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From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
	Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
	Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
	Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 17/27] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 12:42:13 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210628174223.1302-18-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210628174223.1302-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275

The VMM launch sequence should have pre-validated all the data pages used
in the Reset vector. The range does not cover the data pages used during
the SEC phase (mainly PEI and DXE firmware volume decompression memory).

When SEV-SNP is active, the memory must be pre-validated before the access.
Add support to pre-validate the memory range from SnpSecPreValidatedStart
to SnpSecPreValidatedEnd. This should be sufficent to enter into the PEI
phase.

Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |  5 ++++
 .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |  2 ++
 OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf                       |  3 +++
 .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  5 ++++
 OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c                         | 27 +++++++++++++++++++
 OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc       |  5 ++++
 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
index d0ec14ca2318..afc559d74335 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
@@ -339,6 +339,11 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedStart|0x0|UINT32|0x51
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedEnd|0x0|UINT32|0x52
 
+  ## The range of memory that need to be pre-validated in the SEC phase
+  #  when SEV-SNP is active in the guest VM.
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedStart|0|UINT32|0x53
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedEnd|0|UINT32|0x54
+
 [PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableEvent|0|UINT64|2
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashVariablesEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x10
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
index f4058911e7b6..2b60920f4b25 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
@@ -58,5 +58,7 @@ [FeaturePcd]
 
 [FixedPcd]
   gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedEnd
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedStart
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedEnd
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedStart
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
index 7f78dcee2772..8144b1d115cf 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ [LibraryClasses]
   PeCoffExtraActionLib
   ExtractGuidedSectionLib
   LocalApicLib
+  MemEncryptSevLib
   CpuExceptionHandlerLib
 
 [Ppis]
@@ -70,6 +71,8 @@ [Pcd]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableSize
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDecompressionScratchEnd
   gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdInitValueInTempStack
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedStart
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedEnd
 
 [FeaturePcd]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmmSmramRequire
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
index 69ffb79633c4..253d42073907 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ STATIC SNP_PRE_VALIDATED_RANGE mPreValidatedRange[] = {
   {
     FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedStart),
     FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedEnd)
+  },
+  // This range is pre-validated by the Sec/SecMain.c
+  {
+    FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedStart),
+    FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedEnd)
   }
 };
 
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
index c10441ddf472..f949a9b0349e 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
@@ -915,6 +915,26 @@ SevEsIsEnabled (
   return ((SevEsWorkArea != NULL) && (SevEsWorkArea->SevEsEnabled != 0));
 }
 
+/**
+ Pre-validate System RAM used for decompressing the PEI and DXE firmware volumes
+ when SEV-SNP is active. The PCDs SecPreValidatedStart and SecPreValidatedEnd are
+ set in OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc.
+
+**/
+STATIC
+VOID
+SevSnpSecPreValidateSystemRam (
+  VOID
+  )
+{
+  PHYSICAL_ADDRESS        Start, End;
+
+  Start = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) PcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedStart);
+  End = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) PcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedEnd);
+
+  MemEncryptSevSnpPreValidateSystemRam (Start, EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (End - Start));
+}
+
 VOID
 EFIAPI
 SecCoreStartupWithStack (
@@ -1046,6 +1066,13 @@ SecCoreStartupWithStack (
   SecCoreData.BootFirmwareVolumeBase = BootFv;
   SecCoreData.BootFirmwareVolumeSize = (UINTN) BootFv->FvLength;
 
+  if (SevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
+    //
+    // Pre-validate the System RAM used in the SEC Phase
+    //
+    SevSnpSecPreValidateSystemRam ();
+  }
+
   //
   // Make sure the 8259 is masked before initializing the Debug Agent and the debug timer is enabled
   //
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc b/OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc
index 46f52583297c..b560fb0b8e4f 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc
@@ -63,3 +63,8 @@
 DEFINE DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE           = (($(DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE_UNALIGNED) + $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE_ALIGNMENT)) & $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE_MASK))
 
 SET gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDecompressionScratchEnd = $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE) + $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE)
+
+#
+# The range of pages that should be pre-validated during the SEC phase when SEV-SNP is active in the guest VM.
+SET gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedStart = $(MEMFD_BASE_ADDRESS) + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase
+SET gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecPreValidatedEnd = $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE) + $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE)
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-28 17:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-28 17:41 [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:41 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move SEV specific code in a separate file Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:41 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: add the macro to invoke MSR protocol based VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-06-29 18:06   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:41 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: add the macro to request guest termination Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/27] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/27] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV-SNP boot block GUID Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/27] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/27] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/27] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/27] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the SEV-SNP enabled PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/27] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/27] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/27] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/27] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-07-28  8:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Yao, Jiewen
2021-07-28 15:22   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-28 16:38     ` [edk2-devel] " Yao, Jiewen
2021-07-29  2:22       ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-08-03 15:01         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-04 13:16           ` Yao, Jiewen

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