From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mail-pj1-f54.google.com (mail-pj1-f54.google.com [209.85.216.54]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.11684.1592931398949995491 for ; Tue, 23 Jun 2020 09:56:39 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=@corthon-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.s=20150623 header.b=0Fvomjdw; spf=none, err=permanent DNS error (domain: corthon.com, ip: 209.85.216.54, mailfrom: bret@corthon.com) Received: by mail-pj1-f54.google.com with SMTP id b92so113837pjc.4 for ; Tue, 23 Jun 2020 09:56:38 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=corthon-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=02QgY2n9rLkmbz2dyd5GZkliEhHngGJ8uZeNRdZDsME=; b=0FvomjdwL/Zt7wsUrKv5SMFoMcLG3MPQqvVQkTnBzxDFkfcuTF8Swq7kWQNVMBD2jp vwax5IOQJvOnfuDZ6Ec1t8eHSvHnmLTUibDYfmn9AoAt4vxdJJ2VmpGj/sVUMokr1STW UGTnlMVPrNZ9lQg2Wj2Kn9mnMidxfMh0v7U+1RdPSErKsBoLmVOAuE0vHplwbp9CnL0h REBEQS2+bL7T40OHRRIIP8APvRTyuAdjUXof+ufkgnkzHzN/KsbuOjUfAagYn3k0xCCt O6XNr4e6FvRzn+ykX3ThcVrYm7rzu+v8q8yuV8iINXIiUbFJgsjUmaMaIEbZn8mBfW3b Of5g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=02QgY2n9rLkmbz2dyd5GZkliEhHngGJ8uZeNRdZDsME=; b=ZOMY1C578gjKcWeOL3nyXIsCVHF2DIGMKQ4SplhFt4621M2pyrNpQdk5ufu7WavkBx KjFqZ9dhZwKxDJ2db1pHgOw9aaTSFzbxWt3Z1P1StWJHn6DDSXeT8nWXtEn3jgruzB+L 0vgBZpMlWbQheqFUDrS6+KduRL3JqCYuiWVv+fdbuZsZuUvl+zYMnLQwitjmlwO092Du 5SOqP7vPEZu0vC2vxDOAjy9qtnGnd6CVbfk7KFm5WDjg1Ey6tW25Vg+3hvgckIL2k4er VZrke7i9YkTGm7fovPCyJDkGbEqgjW4skP8/kXcVLVz6ImtJFnSIHNFoTV58YaFLVTFf ZAiw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5326pd6upzDRGmWfpXr2K7h8x2A58zjcdaevVXmZJAfMcmmIZa9r hWOY52TtxcCwSgEbw8hQGkkaJy/Btas= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwHVB4bFRWYDUoiHTMeFwBtfiMoeoif30tNGE/FX138uHbu1nQBmF+aKXb8I40znNb7rrVAzg== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:ed14:: with SMTP id b20mr24673137pld.173.1592931397826; Tue, 23 Jun 2020 09:56:37 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: Received: from localhost.localdomain (174-21-80-75.tukw.qwest.net. [174.21.80.75]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id f207sm2385131pfa.107.2020.06.23.09.56.36 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 23 Jun 2020 09:56:37 -0700 (PDT) From: "Bret Barkelew" X-Google-Original-From: Bret Barkelew To: devel@edk2.groups.io Cc: Jian J Wang , Hao A Wu , Liming Gao Subject: [PATCH v6 09/14] MdeModulePkg: Connect VariablePolicy business logic to VariableServices Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 09:52:25 -0700 Message-Id: <20200623165230.860-10-brbarkel@microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2.windows.1.8.g01c50adf56.20200515075929 In-Reply-To: <20200623165230.860-7-brbarkel@microsoft.com> References: <20200623165230.860-7-brbarkel@microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D2522 VariablePolicy is an updated interface to replace VarLock and VarCheckProtocol. Add connective code to publish the VariablePolicy protocol and wire it to either the SMM communication interface or directly into the VariablePolicyLib business logic. Cc: Jian J Wang Cc: Hao A Wu Cc: Liming Gao Cc: Bret Barkelew Signed-off-by: Bret Barkelew --- MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableDxe.c | 53= ++ MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariablePolicySmmDxe.c | 642= ++++++++++++++++++++ MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c | 14= + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf | 2= + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf | 3= + MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.inf | 10= + 6 files changed, 724 insertions(+) diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableDxe.c b/Mde= ModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableDxe.c index 7d2b6c8e1fad..d404d4763e54 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableDxe.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableDxe.c @@ -5,18 +5,34 @@ Copyright (C) 2013, Red Hat, Inc.=0D Copyright (c) 2006 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
=0D (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
