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From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	"Jiewen Yao" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Jordan Justen" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	"Michael Roth" <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	"Michael D Kinney" <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
	Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
	Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
	Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v14 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 21:27:29 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211209032800.3802995-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211209032800.3802995-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275

Move all the SEV specific function in AmdSev.c.

No functional change intended.

Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf |   2 +
 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h    |  71 +++++++++++++++++
 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c    | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c   | 156 +-------------------------------------
 4 files changed, 239 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
 create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
index ea4b9611f52d..41dcdba1209a 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ [Defines]
 
 [Sources]
   SecMain.c
+  AmdSev.c
+  AmdSev.h
 
 [Sources.IA32]
   Ia32/SecEntry.nasm
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c0b1ca96183d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/** @file
+  File defines the Sec routines for the AMD SEV
+
+  Copyright (c) 2021, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
+
+  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef _AMD_SEV_SEC_INTERNAL_H__
+#define _AMD_SEV_SEC_INTERNAL_H__
+
+/**
+  Handle an SEV-ES/GHCB protocol check failure.
+
+  Notify the hypervisor using the VMGEXIT instruction that the SEV-ES guest
+  wishes to be terminated.
+
+  @param[in] ReasonCode  Reason code to provide to the hypervisor for the
+                         termination request.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SevEsProtocolFailure (
+  IN UINT8  ReasonCode
+  );
+
+/**
+  Validate the SEV-ES/GHCB protocol level.
+
+  Verify that the level of SEV-ES/GHCB protocol supported by the hypervisor
+  and the guest intersect. If they don't intersect, request termination.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SevEsProtocolCheck (
+  VOID
+  );
+
+/**
+ Determine if the SEV is active.
+
+ During the early booting, GuestType is set in the work area. Verify that it
+ is an SEV guest.
+
+ @retval TRUE   SEV is enabled
+ @retval FALSE  SEV is not enabled
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsSevGuest (
+  VOID
+  );
+
+/**
+  Determine if SEV-ES is active.
+
+  During early booting, SEV-ES support code will set a flag to indicate that
+  SEV-ES is enabled. Return the value of this flag as an indicator that SEV-ES
+  is enabled.
+
+  @retval TRUE   SEV-ES is enabled
+  @retval FALSE  SEV-ES is not enabled
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+SevEsIsEnabled (
+  VOID
+  );
+
+#endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..27fd24fc137e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/** @file
+  File defines the Sec routines for the AMD SEV
+
+  Copyright (c) 2021, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
+
+  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+**/
+
+#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Register/Amd/Ghcb.h>
+#include <Register/Amd/Msr.h>
+
+#include "AmdSev.h"
+
+/**
+  Handle an SEV-ES/GHCB protocol check failure.
+
+  Notify the hypervisor using the VMGEXIT instruction that the SEV-ES guest
+  wishes to be terminated.
+
+  @param[in] ReasonCode  Reason code to provide to the hypervisor for the
+                         termination request.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SevEsProtocolFailure (
+  IN UINT8  ReasonCode
+  )
+{
+  MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB_REGISTER  Msr;
+
+  //
+  // Use the GHCB MSR Protocol to request termination by the hypervisor
