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From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	"Jiewen Yao" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Jordan Justen" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	"Michael Roth" <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	"Michael D Kinney" <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
	Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
	Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
	Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v13 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 11:39:27 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211112173959.2505972-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hi Ray, 
  
Thanks for your reviews and continuous support; I have updated a couple of patches
to address your comment. As I said in my previous reply, I will working on a
follow-up series to group some of those Sev specific variables in CpuData.
      
I hope that is okay with you. 
         
thanks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275

SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integrity
protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
encryption environment.
 
This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP
VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-SNP
such as interrupt protection.

Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP
VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the
guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to
guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE
instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request NAE"
defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page
from the RMP table.

Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated,
as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two
approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and
Lazy Validation.

Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under
lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a
unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception
handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of
the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The
recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate the
unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS.

At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the available
system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is validated
before it is made available to the EDK2 core.

Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP
guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the
SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted.

Additional resources
---------------------
SEV-SNP whitepaper
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf

APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)

The complete source is available at
https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/snp-v13

GHCB spec:
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf

SEV-SNP firmware specification:
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf

Change since v12:
 * MpLib: Add comment to clarify that SEV-SNP enabled implicitly means SEV and SEV-ES are active.
 * MpLib: Move the extended topology initialization in AmdSev.c

Change since v11:
 * rebase to the latest
 * fix the UefiCpuPkg PCD definition patch header.

Change since v10:
 * fix 'unresolved external symbol __allshl' link error when building I32 for VS2017.

Changes since v9:
 * Move CCAttrs Pcd define in MdePkg
 * Add comment to indicate that allocating the identity map PT is temporary until we get lazy validation

Changes since v8:
 * drop the generic metadata and make it specific to SEV.

Changes since v7:
 * Move SEV specific changes in MpLib in AmdSev file
 * Update the GHCB register function to not restore the GHCB MSR because
   we were already in the MSR protocol mode.
 * Drop the SNP name from PcdSnpSecPreValidate.
 * Add new section for GHCB memory in the OVMF metadata.

Change since v6:
 * Drop the SNP boot block GUID and switch to using the Metadata guided structure
   proposed by Min in TDX series.
 * Exclude the GHCB page from the pre-validated region. It simplifies the reset
   vector code where we do not need to unvalidate the GHCB page.
 * Now that GHCB page is not validated so move the VMPL check from reset vector
   code to the MemEncryptSevLib on the first page validation.
 * Introduce the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr PCD to communicate which
   memory encryption is active so that MpInitLib can make use of it.
 * Drop the SEVES specific PCD as the information can be communicated via
   the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.
 * Move the SNP specific AP creation function in AmdSev.c.
 * Define the SNP Blob GUID in a new file.

Change since v5:
 * When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page
 * Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c
 * Rebase to the latest code
 * Add the review feedback from Yao.

Change since v4:
 * Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS
 * Add VMPL-0 check

Change since v3:
 * ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to keep
   the code readable.
 * Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state.
 * Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB GPA.
 * Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the
   AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it.
 * Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets.

Changes since v2:
 * Add support for the AP creation.
 * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI reads.
 * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
 * 
Changes since v1:
 * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
 * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
 * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is supported.
 * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from MMIO ranges.
 * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
 * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location through
   EFI configuration table.

Brijesh Singh (28):
  OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
  UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
  OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain
  OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use
  OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page
  OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page
  OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase
  OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
  OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
  OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
  OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
  OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0
  OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
  OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
    phase
  OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
  MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr
  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is
    active
  UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV
    status
  UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures
  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD
  MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
  UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
    enabled
  OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table
  OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map
  OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
    table

Michael Roth (3):
  OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
  OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
  UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check

Tom Lendacky (1):
  UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs

 MdePkg/MdePkg.dec                             |   4 +
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |  19 +
 UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec                     |   5 +
 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc                  |   8 +-
 OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc                    |   5 +-
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc                       |   4 +
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc                    |   9 +-
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                        |   8 +-
 OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc                           |   5 +-
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                        |   6 +
 OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf               |   7 +
 .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
 .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   7 +
 .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   3 +
 OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf  |   2 +
 OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf     |   3 +
 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf           |   7 +
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf           |   5 +
 OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf                       |   4 +
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf |   6 +-
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf |   6 +-
 .../Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h  |  25 +
 MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h            |   2 +-
 .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h    |  33 ++
 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h    |  26 +
 .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h                  |  36 ++
 .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h  |  24 +
 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h                |   5 +
 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h                          |  95 ++++
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h          | 103 ++++
 OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c                 |  23 +
 .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
 .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c                   |  17 +
 .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  27 ++
 .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c             |  19 +
 .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  40 ++
 .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c                 | 167 ++++++-
 .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c             | 127 +++++
 .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c             |  82 ++++
 .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c          | 294 ++++++++++++
 OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 444 ++++++++++++++++--
 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c                  | 231 +++++++++
 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c               |   2 +
 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c                          | 298 ++++++++++++
 OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c                         | 158 +------
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c         | 260 ++++++++++
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c       |  16 +-
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c    |  70 +++
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c          | 347 +++++---------
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c       |   4 +-
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c     | 261 ++++++++++
 OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc       |   5 +
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm  |  14 +
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm           |  86 +++-
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb         |  18 +
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm   |  74 +++
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc        |   2 +
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm  | 200 ++++++++
 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 100 +---
 59 files changed, 3360 insertions(+), 528 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
 create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c
 create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c
 create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
 create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm

-- 
2.25.1


             reply	other threads:[~2021-11-12 17:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-12 17:39 Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 20/32] MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-11-30 11:10   ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-11-30 11:16   ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-11-26 15:21 ` [PATCH v13 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
     [not found] ` <16BB21DA37CA6E86.23256@groups.io>
2021-11-29 19:21   ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh

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