=0D +Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.=0D SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent=0D =0D **/=0D =0D #include "Variable.h"=0D =0D +#include =0D +#include =0D +=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +EFIAPI=0D +ProtocolIsVariablePolicyEnabled (=0D + OUT BOOLEAN *State=0D + );=0D +=0D EFI_HANDLE mHandle =3D NULL;=0D EFI_EVENT mVirtualAddressChangeEvent =3D NULL;=0D VOID *mFtwRegistration =3D NULL;=0D VOID ***mVarCheckAddressPointer =3D NULL;=0D UINTN mVarCheckAddressPointerCount =3D 0;=0D EDKII_VARIABLE_LOCK_PROTOCOL mVariableLock =3D { Varia= bleLockRequestToLock };=0D +EDKII_VARIABLE_POLICY_PROTOCOL mVariablePolicyProtocol =3D { EDKII= _VARIABLE_POLICY_PROTOCOL_REVISION,=0D + Disabl= eVariablePolicy,=0D + Protoc= olIsVariablePolicyEnabled,=0D + Regist= erVariablePolicy,=0D + DumpVa= riablePolicy,=0D + LockVa= riablePolicy };=0D EDKII_VAR_CHECK_PROTOCOL mVarCheck =3D { VarCh= eckRegisterSetVariableCheckHandler,=0D VarChe= ckVariablePropertySet,=0D VarChe= ckVariablePropertyGet };=0D @@ -303,6 +319,8 @@ OnReadyToBoot ( }=0D }=0D =0D + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (LockVariablePolicy ());=0D +=0D gBS->CloseEvent (Event);=0D }=0D =0D @@ -466,6 +484,28 @@ FtwNotificationEvent ( }=0D =0D =0D +/**=0D + This API function returns whether or not the policy engine is=0D + currently being enforced.=0D +=0D + @param[out] State Pointer to a return value for whether the poli= cy enforcement=0D + is currently enabled.=0D +=0D + @retval EFI_SUCCESS=0D + @retval Others An error has prevented this command from compl= eting.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +EFIAPI=0D +ProtocolIsVariablePolicyEnabled (=0D + OUT BOOLEAN *State=0D + )=0D +{=0D + *State =3D IsVariablePolicyEnabled ();=0D + return EFI_SUCCESS;=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D /**=0D Variable Driver main entry point. The Variable driver places the 4 EFI=0D runtime services in the EFI System Table and installs arch protocols=0D @@ -576,6 +616,19 @@ VariableServiceInitialize ( );=0D ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);=0D =0D + // Register and initialize the VariablePolicy engine.=0D + Status =3D InitVariablePolicyLib (VariableServiceGetVariable);=0D + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);=0D + Status =3D VarCheckRegisterSetVariableCheckHandler (ValidateSetVariable)= ;=0D + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);=0D + Status =3D gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (=0D + &mHandle,=0D + &gEdkiiVariablePolicyProtocolGuid,=0D + &mVariablePolicyProtocol,=0D + NULL=0D + );=0D + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);=0D +=0D return EFI_SUCCESS;=0D }=0D =0D diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariablePolicySmmDx= e.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariablePolicySmmDxe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e2d4cf4cec1a --- /dev/null +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariablePolicySmmDxe.c @@ -0,0 +1,642 @@ +/** @file -- VariablePolicySmmDxe.c=0D +This protocol allows communication with Variable Policy Engine.=0D +=0D +Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.=0D +SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent=0D +=0D +**/=0D +=0D +#include =0D +#include =0D +#include =0D +#include =0D +#include =0D +#include =0D +#include =0D +=0D +#include =0D +#include =0D +=0D +#include =0D +=0D +#include "Variable.h"=0D +=0D +EDKII_VARIABLE_POLICY_PROTOCOL mVariablePolicyProtocol;=0D +EFI_MM_COMMUNICATION2_PROTOCOL *mMmCommunication;=0D +=0D +VOID *mMmCommunicationBuffer;=0D +UINTN mMmCommunicationBufferSize;=0D +EFI_LOCK mMmCommunicationLock;=0D +=0D +/**=0D + Internal helper function to consolidate communication method.=0D +=0D + @param[in,out] CommBuffer=0D + @param[in,out] CommSize Size of the CommBuffer.=0D +=0D + @retval EFI_STATUS Result from communication method.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +InternalMmCommunicate (=0D + IN OUT VOID *CommBuffer,=0D + IN OUT UINTN *CommSize=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EFI_STATUS Status;=0D + if (CommBuffer =3D=3D NULL || CommSize =3D=3D NULL) {=0D + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;=0D + }=0D + Status =3D mMmCommunication->Communicate (mMmCommunication, CommBuffer, = CommBuffer, CommSize);=0D + return Status;=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + This API function disables the variable policy enforcement. If it's=0D + already been called once, will return EFI_ALREADY_STARTED.=0D +=0D + @retval EFI_SUCCESS=0D + @retval EFI_ALREADY_STARTED Has already been called once this boot= .=0D + @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Interface has been locked until reboot= .=0D + @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED Interface option is disabled by platfo= rm PCD.