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From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
	Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
	Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
	Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 07/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 12:42:03 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210628174223.1302-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210628174223.1302-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275

An SEV-SNP guest requires that private memory (aka pages mapped encrypted)
must be validated before being accessed.

The validation process consist of the following sequence:

1) Set the memory encryption attribute in the page table (aka C-bit).
   Note: If the processor is in non-PAE mode, then all the memory accesses
   are considered private.
2) Add the memory range as private in the RMP table. This can be performed
   using the Page State Change VMGEXIT defined in the GHCB specification.
3) Use the PVALIDATE instruction to set the Validated Bit in the RMP table.

During the guest creation time, the VMM encrypts the OVMF_CODE.fd using
the SEV-SNP firmware provided LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command. In addition to
encrypting the content, the command also validates the memory region.
This allows us to execute the code without going through the validation
sequence.

During execution, the reset vector need to access some data pages
(such as page tables, SevESWorkarea, Sec stack). The data pages are
accessed as private memory. The data pages are not part of the
OVMF_CODE.fd, so they were not validated during the guest creation.

There are two approaches we can take to validate the data pages before
the access:

a) Enhance the OVMF reset vector code to validate the pages as described
   above (go through step 2 - 3).
OR
b) Validate the pages during the guest creation time. The SEV firmware
   provides a command which can be used by the VMM to validate the pages
   without affecting the measurement of the launch.

Approach #b seems much simpler; it does not require any changes to the
OVMF reset vector code.

Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                          | 5 +++++
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                       | 8 +++++++-
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf          | 2 ++
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 5 +++++
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb        | 2 ++
 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
index 93f759534ade..d0ec14ca2318 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
@@ -334,6 +334,11 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidBase|0|UINT32|0x49
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize|0|UINT32|0x50
 
+  ## The start and end of pre-validated memory region by the hypervisor
+  #  through the SEV-SNP firmware.
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedStart|0x0|UINT32|0x51
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedEnd|0x0|UINT32|0x52
+
 [PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableEvent|0|UINT64|2
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashVariablesEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x10
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
index 3e257aaf72bd..6bce3369e10d 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
@@ -105,7 +105,13 @@ [FD.MEMFD]
 gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDxeMemFvBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDxeMemFvSize
 FV = DXEFV
 
-################################################################################
+##########################################################################################
+#
+# The range of the pages pre-validated through the SEV-SNP firmware.
+#
+SET gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedStart = $(MEMFD_BASE_ADDRESS) + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase
+SET gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedEnd = $(MEMFD_BASE_ADDRESS) + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase
+##########################################################################################
 
 [FV.SECFV]
 FvNameGuid         = 763BED0D-DE9F-48F5-81F1-3E90E1B1A015
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
index 9a95d8687345..32206855193f 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
@@ -51,3 +51,5 @@ [FixedPcd]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidBase
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedStart
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedEnd
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
index ecf1dbcc2caf..c5a062e69b26 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
@@ -57,9 +57,14 @@ guidedStructureStart:
 ;   SEV-SNP boot block GUID and provide the GPA to the PSP to populate
 ;   the memory area with the required information..
 ;
+;   In order to boot the SEV-SNP guest the hypervisor must pre-validated the
+;   memory range from SNP_HV_VALIDATED_START to SNP_HV_VALIDATED_END.
+;
 ; GUID (SEV-SNP boot block): bd39c0c2-2f8e-4243-83e8-1b74cebcb7d9
 ;
 sevSnpBootBlockStart:
+    DD      SNP_HV_VALIDATED_START
+    DD      SNP_HV_VALIDATED_END
     DD      SNP_SECRETS_BASE
     DD      SNP_SECRETS_SIZE
     DD      SNP_CPUID_BASE
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
index 247f4eb0dc5e..645e949845f9 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
@@ -93,5 +93,7 @@
   %define SNP_CPUID_SIZE  FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpCpuidSize)
   %define SNP_SECRETS_BASE  FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase)
   %define SNP_SECRETS_SIZE  FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize)
+  %define SNP_HV_VALIDATED_START FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedStart)
+  %define SNP_HV_VALIDATED_END FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpHypervisorPreValidatedEnd)
 %include "Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm"
 
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-28 17:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-28 17:41 [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:41 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move SEV specific code in a separate file Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:41 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: add the macro to invoke MSR protocol based VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-06-29 18:06   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:41 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: add the macro to request guest termination Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/27] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/27] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV-SNP boot block GUID Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/27] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/27] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/27] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/27] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/27] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/27] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the SEV-SNP enabled PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/27] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/27] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/27] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/27] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/27] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-06-28 17:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/27] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-07-28  8:16 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Yao, Jiewen
2021-07-28 15:22   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-28 16:38     ` [edk2-devel] " Yao, Jiewen
2021-07-29  2:22       ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-08-03 15:01         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-04 13:16           ` Yao, Jiewen

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