From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>,
Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v5 19/28] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 07:53:12 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210630125321.30278-20-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210630125321.30278-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
When SEV-SNP is active, a memory region mapped encrypted in the page
table must be validated before access. There are two approaches that
can be taken to validate the system RAM detected during the PEI phase:
1) Validate on-demand
OR
2) Validate before access
On-demand
=========
If memory is not validated before access, it will cause a #VC
exception with the page-not-validated error code. The VC exception
handler can perform the validation steps.
The pages that have been validated will need to be tracked to avoid
the double validation scenarios. The range of memory that has not
been validated will need to be communicated to the OS through the
recently introduced unaccepted memory type
https://github.com/microsoft/mu_basecore/pull/66, so that OS can
validate those ranges before using them.
Validate before access
======================
Since the PEI phase detects all the available system RAM, use the
MemEncryptSevSnpValidateSystemRam() function to pre-validate the
system RAM in the PEI phase.
For now, choose option 2 due to the dependency and the complexity
of the on-demand validation.
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
index de876fdb478e..391e7bbb7dbd 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
@@ -23,6 +23,40 @@
#include "Platform.h"
+/**
+ Initialize SEV-SNP support if running as an SEV-SNP guest.
+
+**/
+STATIC
+VOID
+AmdSevSnpInitialize (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ EFI_PEI_HOB_POINTERS Hob;
+ EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR *ResourceHob;
+
+ if (!MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Iterate through the system RAM and validate it.
+ //
+ for (Hob.Raw = GetHobList (); !END_OF_HOB_LIST (Hob); Hob.Raw = GET_NEXT_HOB (Hob)) {
+ if (Hob.Raw != NULL && GET_HOB_TYPE (Hob) == EFI_HOB_TYPE_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR) {
+ ResourceHob = Hob.ResourceDescriptor;
+
+ if (ResourceHob->ResourceType == EFI_RESOURCE_SYSTEM_MEMORY) {
+ MemEncryptSevSnpPreValidateSystemRam (
+ ResourceHob->PhysicalStart,
+ EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES ((UINTN) ResourceHob->ResourceLength)
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/**
Handle an SEV-SNP/GHCB protocol check failure.
@@ -240,6 +274,14 @@ AmdSevInitialize (
return;
}
+ //
+ // Check and perform SEV-SNP initialization if required. This need to be
+ // done before the GHCB page is made shared in the AmdSevEsInitialize(). This
+ // is because the system RAM must be validated before it is made shared.
+ // The AmdSevSnpInitialize() validates the system RAM.
+ //
+ AmdSevSnpInitialize ();
+
//
// Set Memory Encryption Mask PCD
//
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-30 12:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-30 12:52 [RFC PATCH v5 00/28] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:52 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move SEV specific code in a separate file Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:52 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: add the macro to invoke MSR protocol based VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:52 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: add the macro to request guest termination Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:52 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/28] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:52 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/28] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:52 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV-SNP boot block GUID Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-07-31 8:44 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-08-03 15:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/28] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/28] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/28] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/28] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/28] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/28] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/28] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 20/28] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the SEV-SNP enabled PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 21/28] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 22/28] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 23/28] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 24/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 25/28] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 26/28] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 27/28] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 12:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 28/28] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 7:33 ` [edk2-devel] [RFC PATCH v5 00/28] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Gerd Hoffmann
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