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +EFIAPI=0D +ProtocolDisableVariablePolicy (=0D + VOID=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EFI_STATUS Status;=0D + EFI_MM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER *CommHeader;=0D + VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER *PolicyHeader;=0D + UINTN BufferSize;=0D +=0D + // Check the PCD for convenience.=0D + // This would also be rejected by the lib, but why go to MM if we don't = have to?=0D + if (!PcdGetBool (PcdAllowVariablePolicyEnforcementDisable)) {=0D + return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;=0D + }=0D +=0D + AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mMmCommunicationLock);=0D +=0D + // Set up the MM communication.=0D + BufferSize =3D mMmCommunicationBufferSize;=0D + CommHeader =3D mMmCommunicationBuffer;=0D + PolicyHeader =3D (VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER*)&CommHeader->Data;=0D + CopyGuid( &CommHeader->HeaderGuid, &gVarCheckPolicyLibMmiHandlerGuid );= =0D + CommHeader->MessageLength =3D BufferSize;=0D + PolicyHeader->Signature =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_SIG;=0D + PolicyHeader->Revision =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_REVISION;=0D + PolicyHeader->Command =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMMAND_DISABLE;=0D +=0D + Status =3D InternalMmCommunicate (CommHeader, &BufferSize);=0D + DEBUG(( DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%a - MmCommunication returned %r.\n", __FUNCTION= __, Status ));=0D +=0D + ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mMmCommunicationLock);=0D +=0D + return (EFI_ERROR( Status )) ? Status : PolicyHeader->Result;=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + This API function returns whether or not the policy engine is=0D + currently being enforced.=0D +=0D + @param[out] State Pointer to a return value for whether the poli= cy enforcement=0D + is currently enabled.=0D +=0D + @retval EFI_SUCCESS=0D + @retval Others An error has prevented this command from compl= eting.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +EFIAPI=0D +ProtocolIsVariablePolicyEnabled (=0D + OUT BOOLEAN *State=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EFI_STATUS Status;=0D + EFI_MM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER *CommHeader;=0D + VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER *PolicyHeader;=0D + VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_IS_ENABLED_PARAMS *CommandParams;=0D + UINTN BufferSize;=0D +=0D + if (State =3D=3D NULL) {=0D + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;=0D + }=0D +=0D + AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mMmCommunicationLock);=0D +=0D + // Set up the MM communication.=0D + BufferSize =3D mMmCommunicationBufferSize;=0D + CommHeader =3D mMmCommunicationBuffer;=0D + PolicyHeader =3D (VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER*)&CommHeader->Data;=0D + CommandParams =3D (VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_IS_ENABLED_PARAMS*)(PolicyHeade= r + 1);=0D + CopyGuid( &CommHeader->HeaderGuid, &gVarCheckPolicyLibMmiHandlerGuid );= =0D + CommHeader->MessageLength =3D BufferSize;=0D + PolicyHeader->Signature =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_SIG;=0D + PolicyHeader->Revision =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_REVISION;=0D + PolicyHeader->Command =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMMAND_IS_ENABLED;=0D +=0D + Status =3D InternalMmCommunicate (CommHeader, &BufferSize);=0D + DEBUG(( DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%a - MmCommunication returned %r.\n", __FUNCTION= __, Status ));=0D +=0D + if (!EFI_ERROR( Status )) {=0D + Status =3D PolicyHeader->Result;=0D + *State =3D CommandParams->State;=0D + }=0D +=0D + ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mMmCommunicationLock);=0D +=0D + return Status;=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + This API function validates and registers a new policy with=0D + the policy enforcement engine.=0D +=0D + @param[in] NewPolicy Pointer to the incoming policy structure.=0D +=0D + @retval EFI_SUCCESS=0D + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER NewPolicy is NULL or is internally i= nconsistent.=0D + @retval EFI_ALREADY_STARTED An identical matching policy already= exists.=0D + @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED The interface has been locked until = the next reboot.=0D + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Policy enforcement has been disabled= . No reason to add more policies.