From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
"Jiewen Yao" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Jordan Justen" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
"Michael Roth" <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
"Michael D Kinney" <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v12 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 16:14:31 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211110221457.2397234-7-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211110221457.2397234-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
Platform features and capabilities are traditionally discovered via the
CPUID instruction. Hypervisors typically trap and emulate the CPUID
instruction for a variety of reasons. There are some cases where incorrect
CPUID information can potentially lead to a security issue. The SEV-SNP
firmware provides a feature to filter the CPUID results through the PSP.
The filtered CPUID values are saved on a special page for the guest to
consume. Reserve a page in MEMFD that will contain the results of
filtered CPUID values.
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 7 +++++++
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 3 +++
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 2 ++
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 2 ++
OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm | 16 ++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
index deb285fd62c5..bc14cf2ed403 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
@@ -357,6 +357,13 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild]
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase|0|UINT32|0x58
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize|0|UINT32|0x59
+ ## The base address and size of a CPUID Area that contains the hypervisor
+ # provided CPUID results. In the case of SEV-SNP, the CPUID results are
+ # filtered by the SEV-SNP firmware. If this is set in the .fdf, the
+ # platform is responsible to reserve this area from DXE phase overwrites.
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidBase|0|UINT32|0x60
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidSize|0|UINT32|0x61
+
[PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableEvent|0|UINT64|2
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashVariablesEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x10
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
index 1313c7f016bf..e94b433e7b28 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ [FD.MEMFD]
0x00D000|0x001000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize
+0x00E000|0x001000
+gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidSize
+
0x010000|0x010000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
index fcbc25d0ce3d..1c5d84184ed7 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ [Pcd]
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdBfvRawDataSize
[FixedPcd]
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidBase
+ gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidSize
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdQemuHashTableBase
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
index 4e685ef23684..fbaeab5f5168 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@
%define SEV_ES_VC_TOP_OF_STACK (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase) + FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize))
%define SEV_SNP_SECRETS_BASE (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase))
%define SEV_SNP_SECRETS_SIZE (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize))
+ %define CPUID_BASE (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidBase))
+ %define CPUID_SIZE (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidSize))
%include "X64/IntelTdxMetadata.asm"
%include "Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm"
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
index 2bc7790bd808..0cc12ad3473f 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
@@ -17,6 +17,16 @@ BITS 64
; AMD SEV-SNP specific sections
%define OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_SNP_SECRETS 0x2
+;
+; The section contains the hypervisor pre-populated CPUID values.
+; In the case of SEV-SNP, the CPUID values are filtered and measured by
+; the SEV-SNP firmware.
+; The CPUID format is documented in SEV-SNP firmware spec 0.9 section 7.1
+; (CPUID function structure).
+;
+%define OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_CPUID 0x3
+
+
ALIGN 16
TIMES (15 - ((OvmfSevGuidedStructureEnd - OvmfSevGuidedStructureStart + 15) % 16)) DB 0
@@ -39,5 +49,11 @@ SevSnpSecrets:
DD SEV_SNP_SECRETS_SIZE
DD OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_SNP_SECRETS
+; CPUID values
+CpuidSec:
+ DD CPUID_BASE
+ DD CPUID_SIZE
+ DD OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_CPUID
+
OvmfSevGuidedStructureEnd:
ALIGN 16
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-10 22:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-10 22:14 [PATCH v12 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:40 ` [edk2-devel] " Ni, Ray
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 20/32] MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-11-11 14:00 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-11 17:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 2:28 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-12 3:19 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 3:57 ` Yao, Jiewen
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:27 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 12:33 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 12:59 ` James Bottomley
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:28 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:29 ` [edk2-devel] " Ni, Ray
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:48 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 14:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-30 11:13 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 1:53 ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 14:45 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:14 ` [PATCH v12 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 2:09 ` [edk2-devel] " Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 14:25 ` Brijesh Singh
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