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* [PATCH] OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage()
@ 2020-06-05 23:52 Laszlo Ersek
  2020-06-07 22:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Laszlo Ersek @ 2020-06-05 23:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: edk2-devel-groups-io
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Jordan Justen, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé

When an image fails Secure Boot validation, LoadImage() returns
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION if the platform policy is
DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION.

If the platform policy is DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION, then
LoadImage() returns EFI_ACCESS_DENIED (and the image does not remain
loaded).

(Before <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129>, this
difference would be masked, as DxeImageVerificationLib would incorrectly
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION for DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION as
well.)

In X86QemuLoadImageLib, proceed to the legacy Linux/x86 Boot Protocol upon
seeing EFI_ACCESS_DENIED too.

Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2785
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
---

Notes:
    Repo:   https://pagure.io/lersek/edk2.git
    Branch: x86_qlil_access_denied

 OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c | 14 ++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
index ef753be7ea90..931553c0c1fb 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
@@ -319,13 +319,19 @@ QemuLoadKernelImage (
     return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
 
   case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
+    //
+    // Since the image has been loaded, we need to unload it before proceeding
+    // to the EFI_ACCESS_DENIED case below.
+    //
+    gBS->UnloadImage (KernelImageHandle);
+    //
+    // Fall through
+    //
+  case EFI_ACCESS_DENIED:
     //
     // We are running with UEFI secure boot enabled, and the image failed to
     // authenticate. For compatibility reasons, we fall back to the legacy
-    // loader in this case. Since the image has been loaded, we need to unload
-    // it before proceeding
-    //
-    gBS->UnloadImage (KernelImageHandle);
+    // loader in this case.
     //
     // Fall through
     //
-- 
2.19.1.3.g30247aa5d201


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage()
  2020-06-05 23:52 [PATCH] OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage() Laszlo Ersek
@ 2020-06-07 22:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
  2020-06-08  8:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2020-06-09 20:20 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé @ 2020-06-07 22:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Laszlo Ersek, edk2-devel-groups-io; +Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Jordan Justen

On 6/6/20 1:52 AM, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> When an image fails Secure Boot validation, LoadImage() returns
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION if the platform policy is
> DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
> 
> If the platform policy is DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION, then
> LoadImage() returns EFI_ACCESS_DENIED (and the image does not remain
> loaded).
> 
> (Before <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129>, this
> difference would be masked, as DxeImageVerificationLib would incorrectly
> return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION for DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION as
> well.)
> 
> In X86QemuLoadImageLib, proceed to the legacy Linux/x86 Boot Protocol upon
> seeing EFI_ACCESS_DENIED too.
> 
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2785
> Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
> Notes:
>     Repo:   https://pagure.io/lersek/edk2.git
>     Branch: x86_qlil_access_denied
> 
>  OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c | 14 ++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> index ef753be7ea90..931553c0c1fb 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> @@ -319,13 +319,19 @@ QemuLoadKernelImage (
>      return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
>  
>    case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
> +    //
> +    // Since the image has been loaded, we need to unload it before proceeding
> +    // to the EFI_ACCESS_DENIED case below.
> +    //
> +    gBS->UnloadImage (KernelImageHandle);
> +    //
> +    // Fall through

Nice catch.

Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>

> +    //
> +  case EFI_ACCESS_DENIED:
>      //
>      // We are running with UEFI secure boot enabled, and the image failed to
>      // authenticate. For compatibility reasons, we fall back to the legacy
> -    // loader in this case. Since the image has been loaded, we need to unload
> -    // it before proceeding
> -    //
> -    gBS->UnloadImage (KernelImageHandle);
> +    // loader in this case.
>      //
>      // Fall through
>      //
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage()
  2020-06-05 23:52 [PATCH] OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage() Laszlo Ersek
  2020-06-07 22:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
@ 2020-06-08  8:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2020-06-09 20:20 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2020-06-08  8:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Laszlo Ersek, edk2-devel-groups-io
  Cc: Jordan Justen, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé

