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From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	"Jiewen Yao" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Jordan Justen" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	"Michael Roth" <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	"Michael D Kinney" <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
	Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
	Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
	Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v13 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 11:39:33 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211112173959.2505972-7-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211112173959.2505972-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275

Platform features and capabilities are traditionally discovered via the
CPUID instruction. Hypervisors typically trap and emulate the CPUID
instruction for a variety of reasons. There are some cases where incorrect
CPUID information can potentially lead to a security issue. The SEV-SNP
firmware provides a feature to filter the CPUID results through the PSP.
The filtered CPUID values are saved on a special page for the guest to
consume. Reserve a page in MEMFD that will contain the results of
filtered CPUID values.

Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                         |  7 +++++++
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf                      |  3 +++
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf         |  2 ++
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb       |  2 ++
 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
index deb285fd62c5..bc14cf2ed403 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
@@ -357,6 +357,13 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase|0|UINT32|0x58
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize|0|UINT32|0x59
 
+  ## The base address and size of a CPUID Area that contains the hypervisor
+  #  provided CPUID results. In the case of SEV-SNP, the CPUID results are
+  #  filtered by the SEV-SNP firmware. If this is set in the .fdf, the
+  #  platform is responsible to reserve this area from DXE phase overwrites.
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidBase|0|UINT32|0x60
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidSize|0|UINT32|0x61
+
 [PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableEvent|0|UINT64|2
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashVariablesEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x10
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
index 1313c7f016bf..e94b433e7b28 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ [FD.MEMFD]
 0x00D000|0x001000
 gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize
 
+0x00E000|0x001000
+gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidSize
+
 0x010000|0x010000
 gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
 
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
index fcbc25d0ce3d..1c5d84184ed7 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ [Pcd]
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdBfvRawDataSize
 
 [FixedPcd]
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidBase
+  gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfCpuidSize
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
   gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdQemuHashTableBase
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
index 4e685ef23684..fbaeab5f5168 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@
   %define SEV_ES_VC_TOP_OF_STACK (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase) + FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize))
   %define SEV_SNP_SECRETS_BASE  (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase))
   %define SEV_SNP_SECRETS_SIZE  (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize))
+  %define CPUID_BASE  (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidBase))
+  %define CPUID_SIZE  (FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidSize))
 
 %include "X64/IntelTdxMetadata.asm"
 %include "Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm"
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
index 2bc7790bd808..0cc12ad3473f 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
+++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
@@ -17,6 +17,16 @@ BITS  64
 ; AMD SEV-SNP specific sections
 %define OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_SNP_SECRETS     0x2
 
+;
+; The section contains the hypervisor pre-populated CPUID values.
+; In the case of SEV-SNP, the CPUID values are filtered and measured by
+; the SEV-SNP firmware.
+; The CPUID format is documented in SEV-SNP firmware spec 0.9 section 7.1
+; (CPUID function structure).
+;
+%define OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_CPUID           0x3
+
+
 ALIGN 16
 
 TIMES (15 - ((OvmfSevGuidedStructureEnd - OvmfSevGuidedStructureStart + 15) % 16)) DB 0
@@ -39,5 +49,11 @@ SevSnpSecrets:
   DD  SEV_SNP_SECRETS_SIZE
   DD  OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_SNP_SECRETS
 
+; CPUID values
+CpuidSec:
+  DD  CPUID_BASE
+  DD  CPUID_SIZE
+  DD  OVMF_SECTION_TYPE_CPUID
+
 OvmfSevGuidedStructureEnd:
   ALIGN   16
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-11-12 17:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-12 17:39 [PATCH v13 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 20/32] MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-11-30 11:10   ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-11-30 11:16   ` Ni, Ray
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-11-26 15:21 ` [PATCH v13 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
     [not found] ` <16BB21DA37CA6E86.23256@groups.io>
2021-11-29 19:21   ` [edk2-devel] " Brijesh Singh

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