=0D + @retval EFI_ABORTED A calculation error has prevented th= is function from completing.=0D + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Cannot grow the table to hold any mo= re policies.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +EFIAPI=0D +ProtocolRegisterVariablePolicy (=0D + IN CONST VARIABLE_POLICY_ENTRY *NewPolicy=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EFI_STATUS Status;=0D + EFI_MM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER *CommHeader;=0D + VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER *PolicyHeader;=0D + VOID *PolicyBuffer;=0D + UINTN BufferSize;=0D + UINTN RequiredSize;=0D +=0D + if (NewPolicy =3D=3D NULL) {=0D + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;=0D + }=0D +=0D + // First, make sure that the required size does not exceed the capabilit= ies=0D + // of the MmCommunication buffer.=0D + RequiredSize =3D OFFSET_OF(EFI_MM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER, Data) + sizeof(VAR= _CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER);=0D + Status =3D SafeUintnAdd( RequiredSize, NewPolicy->Size, &RequiredSize );= =0D + if (EFI_ERROR( Status ) || RequiredSize > mMmCommunicationBufferSize) {= =0D + DEBUG(( DEBUG_ERROR, "%a - Policy too large for buffer! %r, %d > %d \n= ", __FUNCTION__,=0D + Status, RequiredSize, mMmCommunicationBufferSize ));=0D + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;=0D + }=0D +=0D + AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mMmCommunicationLock);=0D +=0D + // Set up the MM communication.=0D + BufferSize =3D mMmCommunicationBufferSize;=0D + CommHeader =3D mMmCommunicationBuffer;=0D + PolicyHeader =3D (VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER*)&CommHeader->Data;=0D + PolicyBuffer =3D (VOID*)(PolicyHeader + 1);=0D + CopyGuid( &CommHeader->HeaderGuid, &gVarCheckPolicyLibMmiHandlerGuid );= =0D + CommHeader->MessageLength =3D BufferSize;=0D + PolicyHeader->Signature =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_SIG;=0D + PolicyHeader->Revision =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_REVISION;=0D + PolicyHeader->Command =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMMAND_REGISTER;=0D +=0D + // Copy the policy into place. This copy is safe because we've already t= ested above.=0D + CopyMem( PolicyBuffer, NewPolicy, NewPolicy->Size );=0D +=0D + Status =3D InternalMmCommunicate (CommHeader, &BufferSize);=0D + DEBUG(( DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%a - MmCommunication returned %r.\n", __FUNCTION= __, Status ));=0D +=0D + ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mMmCommunicationLock);=0D +=0D + return (EFI_ERROR( Status )) ? Status : PolicyHeader->Result;=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + This helper function takes care of the overhead of formatting, sending, = and interpreting=0D + the results for a single DumpVariablePolicy request.=0D +=0D + @param[in] PageRequested The page of the paginated results from M= M. 0 for metadata.=0D + @param[out] TotalSize The total size of the entire buffer. Ret= urned as part of metadata.=0D + @param[out] PageSize The size of the current page being retur= ned. Not valid as part of metadata.=0D + @param[out] HasMore A flag indicating whether there are more= pages after this one.=0D + @param[out] Buffer The start of the current page from MM.=0D +=0D + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Output params have been updated (eit= her metadata or dump page).=0D + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One of the output params is NULL.=0D + @retval Others Response from MM handler.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +DumpVariablePolicyHelper (=0D + IN UINT32 PageRequested,=0D + OUT UINT32 *TotalSize,=0D + OUT UINT32 *PageSize,=0D + OUT BOOLEAN *HasMore,=0D + OUT UINT8 **Buffer=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EFI_STATUS Status;=0D + EFI_MM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER *CommHeader;=0D + VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER *PolicyHeader;=0D + VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_DUMP_PARAMS *CommandParams;=0D + UINTN BufferSize;=0D +=0D + if (TotalSize =3D=3D NULL || PageSize =3D=3D NULL || HasMore =3D=3D NULL= || Buffer =3D=3D NULL) {=0D + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;=0D + }=0D +=0D + // Set up the MM communication.=0D + BufferSize =3D mMmCommunicationBufferSize;=0D + CommHeader =3D mMmCommunicationBuffer;=0D + PolicyHeader =3D (VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER*)&CommHeader->Data;=0D + CommandParams =3D (VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_DUMP_PARAMS*)(PolicyHeader + 1)= ;=0D + CopyGuid( &CommHeader->HeaderGuid, &gVarCheckPolicyLibMmiHandlerGuid );= =0D + CommHeader->MessageLength =3D BufferSize;=0D + PolicyHeader->Signature =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_SIG;=0D + PolicyHeader->Revision =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_REVISION;=0D + PolicyHeader->Command =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMMAND_DUMP;=0D +=0D + CommandParams->PageRequested =3D PageRequested;=0D +=0D + Status =3D InternalMmCommunicate (CommHeader, &BufferSize);=0D + DEBUG(( DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%a - MmCommunication returned %r.\n", __FUNCTION= __, Status ));=0D +=0D + if (!EFI_ERROR( Status )) {=0D + Status =3D PolicyHeader->Result;=0D + *TotalSize =3D CommandParams->TotalSize;=0D + *PageSize =3D CommandParams->PageSize;=0D + *HasMore =3D CommandParams->HasMore;=0D + *Buffer =3D (UINT8*)(CommandParams + 1);=0D + }=0D +=0D + return Status;=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + This API function will dump the entire contents of the variable policy t= able.=0D +=0D + Similar to GetVariable, the first call can be made with a 0 size and it = will return=0D + the size of the buffer required to hold the entire table.=0D +=0D + @param[out] Policy Pointer to the policy buffer. Can be NULL if Siz= e is 0.=0D + @param[in,out] Size On input, the size of the output buffer. On outp= ut, the size=0D + of the data returned.=0D +=0D + @retval EFI_SUCCESS Policy data is in the output buffer = and Size has been updated.=0D + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Size is NULL, or Size is non-zero an= d Policy is NULL.=0D + @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL Size is insufficient to hold policy.= Size updated with required size.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +EFIAPI=0D +ProtocolDumpVariablePolicy (=0D + OUT UINT8 *Policy OPTIONAL,=0D + IN OUT UINT32 *Size=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EFI_STATUS Status;=0D + UINT8 *Source;=0D + UINT8 *Destination;=0D + UINT32 PolicySize;=0D + UINT32 PageSize;=0D + BOOLEAN HasMore;=0D + UINT32 PageIndex;=0D +=0D + if (Size =3D=3D NULL || (*Size > 0 && Policy =3D=3D NULL)) {=0D + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;=0D + }=0D +=0D + AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mMmCommunicationLock);=0D +=0D + // Repeat this whole process until we either have a failure case or get = the entire buffer.=0D + do {=0D + // First, we must check the zero page to determine the buffer size and= =0D + // reset the internal state.=0D + PolicySize =3D 0;=0D + PageSize =3D 0;=0D + HasMore =3D FALSE;=0D + Status =3D DumpVariablePolicyHelper (0, &PolicySize, &PageSize, &HasMo= re, &Source);=0D + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {=0D + break;=0D + }=0D +=0D + // If we're good, we can at least check the required size now.=0D + if (*Size < PolicySize) {=0D + *Size =3D PolicySize;=0D + Status =3D EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;=0D + break;=0D + }=0D +=0D + // On further thought, let's update the size either way.=0D + *Size =3D PolicySize;=0D + // And get ready to ROCK.=0D + Destination =3D Policy;=0D +=0D + // Keep looping and copying until we're either done or freak out.=0D + for (PageIndex =3D 1; !EFI_ERROR (Status) && HasMore && PageIndex < MA= X_UINT32; PageIndex++) {=0D + Status =3D DumpVariablePolicyHelper (PageIndex, &PolicySize, &PageSi= ze, &HasMore, &Source);=0D + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {=0D + CopyMem (Destination, Source, PageSize);=0D + Destination +=3D PageSize;=0D + }=0D + }=0D +=0D + // Next, we check to see whether=0D + } while (Status =3D=3D EFI_TIMEOUT);=0D +=0D + ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mMmCommunicationLock);=0D +=0D + // There's currently no use for this, but it shouldn't be hard to implem= ent.=0D + return Status;=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + This API function locks the interface so that no more policy updates=0D + can be performed or changes made to the enforcement until the next boot.= =0D +=0D + @retval EFI_SUCCESS=0D + @retval Others An error has prevented this command from compl= eting.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +EFIAPI=0D +ProtocolLockVariablePolicy (=0D + VOID=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EFI_STATUS Status;=0D + EFI_MM_COMMUNICATE_HEADER *CommHeader;=0D + VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER *PolicyHeader;=0D + UINTN BufferSize;=0D +=0D + AcquireLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mMmCommunicationLock);=0D +=0D + // Set up the MM communication.