From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>,
Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 15/27] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 12:42:11 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210628174223.1302-16-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210628174223.1302-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
The MemEncryptSevSnpPreValidateSystemRam() is used for pre-validating the
system RAM. As the boot progress, each phase validates a fixed region of
the RAM. In the PEI phase, the PlatformPei detects all the available RAM
and calls to pre-validate the detected system RAM.
While validating the system RAM in PEI phase, we must skip previously
validated system RAM to avoid the double validation.
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
.../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 2 +
.../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
index 0402e49a1028..f4058911e7b6 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
@@ -58,3 +58,5 @@ [FeaturePcd]
[FixedPcd]
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedEnd
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedStart
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
index 64aab7f45b6d..3e692a3b869d 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
@@ -14,6 +14,44 @@
#include "SnpPageStateChange.h"
+typedef struct {
+ UINT64 StartAddress;
+ UINT64 EndAddress;
+} SNP_PRE_VALIDATED_RANGE;
+
+STATIC SNP_PRE_VALIDATED_RANGE mPreValidatedRange[] = {
+ // This range is pre-validated by the Hypervisor.
+ {
+ FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedStart),
+ FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedEnd)
+ }
+};
+
+STATIC
+BOOLEAN
+DetectPreValidatedOverLap (
+ IN PHYSICAL_ADDRESS StartAddress,
+ IN PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EndAddress,
+ OUT SNP_PRE_VALIDATED_RANGE *OverlapRange
+ )
+{
+ UINTN i;
+
+ //
+ // Check if the specified address range exist in pre-validated array.
+ //
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE (mPreValidatedRange); i++) {
+ if ((mPreValidatedRange[i].StartAddress < EndAddress) &&
+ (StartAddress < mPreValidatedRange[i].EndAddress)) {
+ OverlapRange->StartAddress = mPreValidatedRange[i].StartAddress;
+ OverlapRange->EndAddress = mPreValidatedRange[i].EndAddress;
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
/**
Pre-validate the system RAM when SEV-SNP is enabled in the guest VM.
@@ -28,9 +66,34 @@ MemEncryptSevSnpPreValidateSystemRam (
IN UINTN NumPages
)
{
+ PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EndAddress;
+ SNP_PRE_VALIDATED_RANGE OverlapRange;
+
if (!MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
return;
}
- InternalSetPageState (BaseAddress, NumPages, SevSnpPagePrivate, TRUE);
+ EndAddress = BaseAddress + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (NumPages);
+
+ while (BaseAddress < EndAddress) {
+ //
+ // Check if the range overlaps with the pre-validated ranges.
+ //
+ if (DetectPreValidatedOverLap (BaseAddress, EndAddress, &OverlapRange)) {
+ // Validate the non-overlap regions.
+ if (BaseAddress < OverlapRange.StartAddress) {
+ NumPages = EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (OverlapRange.StartAddress - BaseAddress);
+
+ InternalSetPageState (BaseAddress, NumPages, SevSnpPagePrivate, TRUE);
+ }
+
+ BaseAddress = OverlapRange.EndAddress;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // Validate the remaining pages.
+ NumPages = EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (EndAddress - BaseAddress);
+ InternalSetPageState (BaseAddress, NumPages, SevSnpPagePrivate, TRUE);
+ BaseAddress = EndAddress;
+ }
}
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-28 17:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-28 17:41 [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:41 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move SEV specific code in a separate file Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:41 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: add the macro to invoke MSR protocol based VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-06-29 18:06 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:41 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: add the macro to request guest termination Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/27] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/27] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV-SNP boot block GUID Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/27] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/27] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/27] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/27] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the SEV-SNP enabled PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/27] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/27] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/27] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/27] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-07-28 8:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Yao, Jiewen
2021-07-28 15:22 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-28 16:38 ` [edk2-devel] " Yao, Jiewen
2021-07-29 2:22 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-08-03 15:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-04 13:16 ` Yao, Jiewen
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