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From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	devel@edk2.groups.io, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>, Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2021 18:10:07 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210922231007.566nxiaqagtwjlps@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210922075558.zpbcyceegytfumqq@sirius.home.kraxel.org>

On Wed, Sep 22, 2021 at 09:55:58AM +0200, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
>   Hi,
> 
> > +    ; If SEV-SNP is enabled, use the CPUID page to handle the CPUID
> > +    ; instruction.
> > +    mov     ecx, SEV_STATUS_MSR
> > +    rdmsr
> > +    bt      eax, 2
> > +    jc      SnpCpuidLookup
> 
> Maybe check SNP_CPUID_COUNT instead, so the cpuid page can also be used
> without SEV-SNP ?

One issue with that is that the contents of the CPUID page are not part
of guest measurement that will be checked later during attestation (only
the metadata such as page type/location is recorded in the measurement).

So if someone on the host slipped in, say, a malicious QEMU, and modified
it to zero out the CPUID page prior to launching the guest, it would end up
being accepted by firmware as legitimate CPUID table encoding 0 entries. So
implementing the check based on SNP_CPUID_COUNT would make it easy to bypass
the CPUID page in such a scenario, and even worse, they'd be able to get
all the way past attestation, since the CPUID metadata is the same, it's
only the contents that have changed.

Since the CPUID page is required by SNP, the approach taken here is to
always utilize it when SNP is enabled. In that case, if someone were to
maliciously zero out the CPUID page, it would still get used by the
guest, rather than bypassed, in which case the guest would never make it
to attestation since bits that get checked for early like
SEV/SEV-ES/SEV-SNP flags in 0x8000001F would all be 0.

That said, for the !SNP case, additional handling *could* be added to make
use of the CPUID page, but in that case it wouldn't be validated by firmware,
so isn't much better security-wise than asking KVM. It might be possible to
bake the CPUID page into the measurement to ensure integrity, but that
requires accounting for the CPUID page along with all the other elements of
the initial payload (like OVMF), and unlike with OVMF, the CPUID values
will vary often depending on guest configuration, and so cloud providers
would need to provide some sort of tooling to export this CPUID page to the
guest owner so it can be verified and accounted for in attestation, which
doesn't seem likely to get much uptake (and is probably at least partly why
the CPUID page contents aren't included in the measurement for SNP).

> 
> take care,
>   Gerd
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2021-09-22 23:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-20 18:45 [PATCH v8 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: " Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-09-22  7:55   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-22 23:10     ` Michael Roth [this message]
2021-09-23  8:25       ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-09-22  8:00   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-24 10:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-09-22  8:21   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-09-24 10:48     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 20/32] UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:45 ` [PATCH v8 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:46 ` [PATCH v8 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:46 ` [PATCH v8 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:46 ` [PATCH v8 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:46 ` [PATCH v8 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-09-20 18:46 ` [PATCH v8 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh

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