=0D + BufferSize =3D mMmCommunicationBufferSize;=0D + CommHeader =3D mMmCommunicationBuffer;=0D + PolicyHeader =3D (VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_HEADER*)&CommHeader->Data;=0D + CopyGuid( &CommHeader->HeaderGuid, &gVarCheckPolicyLibMmiHandlerGuid );= =0D + CommHeader->MessageLength =3D BufferSize;=0D + PolicyHeader->Signature =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_SIG;=0D + PolicyHeader->Revision =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMM_REVISION;=0D + PolicyHeader->Command =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_COMMAND_LOCK;=0D +=0D + Status =3D InternalMmCommunicate (CommHeader, &BufferSize);=0D + DEBUG(( DEBUG_VERBOSE, "%a - MmCommunication returned %r.\n", __FUNCTION= __, Status ));=0D +=0D + ReleaseLockOnlyAtBootTime (&mMmCommunicationLock);=0D +=0D + return (EFI_ERROR( Status )) ? Status : PolicyHeader->Result;=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + This helper function locates the shared comm buffer and assigns it to in= put pointers.=0D +=0D + @param[in,out] BufferSize On input, the minimum buffer size requir= ed INCLUDING the MM communicate header.=0D + On output, the size of the matching buff= er found.=0D + @param[out] LocatedBuffer A pointer to the matching buffer.=0D +=0D + @retval EFI_SUCCESS=0D + @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One of the output pointers was NULL.= =0D + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough memory to allocate a comm= buffer.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +InitMmCommonCommBuffer (=0D + IN OUT UINTN *BufferSize,=0D + OUT VOID **LocatedBuffer=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EFI_STATUS Status;=0D +=0D + Status =3D EFI_SUCCESS;=0D +=0D + // Make sure that we're working with good pointers.=0D + if (BufferSize =3D=3D NULL || LocatedBuffer =3D=3D NULL) {=0D + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;=0D + }=0D +=0D + // Allocate the runtime memory for the comm buffer.=0D + *LocatedBuffer =3D AllocateRuntimePool (*BufferSize);=0D + if (*LocatedBuffer =3D=3D NULL) {=0D + Status =3D EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;=0D + *BufferSize =3D 0;=0D + }=0D +=0D + EfiInitializeLock (&mMmCommunicationLock, TPL_NOTIFY);=0D +=0D + return Status;=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + This helper is responsible for telemetry and any other actions that=0D + need to be taken if the VariablePolicy fails to lock.=0D +=0D + NOTE: It's possible that parts of this handling will need to become=0D + part of a platform policy.=0D +=0D + @param[in] FailureStatus The failure that was reported by LockVariabl= ePolicy=0D +=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +VOID=0D +VariablePolicyHandleFailureToLock (=0D + IN EFI_STATUS FailureStatus=0D + )=0D +{=0D + // For now, there's no agreed-upon policy for this.=0D + return;=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + ReadyToBoot Callback=0D + Lock the VariablePolicy interface if it hasn't already been locked.=0D +=0D + @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked= =0D + @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context=0D +=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +VOID=0D +EFIAPI=0D +LockPolicyInterfaceAtReadyToBoot (=0D + IN EFI_EVENT Event,=0D + IN VOID *Context=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EFI_STATUS Status;=0D +=0D + Status =3D ProtocolLockVariablePolicy();=0D +=0D + if (EFI_ERROR( Status )) {=0D + VariablePolicyHandleFailureToLock( Status );=0D + }=0D + else {=0D + gBS->CloseEvent( Event );=0D + }=0D +=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + Convert internal pointer addresses to virtual addresses.=0D +=0D + @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked= .=0D + @param[in] Context The pointer to the notification function's context= , which=0D + is implementation-dependent.=0D +**/=0D +STATIC=0D +VOID=0D +EFIAPI=0D +VariablePolicyVirtualAddressCallback (=0D + IN EFI_EVENT Event,=0D + IN VOID *Context=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EfiConvertPointer (0, (VOID **)&mMmCommunication);=0D + EfiConvertPointer (0, (VOID **)&mMmCommunicationBuffer);=0D +}=0D +=0D +=0D +/**=0D + The driver's entry point.=0D +=0D + @param[in] ImageHandle The firmware allocated handle for the EFI image.