From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 11:16:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210901161646.24763-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integrity
protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
encryption environment.
This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP
VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-SNP
such as interrupt protection.
Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP
VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the
guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to
guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE
instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request NAE"
defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page
from the RMP table.
Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated,
as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two
approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and
Lazy Validation.
Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under
lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a
unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception
handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of
the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The
recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate the
unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS.
At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the available
system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is validated
before it is made available to the EDK2 core.
Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP
guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the
SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted.
Additional resources
---------------------
SEV-SNP whitepaper
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)
The complete source is available at
https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/sev-snp-rfc-5
GHCB spec:
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
SEV-SNP firmware specification:
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
Change since v5:
* When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page
* Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c
* Rebase to the latest code
* Add the review feedback from Yao.
Change since v4:
* Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS
* Add VMPL-0 check
Change since v3:
* ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to keep
the code readable.
* Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state.
* Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB GPA.
* Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the
AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it.
* Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets.
Changes since v2:
* Add support for the AP creation.
* Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI reads.
* Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
*
Changes since v1:
* Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
* Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
* Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is supported.
* Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from MMIO ranges.
* Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
* Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location through
EFI configuration table.
Brijesh Singh (25):
OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page
OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for SEV-SNP
OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV-SNP boot block GUID
OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page
OvmfPkg/ResetVector: check the vmpl level
OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase
UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs
OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
phase
OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the SEV-SNP enabled PCD
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD
MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
enabled
OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table
OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map
OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
table
Michael Roth (3):
OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check
Tom Lendacky (1):
UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 23 +
UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec | 11 +
OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 5 +-
OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc | 5 +-
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 1 +
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 6 +-
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 5 +-
OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 5 +-
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 12 +-
OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf | 7 +
.../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 +
.../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 7 +
.../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 +
OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf | 2 +
OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf | 3 +
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 10 +
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 6 +
OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf | 4 +
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf | 4 +
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf | 4 +
MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h | 2 +-
.../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h | 18 +
OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 26 +
.../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h | 31 ++
.../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 19 +
OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h | 95 ++++
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h | 20 +
OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 23 +
.../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++
.../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 17 +
.../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++
.../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 19 +
.../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 40 ++
.../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 167 ++++++-
.../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 126 +++++
.../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 36 ++
.../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c | 295 ++++++++++++
OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 444 ++++++++++++++++--
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 192 ++++++++
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 21 +
OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c | 267 +++++++++++
OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 160 +------
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c | 11 +-
.../MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c | 31 ++
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 286 ++++++++++-
.../MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c | 44 ++
OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc | 5 +
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 28 ++
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm | 307 +++++++++++-
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 6 +
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc | 2 +
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 78 +++
52 files changed, 2771 insertions(+), 225 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c
create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c
--
2.17.1
next reply other threads:[~2021-09-01 16:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-01 16:16 Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 01/29] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 02/29] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02 8:04 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-02 12:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02 21:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-03 6:28 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-03 11:56 ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 03/29] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV-SNP boot block GUID Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 04/29] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 05/29] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 06/29] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02 8:20 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-06 1:10 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-09-06 12:16 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-06 13:19 ` Min Xu
2021-09-07 7:07 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-07 13:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-08 6:36 ` Min Xu
2021-09-14 3:49 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-09-16 7:42 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 07/29] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 08/29] UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 09/29] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 10/29] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 11/29] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 12/29] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 13/29] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 14/29] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 15/29] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02 9:50 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-02 13:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-03 7:04 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 16/29] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 17/29] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 18/29] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 19/29] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 20/29] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the SEV-SNP enabled PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 21/29] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 22/29] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 23/29] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 24/29] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 25/29] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 26/29] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 27/29] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 28/29] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 29/29] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-09-07 2:36 ` [PATCH v6 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Yao, Jiewen
2021-09-08 2:29 ` Min Xu
2021-09-08 6:03 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-09-08 19:45 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 0:31 ` Min Xu
2021-09-09 10:51 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 11:22 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-09 11:40 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 11:45 ` [edk2-devel] " Min Xu
2021-09-09 11:55 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-09-12 22:55 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 0:33 ` Yao, Jiewen
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