From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
"Jiewen Yao" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Jordan Justen" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
"Michael Roth" <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
"Michael D Kinney" <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v12 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 16:14:46 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211110221457.2397234-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211110221457.2397234-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
The MpInitLib uses the ConfidentialComputingAttr PCD to determine whether
AMD SEV is active so that it can use the VMGEXITs defined in the GHCB
specification to create APs.
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 3 +++
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 3 +++
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 3 +++
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 3 +++
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 1 +
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
index 2997929faa05..8f5876341e26 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
@@ -575,6 +575,9 @@ [PcdsDynamicDefault]
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy|0x00
+ # Set ConfidentialComputing defaults
+ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr|0
+
!if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid|{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}
!endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
index 1dc069e42420..dbcfa5ab52ce 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
@@ -651,6 +651,9 @@ [PcdsDynamicDefault]
gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdIPv4PXESupport|0x01
gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdIPv6PXESupport|0x01
+ # Set ConfidentialComputing defaults
+ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr|0
+
[PcdsDynamicHii]
!if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE && $(TPM_CONFIG_ENABLE) == TRUE
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|L"TCG2_VERSION"|gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid|0x0|"1.3"|NV,BS
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
index a766457e6bc6..e4597e7f03da 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
@@ -659,6 +659,9 @@ [PcdsDynamicDefault]
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTpmInstanceGuid|{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}
!endif
+ # Set ConfidentialComputing defaults
+ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr|0
+
[PcdsDynamicDefault.X64]
# IPv4 and IPv6 PXE Boot support.
gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdIPv4PXESupport|0x01
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
index 97b7cb40ff88..08837bf8ec97 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
@@ -662,6 +662,9 @@ [PcdsDynamicDefault]
gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdIPv4PXESupport|0x01
gEfiNetworkPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdIPv6PXESupport|0x01
+ # Set ConfidentialComputing defaults
+ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr|0
+
[PcdsDynamicHii]
!if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE && $(TPM_CONFIG_ENABLE) == TRUE
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer|L"TCG2_VERSION"|gTcg2ConfigFormSetGuid|0x0|"1.3"|NV,BS
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
index 67eb7aa7166b..bada5ea14439 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ [Pcd]
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuBootLogicalProcessorNumber
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApStackSize
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsIsEnabled
+ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr
[FixedPcd]
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciExpressBaseAddress
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
index e1504831bec0..c447753075b1 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <Register/Amd/Msr.h>
#include <Register/Intel/SmramSaveStateMap.h>
#include <Library/VmgExitLib.h>
+#include <ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h>
#include "Platform.h"
@@ -338,4 +339,18 @@ AmdSevInitialize (
// Check and perform SEV-ES initialization if required.
//
AmdSevEsInitialize ();
+
+ //
+ // Set the Confidential computing attr PCD to communicate which SEV
+ // technology is active.
+ //
+ if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
+ PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr, CCAttrAmdSevSnp);
+ } else if (MemEncryptSevEsIsEnabled ()) {
+ PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr, CCAttrAmdSevEs);
+ } else {
+ PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr, CCAttrAmdSev);
+ }
+ ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
+
}
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-10 22:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-10 22:14 [PATCH v12 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:40 ` [edk2-devel] " Ni, Ray
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 20/32] MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-11-11 14:00 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-11 17:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 2:28 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-12 3:19 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 3:57 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-10 22:14 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:27 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 12:33 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 12:59 ` James Bottomley
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:28 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:29 ` [edk2-devel] " Ni, Ray
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:48 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 14:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-30 11:13 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:53 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 14:45 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 2:09 ` [edk2-devel] " Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 14:25 ` Brijesh Singh
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