= =0D + @param[in] SystemTable A pointer to the EFI System Table.=0D +=0D + @retval EFI_SUCCESS The entry point executed successfully.=0D + @retval other Some error occured when executing this entry poi= nt.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +EFIAPI=0D +VariablePolicySmmDxeMain (=0D + IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,=0D + IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable=0D + )=0D +{=0D + EFI_STATUS Status;=0D + BOOLEAN ProtocolInstalled;=0D + BOOLEAN CallbackRegistered;=0D + BOOLEAN VirtualAddressChangeRegistered;=0D + EFI_EVENT ReadyToBootEvent;=0D + EFI_EVENT VirtualAddressChangeEvent;=0D +=0D + Status =3D EFI_SUCCESS;=0D + ProtocolInstalled =3D FALSE;=0D + CallbackRegistered =3D FALSE;=0D + VirtualAddressChangeRegistered =3D FALSE;=0D +=0D + // Update the minimum buffer size.=0D + mMmCommunicationBufferSize =3D VAR_CHECK_POLICY_MM_COMM_BUFFER_SIZE;=0D + // Locate the shared comm buffer to use for sending MM commands.=0D + Status =3D InitMmCommonCommBuffer( &mMmCommunicationBufferSize, &mMmComm= unicationBuffer );=0D + if (EFI_ERROR( Status )) {=0D + DEBUG((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a - Failed to locate a viable MM comm buffer! %r= \n", __FUNCTION__, Status));=0D + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR( Status );=0D + return Status;=0D + }=0D +=0D + // Locate the MmCommunication protocol.=0D + Status =3D gBS->LocateProtocol( &gEfiMmCommunication2ProtocolGuid, NULL,= (VOID**)&mMmCommunication );=0D + if (EFI_ERROR( Status )) {=0D + DEBUG((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a - Failed to locate MmCommunication protocol! %= r\n", __FUNCTION__, Status));=0D + ASSERT_EFI_ERROR( Status );=0D + return Status;=0D + }=0D +=0D + // Configure the VariablePolicy protocol structure.=0D + mVariablePolicyProtocol.Revision =3D EDKII_VARIABLE_POLIC= Y_PROTOCOL_REVISION;=0D + mVariablePolicyProtocol.DisableVariablePolicy =3D ProtocolDisableVaria= blePolicy;=0D + mVariablePolicyProtocol.IsVariablePolicyEnabled =3D ProtocolIsVariablePo= licyEnabled;=0D + mVariablePolicyProtocol.RegisterVariablePolicy =3D ProtocolRegisterVari= ablePolicy;=0D + mVariablePolicyProtocol.DumpVariablePolicy =3D ProtocolDumpVariable= Policy;=0D + mVariablePolicyProtocol.LockVariablePolicy =3D ProtocolLockVariable= Policy;=0D +=0D + // Register all the protocols and return the status.=0D + Status =3D gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces( &ImageHandle,=0D + &gEdkiiVariablePolicyPr= otocolGuid, &mVariablePolicyProtocol,=0D + NULL );=0D + if (EFI_ERROR( Status )) {=0D + DEBUG(( DEBUG_ERROR, "%a - Failed to install protocol! %r\n", __FUNCTI= ON__, Status ));=0D + goto Exit;=0D + }=0D + else {=0D + ProtocolInstalled =3D TRUE;=0D + }=0D +=0D + //=0D + // Register a callback for ReadyToBoot so that the interface is at least= locked before=0D + // dispatching any bootloaders or UEFI apps.=0D + Status =3D gBS->CreateEventEx( EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL,=0D + TPL_CALLBACK,=0D + LockPolicyInterfaceAtReadyToBoot,=0D + NULL,=0D + &gEfiEventReadyToBootGuid,=0D + &ReadyToBootEvent );=0D + if (EFI_ERROR( Status )) {=0D + DEBUG(( DEBUG_ERROR, "%a - Failed to create ReadyToBoot event! %r\n", = __FUNCTION__, Status ));=0D + goto Exit;=0D + }=0D + else {=0D + CallbackRegistered =3D TRUE;=0D + }=0D +=0D + //=0D + // Register a VirtualAddressChange callback for the MmComm protocol and = Comm buffer.=0D + Status =3D gBS->CreateEventEx (EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL,=0D + TPL_NOTIFY,=0D + VariablePolicyVirtualAddressCallback,=0D + NULL,=0D + &gEfiEventVirtualAddressChangeGuid,=0D + &VirtualAddressChangeEvent);=0D + if (EFI_ERROR( Status )) {=0D + DEBUG(( DEBUG_ERROR, "%a - Failed to create VirtualAddressChange event= ! %r\n", __FUNCTION__, Status ));=0D + goto Exit;=0D + }=0D + else {=0D + VirtualAddressChangeRegistered =3D TRUE;=0D + }=0D +=0D +=0D +Exit:=0D + //=0D + // If we're about to return a failed status (and unload this driver), we= must first undo anything that=0D + // has been successfully done.=0D + if (EFI_ERROR( Status )) {=0D + if (ProtocolInstalled) {=0D + gBS->UninstallProtocolInterface( &ImageHandle, &gEdkiiVariablePolicy= ProtocolGuid, &mVariablePolicyProtocol );=0D + }=0D + if (CallbackRegistered) {=0D + gBS->CloseEvent( ReadyToBootEvent );=0D + }=0D + if (VirtualAddressChangeRegistered) {=0D + gBS->CloseEvent( VirtualAddressChangeEvent );=0D + }=0D + }=0D +=0D + return Status;=0D +}=0D diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeD= xe.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c index 663a1aaa128f..c47e614d81f4 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c @@ -65,6 +65,17 @@ EFI_LOCK mVariableServicesLock; EDKII_VARIABLE_LOCK_PROTOCOL mVariableLock;=0D EDKII_VAR_CHECK_PROTOCOL mVarCheck;=0D =0D +/**=0D + The logic to initialize the VariablePolicy engine is in its own file.=0D +=0D +**/=0D +EFI_STATUS=0D +EFIAPI=0D +VariablePolicySmmDxeMain (=0D + IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,=0D + IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable=0D + );=0D +=0D /**=0D Some Secure Boot Policy Variable may update following other variable cha= nges(SecureBoot follows PK change, etc).=0D Record their initial State when variable write service is ready.=0D @@ -1796,6 +1807,9 @@ VariableSmmRuntimeInitialize ( &mVirtualAddressChangeEvent=0D );=0D =0D + // Initialize the VariablePolicy protocol and engine.=0D + VariablePolicySmmDxeMain (ImageHandle, SystemTable);=0D +=0D return EFI_SUCCESS;=0D }=0D =0D diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.= inf b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf index ceea5d1ff9ac..48ac167906f7 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ # buffer overflow or integer overflow.=0D #=0D # Copyright (c) 2006 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
=0D +# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.=0D # SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent=0D #=0D ##=0D @@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ [LibraryClasses] TpmMeasurementLib=0D AuthVariableLib=0D VarCheckLib=0D + VariablePolicyLib=0D =0D [Protocols]=0D gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES=0D diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf b/M= deModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf index bc3033588d40..bbc8d2080193 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ # the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and = the behavior is undefined.=0D #=0D # Copyright (c) 2010 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
=0D +# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.=0D # SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent=0D #=0D ##=0D @@ -78,6 +79,8 @@ [LibraryClasses] AuthVariableLib=0D VarCheckLib=0D UefiBootServicesTableLib=0D + VariablePolicyLib=0D + VariablePolicyHelperLib=0D =0D [Protocols]=0D gEfiSmmFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES=0D diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeD= xe.inf b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.i= nf index 01564e4c5068..f217530b2985 100644 --- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.inf +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.inf @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ # the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and = the behavior is undefined.=0D #=0D # Copyright (c) 2010 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
=0D +# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.
=0D # SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent=0D #=0D ##=0D @@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ [Sources] VariableParsing.c=0D VariableParsing.h=0D Variable.h=0D + VariablePolicySmmDxe.c=0D =0D [Packages]=0D MdePkg/MdePkg.dec=0D @@ -56,6 +58,8 @@ [LibraryClasses] DxeServicesTableLib=0D UefiDriverEntryPoint=0D TpmMeasurementLib=0D + SafeIntLib=0D + PcdLib=0D =0D [Protocols]=0D gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES=0D @@ -67,11 +71,15 @@ [Protocols] gEfiSmmVariableProtocolGuid=0D gEdkiiVariableLockProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES=0D gEdkiiVarCheckProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES=0D + gEdkiiVariablePolicyProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES=0D =0D [FeaturePcd]=0D gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEnableVariableRuntimeCache #= # CONSUMES=0D gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVariableCollectStatistics #= # CONSUMES=0D =0D +[Pcd]=0D + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAllowVariablePolicyEnforcementDisable = ## CONSUMES=0D +=0D [Guids]=0D ## PRODUCES ## GUID # Signature of Variable store header=0D ## CONSUMES ## GUID # Signature of Variable store header=0D @@ -99,6 +107,8 @@ [Guids] ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"dbt"=0D gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid=0D =0D + gVarCheckPolicyLibMmiHandlerGuid=0D +=0D [Depex]=0D gEfiMmCommunication2ProtocolGuid=0D =0D --=20 2.26.2.windows.1.8.g01c50adf56.20200515075929