From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v2 12/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 06:51:32 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210430115148.22267-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210430115148.22267-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
During the SEV-SNP guest launch sequence, two special pages need to be
inserted, the secrets and CPUID. The secrets page, contain the VM
platform communication keys. The guest BIOS and/or OS can use this key
to communicate with the SEV firmware to get the attestation report.
The CPUID page, contain the CPUIDs entries filtered through the AMD-SEV
firmware.
OvmfPkg already reserves the memory for the Secrets Page in the MEMFD.
Extend the MEMFD to reserve the memory for the CPUID page.
See SEV-SNP spec for more information on the content layout of the secrets
and CPUID page, and how it can be used by the SEV-SNP guest VM.
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 6 ++++++
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 3 +++
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 13 +++++++++++++
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 2 ++
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 2 ++
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 2 ++
7 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
index 9629707020..dac5fb1653 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
@@ -317,6 +317,12 @@
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase|0x0|UINT32|0x42
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize|0x0|UINT32|0x43
+ ## The base address and size of the SEV-SNP CPUID Area provisioned by the
+ # SEV-SNP firmware. If this is set in the .fdf, the platform
+ # is responsible for protecting the area from DXE phase overwrites.
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidBase|0x0|UINT32|0x47
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize|0x0|UINT32|0x48
+
[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableEvent|0|UINT64|2
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashVariablesEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x10
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
index b04175f77c..5cc1da425e 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.P
0x00D000|0x001000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
+0x00E000|0x001000
+gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize
+
0x010000|0x010000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c
index c08aa2e45a..02584123c1 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c
@@ -894,6 +894,19 @@ InitializeRamRegions (
EfiACPIMemoryNVS
);
}
+
+ if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
+ //
+ // If SEV-SNP is enabled, reserve the CPUID page. The memory range should
+ // not be treated as a RAM and must be mapped encrypted by the guest OS, so,
+ // reserve it as ACPI NVS.
+ //
+ BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
+ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN) PcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpCpuidBase),
+ (UINT64)(UINTN) PcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize),
+ EfiACPIMemoryNVS
+ );
+ }
#endif
}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
index 6ef77ba7bb..6d18b0be9f 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@
gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMemoryTypeEfiReservedMemoryType
gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMemoryTypeEfiRuntimeServicesCode
gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMemoryTypeEfiRuntimeServicesData
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidBase
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupSize
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
index 9c0b5853a4..05c7e32f46 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
@@ -47,6 +47,24 @@ TIMES (15 - ((guidedStructureEnd - guidedStructureStart + 15) % 16)) DB 0
;
guidedStructureStart:
+;
+; SEV-SNP boot support
+;
+; sevSnpBlock:
+; For the initial boot of SEV-SNP guest, a CPUID page must be reserved by
+; the BIOS at a RAM area defined by SEV_SNP_CPUID_BASE. A hypervisor will
+; locate this information using the SEV-SNP boot block GUID.
+;
+; GUID (SEV-SNP boot block): bd39c0c2-2f8e-4243-83e8-1b74cebcb7d9
+;
+sevSnpBootBlockStart:
+ DD SNP_CPUID_BASE
+ DD SNP_CPUID_SIZE
+ DW sevSnpBootBlockEnd - sevSnpBootBlockStart
+ DB 0xC2, 0xC0, 0x39, 0xBD, 0x8e, 0x2F, 0x43, 0x42
+ DB 0x83, 0xE8, 0x1B, 0x74, 0xCE, 0xBC, 0xB7, 0xD9
+sevSnpBootBlockEnd:
+
;
; SEV Secret block
;
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
index dc38f68919..8e52265602 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
@@ -45,5 +45,7 @@
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
[FixedPcd]
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidBase
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
index 5fbacaed5f..57f01aa7c7 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
@@ -88,5 +88,7 @@
%define SEV_ES_AP_RESET_IP FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase)
%define SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET_BASE FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase)
%define SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET_SIZE FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretSize)
+ %define SNP_CPUID_BASE FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpCpuidBase)
+ %define SNP_CPUID_SIZE FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize)
%include "Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm"
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-30 11:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-30 11:51 [PATCH RFC v2 00/28] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 01/28] MdePkg: Expand the SEV MSR to include the SNP definition Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 8:39 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 11:42 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 02/28] MdePkg: Define the GHCB Hypervisor features Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 10:10 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:40 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 03/28] MdePkg: Define the GHCB GPA structure Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 10:24 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:19 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 12:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:50 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-03 13:55 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 04/28] MdePkg: Define the Page State Change VMGEXIT structures Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 12:33 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 13:59 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 14:48 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-05-04 18:07 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 18:53 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 18:24 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-05 19:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 05/28] MdePkg: Add AsmPvalidate() support Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 13:58 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 14:09 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-04 19:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 18:56 ` Laszlo Ersek
[not found] ` <167BF2A01FA60569.6407@groups.io>
2021-05-04 19:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:10 ` Laszlo Ersek
[not found] ` <167BF53DA09B327E.22277@groups.io>
2021-05-04 20:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-04 23:03 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:19 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-05 19:17 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 06/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 10:39 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 19:18 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 07/28] OvmfPkg: Use MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear EncMask from Mmio Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 10:50 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 19:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 08/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Remove CacheFlush parameter Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 11:08 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 09/28] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Allow PMBASE register access in Dxe phase Brijesh Singh
2021-05-06 14:08 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 14:12 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-07 13:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-07 15:10 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-07 15:19 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-07 15:47 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 10/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 11/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve Secrets page in MEMFD Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 6:42 ` [edk2-devel] " Dov Murik
2021-05-05 13:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 19:33 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 10:57 ` Dov Murik
2021-05-06 15:06 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-05-06 16:12 ` James Bottomley
2021-05-06 16:02 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-30 11:51 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 13/28] OvmfPkg: Validate the data pages used in the Reset vector and SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 14/28] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 15/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 16/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Extend Es Workarea to include hv features Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 17/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 13:05 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-05-03 14:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 18/28] OvmfPkg: Add a library to support registering GHCB GPA Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 19/28] OvmfPkg: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 20/28] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 21/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-05-03 14:04 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-05-03 18:56 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 22/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 23/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 24/28] OvmfPkg/SecMain: Pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 25/28] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 26/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 27/28] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-05-05 7:10 ` [edk2-devel] " Dov Murik
2021-05-05 19:37 ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-04-30 11:51 ` [PATCH RFC v2 28/28] MdePkg/GHCB: Increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-04-30 16:49 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 00/28] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Laszlo Ersek
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