From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
"Jiewen Yao" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Jordan Justen" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
"Michael Roth" <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
"Michael D Kinney" <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v14 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 21:27:29 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211209032800.3802995-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211209032800.3802995-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
Move all the SEV specific function in AmdSev.c.
No functional change intended.
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf | 2 +
OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h | 71 +++++++++++++++++
OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 156 +-------------------------------------
4 files changed, 239 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
index ea4b9611f52d..41dcdba1209a 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ [Defines]
[Sources]
SecMain.c
+ AmdSev.c
+ AmdSev.h
[Sources.IA32]
Ia32/SecEntry.nasm
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c0b1ca96183d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/** @file
+ File defines the Sec routines for the AMD SEV
+
+ Copyright (c) 2021, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
+
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef _AMD_SEV_SEC_INTERNAL_H__
+#define _AMD_SEV_SEC_INTERNAL_H__
+
+/**
+ Handle an SEV-ES/GHCB protocol check failure.
+
+ Notify the hypervisor using the VMGEXIT instruction that the SEV-ES guest
+ wishes to be terminated.
+
+ @param[in] ReasonCode Reason code to provide to the hypervisor for the
+ termination request.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SevEsProtocolFailure (
+ IN UINT8 ReasonCode
+ );
+
+/**
+ Validate the SEV-ES/GHCB protocol level.
+
+ Verify that the level of SEV-ES/GHCB protocol supported by the hypervisor
+ and the guest intersect. If they don't intersect, request termination.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SevEsProtocolCheck (
+ VOID
+ );
+
+/**
+ Determine if the SEV is active.
+
+ During the early booting, GuestType is set in the work area. Verify that it
+ is an SEV guest.
+
+ @retval TRUE SEV is enabled
+ @retval FALSE SEV is not enabled
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsSevGuest (
+ VOID
+ );
+
+/**
+ Determine if SEV-ES is active.
+
+ During early booting, SEV-ES support code will set a flag to indicate that
+ SEV-ES is enabled. Return the value of this flag as an indicator that SEV-ES
+ is enabled.
+
+ @retval TRUE SEV-ES is enabled
+ @retval FALSE SEV-ES is not enabled
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+SevEsIsEnabled (
+ VOID
+ );
+
+#endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..27fd24fc137e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/** @file
+ File defines the Sec routines for the AMD SEV
+
+ Copyright (c) 2021, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
+
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+**/
+
+#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Register/Amd/Ghcb.h>
+#include <Register/Amd/Msr.h>
+
+#include "AmdSev.h"
+
+/**
+ Handle an SEV-ES/GHCB protocol check failure.
+
+ Notify the hypervisor using the VMGEXIT instruction that the SEV-ES guest
+ wishes to be terminated.
+
+ @param[in] ReasonCode Reason code to provide to the hypervisor for the
+ termination request.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SevEsProtocolFailure (
+ IN UINT8 ReasonCode
+ )
+{
+ MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB_REGISTER Msr;
+
+ //
+ // Use the GHCB MSR Protocol to request termination by the hypervisor
+ //
+ Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = 0;
+ Msr.GhcbTerminate.Function = GHCB_INFO_TERMINATE_REQUEST;
+ Msr.GhcbTerminate.ReasonCodeSet = GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB;
+ Msr.GhcbTerminate.ReasonCode = ReasonCode;
+ AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
+
+ AsmVmgExit ();
+
+ ASSERT (FALSE);
+ CpuDeadLoop ();
+}
+
+/**
+ Validate the SEV-ES/GHCB protocol level.
+
+ Verify that the level of SEV-ES/GHCB protocol supported by the hypervisor
+ and the guest intersect. If they don't intersect, request termination.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SevEsProtocolCheck (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB_REGISTER Msr;
+ GHCB *Ghcb;
+
+ //
+ // Use the GHCB MSR Protocol to obtain the GHCB SEV-ES Information for
+ // protocol checking
+ //
+ Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = 0;
+ Msr.GhcbInfo.Function = GHCB_INFO_SEV_INFO_GET;
+ AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
+
+ AsmVmgExit ();
+
+ Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB);
+
+ if (Msr.GhcbInfo.Function != GHCB_INFO_SEV_INFO) {
+ SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_GENERAL);
+ }
+
+ if (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMin > Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax) {
+ SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_PROTOCOL);
+ }
+
+ if ((Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMin > GHCB_VERSION_MAX) ||
+ (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax < GHCB_VERSION_MIN))
+ {
+ SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_PROTOCOL);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // SEV-ES protocol checking succeeded, set the initial GHCB address
+ //
+ Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase);
+ AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
+
+ Ghcb = Msr.Ghcb;
+ SetMem (Ghcb, sizeof (*Ghcb), 0);
+
+ //
+ // Set the version to the maximum that can be supported
+ //
+ Ghcb->ProtocolVersion = MIN (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax, GHCB_VERSION_MAX);
+ Ghcb->GhcbUsage = GHCB_STANDARD_USAGE;
+}
+
+/**
+ Determine if the SEV is active.
+
+ During the early booting, GuestType is set in the work area. Verify that it
+ is an SEV guest.
+
+ @retval TRUE SEV is enabled
+ @retval FALSE SEV is not enabled
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsSevGuest (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ OVMF_WORK_AREA *WorkArea;
+
+ //
+ // Ensure that the size of the Confidential Computing work area header
+ // is same as what is provided through a fixed PCD.
+ //
+ ASSERT (
+ (UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfConfidentialComputingWorkAreaHeader) ==
+ sizeof (CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_WORK_AREA_HEADER)
+ );
+
+ WorkArea = (OVMF_WORK_AREA *)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfWorkAreaBase);
+
+ return ((WorkArea != NULL) && (WorkArea->Header.GuestType == GUEST_TYPE_AMD_SEV));
+}
+
+/**
+ Determine if SEV-ES is active.
+
+ During early booting, SEV-ES support code will set a flag to indicate that
+ SEV-ES is enabled. Return the value of this flag as an indicator that SEV-ES
+ is enabled.
+
+ @retval TRUE SEV-ES is enabled
+ @retval FALSE SEV-ES is not enabled
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+SevEsIsEnabled (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA *SevEsWorkArea;
+
+ if (!IsSevGuest ()) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ SevEsWorkArea = (SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA *)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase);
+
+ return (SevEsWorkArea->SevEsEnabled != 0);
+}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
index 6d81d5b62988..58e3b923b40e 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
@@ -26,12 +26,11 @@
#include <Library/ExtractGuidedSectionLib.h>
#include <Library/LocalApicLib.h>
#include <Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib.h>
-#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
-#include <Register/Amd/Ghcb.h>
-#include <Register/Amd/Msr.h>
#include <Ppi/TemporaryRamSupport.h>
+#include "AmdSev.h"
+
#define SEC_IDT_ENTRY_COUNT 34
typedef struct _SEC_IDT_TABLE {
@@ -726,157 +725,6 @@ FindAndReportEntryPoints (
return;
}
-/**
- Handle an SEV-ES/GHCB protocol check failure.
-
- Notify the hypervisor using the VMGEXIT instruction that the SEV-ES guest
- wishes to be terminated.
-
- @param[in] ReasonCode Reason code to provide to the hypervisor for the
- termination request.
-
-**/
-STATIC
-VOID
-SevEsProtocolFailure (
- IN UINT8 ReasonCode
- )
-{
- MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB_REGISTER Msr;
-
- //
- // Use the GHCB MSR Protocol to request termination by the hypervisor
- //
- Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = 0;
- Msr.GhcbTerminate.Function = GHCB_INFO_TERMINATE_REQUEST;
- Msr.GhcbTerminate.ReasonCodeSet = GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB;
- Msr.GhcbTerminate.ReasonCode = ReasonCode;
- AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
-
- AsmVmgExit ();
-
- ASSERT (FALSE);
- CpuDeadLoop ();
-}
-
-/**
- Validate the SEV-ES/GHCB protocol level.
-
- Verify that the level of SEV-ES/GHCB protocol supported by the hypervisor
- and the guest intersect. If they don't intersect, request termination.
-
-**/
-STATIC
-VOID
-SevEsProtocolCheck (
- VOID
- )
-{
- MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB_REGISTER Msr;
- GHCB *Ghcb;
-
- //
- // Use the GHCB MSR Protocol to obtain the GHCB SEV-ES Information for
- // protocol checking
- //
- Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = 0;
- Msr.GhcbInfo.Function = GHCB_INFO_SEV_INFO_GET;
- AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
-
- AsmVmgExit ();
-
- Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB);
-
- if (Msr.GhcbInfo.Function != GHCB_INFO_SEV_INFO) {
- SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_GENERAL);
- }
-
- if (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMin > Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax) {
- SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_PROTOCOL);
- }
-
- if ((Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMin > GHCB_VERSION_MAX) ||
- (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax < GHCB_VERSION_MIN))
- {
- SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_PROTOCOL);
- }
-
- //
- // SEV-ES protocol checking succeeded, set the initial GHCB address
- //
- Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase);
- AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
-
- Ghcb = Msr.Ghcb;
- SetMem (Ghcb, sizeof (*Ghcb), 0);
-
- //
- // Set the version to the maximum that can be supported
- //
- Ghcb->ProtocolVersion = MIN (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax, GHCB_VERSION_MAX);
- Ghcb->GhcbUsage = GHCB_STANDARD_USAGE;
-}
-
-/**
- Determine if the SEV is active.
-
- During the early booting, GuestType is set in the work area. Verify that it
- is an SEV guest.
-
- @retval TRUE SEV is enabled
- @retval FALSE SEV is not enabled
-
-**/
-STATIC
-BOOLEAN
-IsSevGuest (
- VOID
- )
-{
- OVMF_WORK_AREA *WorkArea;
-
- //
- // Ensure that the size of the Confidential Computing work area header
- // is same as what is provided through a fixed PCD.
- //
- ASSERT (
- (UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfConfidentialComputingWorkAreaHeader) ==
- sizeof (CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_WORK_AREA_HEADER)
- );
-
- WorkArea = (OVMF_WORK_AREA *)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfWorkAreaBase);
-
- return ((WorkArea != NULL) && (WorkArea->Header.GuestType == GUEST_TYPE_AMD_SEV));
-}
-
-/**
- Determine if SEV-ES is active.
-
- During early booting, SEV-ES support code will set a flag to indicate that
- SEV-ES is enabled. Return the value of this flag as an indicator that SEV-ES
- is enabled.
-
- @retval TRUE SEV-ES is enabled
- @retval FALSE SEV-ES is not enabled
-
-**/
-STATIC
-BOOLEAN
-SevEsIsEnabled (
- VOID
- )
-{
- SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA *SevEsWorkArea;
-
- if (!IsSevGuest ()) {
- return FALSE;
- }
-
- SevEsWorkArea = (SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA *)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase);
-
- return (SevEsWorkArea->SevEsEnabled != 0);
-}
-
VOID
EFIAPI
SecCoreStartupWithStack (
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-09 3:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-09 3:27 [PATCH v14 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 20/32] MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:28 ` [PATCH v14 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 6:30 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v14 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Yao, Jiewen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-list from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20211209032800.3802995-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com \
--to=devel@edk2.groups.io \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox