public inbox for devel@edk2.groups.io
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 14/31] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2021 13:19:24 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210913181941.23405-15-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210913181941.23405-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275

Virtual Machine Privilege Level (VMPL) feature in the SEV-SNP
architecture allows a guest VM to divide its address space into four
levels. The level can be used to provide the hardware isolated
abstraction layers with a VM. The VMPL0 is the highest privilege, and
VMPL3 is the least privilege. Certain operations must be done by the
VMPL0 software, such as:

* Validate or invalidate memory range (PVALIDATE instruction)
* Allocate VMSA page (RMPADJUST instruction when VMSA=1)

The initial SEV-SNP support assumes that the guest is running on VMPL0.
Let's add function in the MemEncryptSevLib that can be used for checking
whether guest is booted under the VMPL0.

Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h                  |  5 ++
 .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c             | 46 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c          |  1 -
 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
index 8bbdf06468b9..cc1318075523 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
@@ -28,4 +28,9 @@ InternalSetPageState (
   IN BOOLEAN                          UseLargeEntry
   );
 
+VOID
+SnpPageStateFailureTerminate (
+  VOID
+  );
+
 #endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
index 64aab7f45b6d..3394094a65e5 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
@@ -14,6 +14,43 @@
 
 #include "SnpPageStateChange.h"
 
+//
+// The variable used for the VMPL check.
+//
+STATIC UINT8 gVmpl0Data[4096];
+
+/**
+ The function checks whether SEV-SNP guest is booted under VMPL0.
+
+ @retval  TRUE      The guest is booted under VMPL0
+ @retval  FALSE     The guest is not booted under VMPL0
+ **/
+STATIC
+BOOLEAN
+SevSnpIsVmpl0 (
+  VOID
+  )
+{
+  UINT64          Rdx;
+  EFI_STATUS      Status;
+
+  //
+  // There is no straightforward way to query the current VMPL level.
+  // The simplest method is to use the RMPADJUST instruction to change
+  // a page permission to a VMPL level-1, and if the guest kernel is
+  // launched at a level <= 1, then RMPADJUST instruction will return
+  // an error.
+  //
+  Rdx = 1;
+
+  Status = AsmRmpAdjust ((UINT64) gVmpl0Data, 0, Rdx);
+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+    return FALSE;
+  }
+
+  return TRUE;
+}
+
 /**
   Pre-validate the system RAM when SEV-SNP is enabled in the guest VM.
 
@@ -32,5 +69,14 @@ MemEncryptSevSnpPreValidateSystemRam (
     return;
   }
 
+  //
+  // The page state change uses the PVALIDATE instruction. The instruction
+  // can be run on VMPL-0 only. If its not VMPL-0 guest then terminate
+  // the boot.
+  //
+  if (!SevSnpIsVmpl0 ()) {
+    SnpPageStateFailureTerminate ();
+  }
+
   InternalSetPageState (BaseAddress, NumPages, SevSnpPagePrivate, TRUE);
 }
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
index 506df12d4e51..653151d4a422 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ MemoryStateToGhcbOp (
   return Cmd;
 }
 
-STATIC
 VOID
 SnpPageStateFailureTerminate (
   VOID
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-09-13 18:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-13 18:19 [PATCH v7 00/31] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 01/31] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 02/31] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 03/31] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 04/31] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 05/31] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-09-16  8:07   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-16 10:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 06/31] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-09-16  8:26   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-16 10:49     ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 07/31] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 08/31] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 09/31] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-09-15 17:08   ` Erdem Aktas
2021-09-15 18:50     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-16  8:30       ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-16 10:49         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 10/31] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 11/31] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-09-16  8:33   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-16 10:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 12/31] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 13/31] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 15/31] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated " Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 16/31] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 17/31] OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-09-16  8:58   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-16 11:11     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 18/31] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 19/31] UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 20/31] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 21/31] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 22/31] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 23/31] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 24/31] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 25/31] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-09-14  2:23   ` Ni, Ray
2021-09-14  2:25     ` Ni, Ray
2021-09-14 14:21       ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh
2021-09-16  9:15         ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-16  9:18           ` Ni, Ray
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 26/31] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 27/31] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 28/31] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 29/31] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 30/31] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-09-13 18:19 ` [PATCH v7 31/31] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-list from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20210913181941.23405-15-brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --to=devel@edk2.groups.io \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox