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From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	"Jiewen Yao" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Jordan Justen" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	"Michael Roth" <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
Date: Tue, 19 Oct 2021 14:39:20 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211019193934.1052465-19-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211019193934.1052465-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275

The VMM launch sequence should have pre-validated all the data pages used
in the Reset vector. The range does not cover the data pages used during
the SEC phase (mainly PEI and DXE firmware volume decompression memory).

When SEV-SNP is active, the memory must be pre-validated before the access.
Add support to pre-validate the memory range from SnpSecPreValidatedStart
to SnpSecPreValidatedEnd. This should be sufficent to enter into the PEI
phase.

Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |  4 ++++
 .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |  2 ++
 OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf                       |  3 +++
 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h                          | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  5 ++++
 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c                          | 22 +++++++++++++++++-
 OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c                         |  5 ++++
 OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc       |  5 ++++
 8 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
index ef0f319938b9..8dde5198c7cd 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
@@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidBase|0|UINT32|0x54
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidSize|0|UINT32|0x55
 
+  ## The range of memory that is validated by the SEC phase.
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecValidatedStart|0|UINT32|0x56
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecValidatedEnd|0|UINT32|0x57
+
 [PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableEvent|0|UINT64|2
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashVariablesEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x10
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
index 49d5bd1beff1..50c83859d7e7 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf
@@ -60,3 +60,5 @@ [FixedPcd]
   gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecValidatedEnd
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecValidatedStart
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
index 9523a8ea6c8f..282e60a2764f 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ [LibraryClasses]
   PeCoffExtraActionLib
   ExtractGuidedSectionLib
   LocalApicLib
+  MemEncryptSevLib
   CpuExceptionHandlerLib
 
 [Ppis]
@@ -73,6 +74,8 @@ [Pcd]
   gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdInitValueInTempStack
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfConfidentialComputingWorkAreaHeader
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfWorkAreaBase
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecValidatedStart
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecValidatedEnd
 
 [FeaturePcd]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmmSmramRequire
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
index adad96d23189..411bbedae4cf 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
@@ -69,4 +69,27 @@ SevEsIsEnabled (
   VOID
   );
 
+/**
+ Validate System RAM used for decompressing the PEI and DXE firmware volumes
+ when SEV-SNP is active. The PCDs SecValidatedStart and SecValidatedEnd are
+ set in OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SecValidateSystemRam (
+  VOID
+  );
+
+/**
+  Determine if SEV-SNP is active.
+
+  @retval TRUE   SEV-SNP is enabled
+  @retval FALSE  SEV-SNP is not enabled
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+SevSnpIsEnabled (
+  VOID
+  );
+
 #endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
index ee8b5bc8011f..d3ed8edecb03 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ STATIC SNP_PRE_VALIDATED_RANGE mPreValidatedRange[] = {
     FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase),
     FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase),
   },
+  // The below range is pre-validated by the Sec/SecMain.c
+  {
+    FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecValidatedStart),
+    FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecValidatedEnd)
+  },
 };
 
 STATIC
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
index 9dd42b195785..4f6a2f62ef99 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ SevEsProtocolFailure (
   @retval FALSE  SEV-SNP is not enabled
 
 **/
-STATIC
 BOOLEAN
 SevSnpIsEnabled (
   VOID
@@ -277,3 +276,24 @@ SevEsIsEnabled (
 
   return (SevEsWorkArea->SevEsEnabled != 0);
 }
+
+/**
+ Validate System RAM used for decompressing the PEI and DXE firmware volumes
+ when SEV-SNP is active. The PCDs SecValidatedStart and SecValidatedEnd are
+ set in OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SecValidateSystemRam (
+  VOID
+  )
+{
+  PHYSICAL_ADDRESS        Start, End;
+
+  if (IsSevGuest () && SevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
+    Start = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) PcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecValidatedStart);
+    End = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) PcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecValidatedEnd);
+
+    MemEncryptSevSnpPreValidateSystemRam (Start, EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (End - Start));
+  }
+}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
index 406e3a25d0cd..b173ff976073 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
@@ -847,6 +847,11 @@ SecCoreStartupWithStack (
   SecCoreData.BootFirmwareVolumeBase = BootFv;
   SecCoreData.BootFirmwareVolumeSize = (UINTN) BootFv->FvLength;
 
+  //
+  // Validate the System RAM used in the SEC Phase
+  //
+  SecValidateSystemRam ();
+
   //
   // Make sure the 8259 is masked before initializing the Debug Agent and the debug timer is enabled
   //
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc b/OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc
index 46f52583297c..d8d45fc9aa6d 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc
@@ -63,3 +63,8 @@
 DEFINE DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE           = (($(DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE_UNALIGNED) + $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE_ALIGNMENT)) & $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE_MASK))
 
 SET gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDecompressionScratchEnd = $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE) + $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE)
+
+#
+# The range of pages that should be pre-validated during the SEC phase when SEV-SNP is active in the guest VM.
+SET gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecValidatedStart = $(MEMFD_BASE_ADDRESS) + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase
+SET gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecValidatedEnd = $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_BASE) + $(DECOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE)
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-10-19 19:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-10-19 19:39 [PATCH v10 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: " Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-10-20  4:54   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-19 19:39 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 20/32] UefiCpuPkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-10-20  4:55   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-10-20  4:58   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-10-20  5:00   ` Gerd Hoffmann
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-10-19 19:39 ` [PATCH v10 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh

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