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From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	"Jiewen Yao" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Jordan Justen" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	"Michael Roth" <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	"Michael D Kinney" <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
	Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
	Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
	Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v13 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 11:39:57 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211112173959.2505972-31-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211112173959.2505972-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

When SEV-SNP is active, the CPUID and Secrets memory range contains the
information that is used during the VM boot. The content need to be persist
across the kexec boot. Mark the memory range as Reserved in the EFI map
so that guest OS or firmware does not use the range as a system RAM.

Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf |  4 ++++
 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h      |  5 +++++
 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c        | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c     |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
index 3c05b550e4bd..1c56ba275835 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ [Pcd]
   gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures
 
 [FixedPcd]
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidBase
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidSize
   gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPciExpressBaseAddress
   gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMemoryTypeEfiACPIMemoryNVS
   gEmbeddedTokenSpaceGuid.PcdMemoryTypeEfiACPIReclaimMemory
@@ -121,6 +123,8 @@ [FixedPcd]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupSize
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfWorkAreaBase
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfWorkAreaSize
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize
 
 [FeaturePcd]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCsmEnable
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h
index 8b1d270c2b0b..4169019b4c07 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h
@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@ AmdSevInitialize (
   VOID
   );
 
+VOID
+SevInitializeRam (
+  VOID
+  );
+
 extern EFI_BOOT_MODE mBootMode;
 
 extern BOOLEAN mS3Supported;
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
index 7da6370113f0..e71c601aa716 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
@@ -410,3 +410,34 @@ AmdSevInitialize (
   ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
 
 }
+
+/**
+ The function performs SEV specific region initialization.
+
+ **/
+VOID
+SevInitializeRam (
+  VOID
+  )
+{
+  if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
+    //
+    // If SEV-SNP is enabled, reserve the Secrets and CPUID memory area.
+    //
+    // This memory range is given to the PSP by the hypervisor to populate
+    // the information used during the SNP VM boots, and it need to persist
+    // across the kexec boots. Mark it as EfiReservedMemoryType so that
+    // the guest firmware and OS does not use it as a system memory.
+    //
+    BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
+      (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN) PcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase),
+      (UINT64)(UINTN) PcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize),
+      EfiReservedMemoryType
+      );
+    BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
+      (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN) PcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidBase),
+      (UINT64)(UINTN) PcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidSize),
+      EfiReservedMemoryType
+      );
+  }
+}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c
index d736b85e0d90..058bb394f0df 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c
@@ -821,6 +821,8 @@ InitializeRamRegions (
 {
   QemuInitializeRam ();
 
+  SevInitializeRam ();
+
   if (mS3Supported && mBootMode != BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME) {
     //
     // This is the memory range that will be used for PEI on S3 resume
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-11-12 17:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-12 17:39 [PATCH v13 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 20/32] MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-11-30 11:10   ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-11-30 11:16   ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-11-26 15:21 ` [PATCH v13 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
     [not found] ` <16BB21DA37CA6E86.23256@groups.io>
2021-11-29 19:21   ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh

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