function. (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent **/ #include "UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib.h" @@ -110,10 +110,19 @@ LoadDriver( NULL, 0, &LoadedDriverHandle); if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (LoadedDriverHandle); + } ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOAD_NOT_IMAGE), gShellLevel2HiiHandle, FileName, Status); } else { // // Make sure it is a driver image // -- 2.18.0.windows.1