+  //
+  Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress         = 0;
+  Msr.GhcbTerminate.Function      = GHCB_INFO_TERMINATE_REQUEST;
+  Msr.GhcbTerminate.ReasonCodeSet = GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB;
+  Msr.GhcbTerminate.ReasonCode    = ReasonCode;
+  AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
+
+  AsmVmgExit ();
+
+  ASSERT (FALSE);
+  CpuDeadLoop ();
+}
+
+/**
+  Validate the SEV-ES/GHCB protocol level.
+
+  Verify that the level of SEV-ES/GHCB protocol supported by the hypervisor
+  and the guest intersect. If they don't intersect, request termination.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SevEsProtocolCheck (
+  VOID
+  )
+{
+  MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB_REGISTER  Msr;
+  GHCB                      *Ghcb;
+
+  //
+  // Use the GHCB MSR Protocol to obtain the GHCB SEV-ES Information for
+  // protocol checking
+  //
+  Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = 0;
+  Msr.GhcbInfo.Function   = GHCB_INFO_SEV_INFO_GET;
+  AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
+
+  AsmVmgExit ();
+
+  Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB);
+
+  if (Msr.GhcbInfo.Function != GHCB_INFO_SEV_INFO) {
+    SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_GENERAL);
+  }
+
+  if (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMin > Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax) {
+    SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_PROTOCOL);
+  }
+
+  if ((Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMin > GHCB_VERSION_MAX) ||
+      (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax < GHCB_VERSION_MIN))
+  {
+    SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_PROTOCOL);
+  }
+
+  //
+  // SEV-ES protocol checking succeeded, set the initial GHCB address
+  //
+  Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase);
+  AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
+
+  Ghcb = Msr.Ghcb;
+  SetMem (Ghcb, sizeof (*Ghcb), 0);
+
+  //
+  // Set the version to the maximum that can be supported
+  //
+  Ghcb->ProtocolVersion = MIN (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax, GHCB_VERSION_MAX);
+  Ghcb->GhcbUsage       = GHCB_STANDARD_USAGE;
+}
+
+/**
+ Determine if the SEV is active.
+
+ During the early booting, GuestType is set in the work area. Verify that it
+ is an SEV guest.
+
+ @retval TRUE   SEV is enabled
+ @retval FALSE  SEV is not enabled
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsSevGuest (
+  VOID
+  )
+{
+  OVMF_WORK_AREA  *WorkArea;
+
+  //
+  // Ensure that the size of the Confidential Computing work area header
+  // is same as what is provided through a fixed PCD.
+  //
+  ASSERT (
+    (UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfConfidentialComputingWorkAreaHeader) ==
+    sizeof (CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_WORK_AREA_HEADER)
+    );
+
+  WorkArea = (OVMF_WORK_AREA *)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfWorkAreaBase);
+
+  return ((WorkArea != NULL) && (WorkArea->Header.GuestType == GUEST_TYPE_AMD_SEV));
+}
+
+/**
+  Determine if SEV-ES is active.
+
+  During early booting, SEV-ES support code will set a flag to indicate that
+  SEV-ES is enabled. Return the value of this flag as an indicator that SEV-ES
+  is enabled.
+
+  @retval TRUE   SEV-ES is enabled
+  @retval FALSE  SEV-ES is not enabled
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+SevEsIsEnabled (
+  VOID
+  )
+{
+  SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA  *SevEsWorkArea;
+
+  if (!IsSevGuest ()) {
+    return FALSE;
+  }
+
+  SevEsWorkArea = (SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA *)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase);
+
+  return (SevEsWorkArea->SevEsEnabled != 0);
+}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
index 6d81d5b62988..58e3b923b40e 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c
@@ -26,12 +26,11 @@
 #include <Library/ExtractGuidedSectionLib.h>
 #include <Library/LocalApicLib.h>
 #include <Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib.h>
-#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
-#include <Register/Amd/Ghcb.h>
-#include <Register/Amd/Msr.h>
 