On 6/6/20 1:52 AM, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> When an image fails Secure Boot validation, LoadImage() returns
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION if the platform policy is
> DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
> 
> If the platform policy is DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION, then
> LoadImage() returns EFI_ACCESS_DENIED (and the image does not remain
> loaded).
> 
> (Before <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129>, this
> difference would be masked, as DxeImageVerificationLib would incorrectly
> return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION for DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION as
> well.)
> 
> In X86QemuLoadImageLib, proceed to the legacy Linux/x86 Boot Protocol upon
> seeing EFI_ACCESS_DENIED too.
> 
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2785
> Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>

> ---
> 
> Notes:
>      Repo:   https://pagure.io/lersek/edk2.git
>      Branch: x86_qlil_access_denied
> 
>   OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c | 14 ++++++++++----
>   1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> index ef753be7ea90..931553c0c1fb 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> @@ -319,13 +319,19 @@ QemuLoadKernelImage (
>       return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
>   
>     case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
> +    //
> +    // Since the image has been loaded, we need to unload it before proceeding
> +    // to the EFI_ACCESS_DENIED case below.
> +    //
> +    gBS->UnloadImage (KernelImageHandle);
> +    //
> +    // Fall through
> +    //
> +  case EFI_ACCESS_DENIED:
>       //
>       // We are running with UEFI secure boot enabled, and the image failed to
>       // authenticate. For compatibility reasons, we fall back to the legacy
> -    // loader in this case. Since the image has been loaded, we need to unload
> -    // it before proceeding
> -    //
> -    gBS->UnloadImage (KernelImageHandle);
> +    // loader in this case.
>       //
>       // Fall through
>       //
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage()
  2020-06-05 23:52 [PATCH] OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage() Laszlo Ersek
  2020-06-07 22:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
  2020-06-08  8:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2020-06-09 20:20 ` Laszlo Ersek
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Laszlo Ersek @ 2020-06-09 20:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: edk2-devel-groups-io
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Jordan Justen, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé

On 06/06/20 01:52, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> When an image fails Secure Boot validation, LoadImage() returns
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION if the platform policy is
> DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
> 
> If the platform policy is DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION, then
> LoadImage() returns EFI_ACCESS_DENIED (and the image does not remain
> loaded).
> 
> (Before <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129>, this
> difference would be masked, as DxeImageVerificationLib would incorrectly
> return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION for DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION as
> well.)
> 
> In X86QemuLoadImageLib, proceed to the legacy Linux/x86 Boot Protocol upon
> seeing EFI_ACCESS_DENIED too.
> 
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2785
> Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
> Notes:
>     Repo:   https://pagure.io/lersek/edk2.git
>     Branch: x86_qlil_access_denied
> 
>  OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c | 14 ++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> index ef753be7ea90..931553c0c1fb 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/X86QemuLoadImageLib/X86QemuLoadImageLib.c
> @@ -319,13 +319,19 @@ QemuLoadKernelImage (
>      return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
>  
>    case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
> +    //
> +    // Since the image has been loaded, we need to unload it before proceeding
> +    // to the EFI_ACCESS_DENIED case below.
> +    //
> +    gBS->UnloadImage (KernelImageHandle);
> +    //
> +    // Fall through
> +    //
> +  case EFI_ACCESS_DENIED:
>      //
>      // We are running with UEFI secure boot enabled, and the image failed to
>      // authenticate. For compatibility reasons, we fall back to the legacy
> -    // loader in this case. Since the image has been loaded, we need to unload
> -    // it before proceeding
> -    //
> -    gBS->UnloadImage (KernelImageHandle);
> +    // loader in this case.
>      //
>      // Fall through
>      //
> 

Merged as commit dafce295e6f4 via
<https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/671>.

Thanks!
Laszlo


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2020-06-09 20:21 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-06-05 23:52 [PATCH] OvmfPkg/X86QemuLoadImageLib: handle EFI_ACCESS_DENIED from LoadImage() Laszlo Ersek
2020-06-07 22:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-06-08  8:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-06-09 20:20 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek

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