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Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2021 10:03:26 +0200
From: "Gerd Hoffmann" <kraxel@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: devel@edk2.groups.io, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>, Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
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	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
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	Michael Roth <Michael.Roth@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0
Message-ID: <20211014080326.z4yoaeh4hgl4iceb@sirius.home.kraxel.org>
References: <20211013165713.727815-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
 <20211013165713.727815-16-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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On Wed, Oct 13, 2021 at 11:56:56AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
> 
> Virtual Machine Privilege Level (VMPL) feature in the SEV-SNP
> architecture allows a guest VM to divide its address space into four
> levels. The level can be used to provide the hardware isolated
> abstraction layers with a VM. The VMPL0 is the highest privilege, and
> VMPL3 is the least privilege. Certain operations must be done by the
> VMPL0 software, such as:
> 
> * Validate or invalidate memory range (PVALIDATE instruction)
> * Allocate VMSA page (RMPADJUST instruction when VMSA=1)
> 
> The initial SEV-SNP support assumes that the guest is running on VMPL0.
> Let's add function in the MemEncryptSevLib that can be used for checking
> whether guest is booted under the VMPL0.

Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>