 #include <Ppi/TemporaryRamSupport.h>
 
+#include "AmdSev.h"
+
 #define SEC_IDT_ENTRY_COUNT  34
 
 typedef struct _SEC_IDT_TABLE {
@@ -726,157 +725,6 @@ FindAndReportEntryPoints (
   return;
 }
 
-/**
-  Handle an SEV-ES/GHCB protocol check failure.
-
-  Notify the hypervisor using the VMGEXIT instruction that the SEV-ES guest
-  wishes to be terminated.
-
-  @param[in] ReasonCode  Reason code to provide to the hypervisor for the
-                         termination request.
-
-**/
-STATIC
-VOID
-SevEsProtocolFailure (
-  IN UINT8  ReasonCode
-  )
-{
-  MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB_REGISTER  Msr;
-
-  //
-  // Use the GHCB MSR Protocol to request termination by the hypervisor
-  //
-  Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress         = 0;
-  Msr.GhcbTerminate.Function      = GHCB_INFO_TERMINATE_REQUEST;
-  Msr.GhcbTerminate.ReasonCodeSet = GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB;
-  Msr.GhcbTerminate.ReasonCode    = ReasonCode;
-  AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
-
-  AsmVmgExit ();
-
-  ASSERT (FALSE);
-  CpuDeadLoop ();
-}
-
-/**
-  Validate the SEV-ES/GHCB protocol level.
-
-  Verify that the level of SEV-ES/GHCB protocol supported by the hypervisor
-  and the guest intersect. If they don't intersect, request termination.
-
-**/
-STATIC
-VOID
-SevEsProtocolCheck (
-  VOID
-  )
-{
-  MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB_REGISTER  Msr;
-  GHCB                      *Ghcb;
-
-  //
-  // Use the GHCB MSR Protocol to obtain the GHCB SEV-ES Information for
-  // protocol checking
-  //
-  Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = 0;
-  Msr.GhcbInfo.Function   = GHCB_INFO_SEV_INFO_GET;
-  AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
-
-  AsmVmgExit ();
-
-  Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = AsmReadMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB);
-
-  if (Msr.GhcbInfo.Function != GHCB_INFO_SEV_INFO) {
-    SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_GENERAL);
-  }
-
-  if (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMin > Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax) {
-    SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_PROTOCOL);
-  }
-
-  if ((Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMin > GHCB_VERSION_MAX) ||
-      (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax < GHCB_VERSION_MIN))
-  {
-    SevEsProtocolFailure (GHCB_TERMINATE_GHCB_PROTOCOL);
-  }
-
-  //
-  // SEV-ES protocol checking succeeded, set the initial GHCB address
-  //
-  Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress = FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase);
-  AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, Msr.GhcbPhysicalAddress);
-
-  Ghcb = Msr.Ghcb;
-  SetMem (Ghcb, sizeof (*Ghcb), 0);
-
-  //
-  // Set the version to the maximum that can be supported
-  //
-  Ghcb->ProtocolVersion = MIN (Msr.GhcbProtocol.SevEsProtocolMax, GHCB_VERSION_MAX);
-  Ghcb->GhcbUsage       = GHCB_STANDARD_USAGE;
-}
-
-/**
- Determine if the SEV is active.
-
- During the early booting, GuestType is set in the work area. Verify that it
- is an SEV guest.
-
- @retval TRUE   SEV is enabled
- @retval FALSE  SEV is not enabled
-
-**/
-STATIC
-BOOLEAN
-IsSevGuest (
-  VOID
-  )
-{
-  OVMF_WORK_AREA  *WorkArea;
-
-  //
-  // Ensure that the size of the Confidential Computing work area header
-  // is same as what is provided through a fixed PCD.
-  //
-  ASSERT (
-    (UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfConfidentialComputingWorkAreaHeader) ==
-    sizeof (CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_WORK_AREA_HEADER)
-    );
-
-  WorkArea = (OVMF_WORK_AREA *)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfWorkAreaBase);
-
-  return ((WorkArea != NULL) && (WorkArea->Header.GuestType == GUEST_TYPE_AMD_SEV));
-}
-
-/**
-  Determine if SEV-ES is active.
-
-  During early booting, SEV-ES support code will set a flag to indicate that
-  SEV-ES is enabled. Return the value of this flag as an indicator that SEV-ES
-  is enabled.
-
-  @retval TRUE   SEV-ES is enabled
-  @retval FALSE  SEV-ES is not enabled
-
-**/
-STATIC
-BOOLEAN
-SevEsIsEnabled (
-  VOID
-  )
-{
-  SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA  *SevEsWorkArea;
-
-  if (!IsSevGuest ()) {
-    return FALSE;
-  }
-
-  SevEsWorkArea = (SEC_SEV_ES_WORK_AREA *)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase);
-
-  return (SevEsWorkArea->SevEsEnabled != 0);
-}
-
 VOID
 EFIAPI
 SecCoreStartupWithStack (
-- 
2.25.1


  reply	other threads:[~2021-12-09  3:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-09  3:27 [PATCH v14 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 20/32] MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:27 ` [PATCH v14 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  3:28 ` [PATCH v14 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09  6:30 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v14 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Yao, Jiewen

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