From: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
"Jiewen Yao" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Jordan Justen" <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
"Michael Roth" <Michael.Roth@amd.com>,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
"Michael D Kinney" <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>,
Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>,
Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>, Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>,
Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>,
Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v14 22/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV status
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2021 21:27:50 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211209032800.3802995-23-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211209032800.3802995-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
Previous commit introduced a generic confidential computing PCD that can
determine whether AMD SEV-ES is enabled. Update the MpInitLib to drop the
PcdSevEsIsEnabled in favor of PcdConfidentialComputingAttr.
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf | 2 +-
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf | 2 +-
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h | 13 ++++
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c | 6 +-
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++-
UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c | 4 +-
6 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf
index 6e510aa89120..de705bc54bb4 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ [Pcd]
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApLoopMode ## CONSUMES
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApTargetCstate ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApStatusCheckIntervalInMicroSeconds ## CONSUMES
- gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsIsEnabled ## CONSUMES
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuStackGuard ## CONSUMES
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGhcbBase ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr ## CONSUMES
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf
index 2cbd9b8b8acc..b7e15ee023f0 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf
@@ -63,9 +63,9 @@ [Pcd]
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuMicrocodePatchRegionSize ## CONSUMES
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApLoopMode ## CONSUMES
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApTargetCstate ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
- gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsIsEnabled ## CONSUMES
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGhcbBase ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr ## CONSUMES
[Ppis]
gEdkiiPeiShadowMicrocodePpiGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h
index 16b4d76d019b..a84df60519ed 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <Library/HobLib.h>
#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
#include <Library/MicrocodeLib.h>
+#include <ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h>
#include <Register/Amd/Fam17Msr.h>
#include <Register/Amd/Ghcb.h>
@@ -773,4 +774,16 @@ SevEsPlaceApHlt (
CPU_MP_DATA *CpuMpData
);
+/**
+ Check if the specified confidential computing attribute is active.
+
+ @retval TRUE The specified Attr is active.
+ @retval FALSE The specified Attr is not active.
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+EFIAPI
+ConfidentialComputingGuestHas (
+ CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_GUEST_ATTR Attr
+ );
+
#endif
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c
index 9d9206d20915..02bc9c2bd2c4 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ GetWakeupBuffer (
EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS StartAddress;
EFI_MEMORY_TYPE MemoryType;
- if (PcdGetBool (PcdSevEsIsEnabled)) {
+ if (ConfidentialComputingGuestHas (CCAttrAmdSevEs)) {
MemoryType = EfiReservedMemoryType;
} else {
MemoryType = EfiBootServicesData;
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ GetWakeupBuffer (
// LagacyBios driver depends on CPU Arch protocol which guarantees below
// allocation runs earlier than LegacyBios driver.
//
- if (PcdGetBool (PcdSevEsIsEnabled)) {
+ if (ConfidentialComputingGuestHas (CCAttrAmdSevEs)) {
//
// SEV-ES Wakeup buffer should be under 0x88000 and under any previous one
//
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ GetWakeupBuffer (
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
StartAddress = (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)-1;
- } else if (PcdGetBool (PcdSevEsIsEnabled)) {
+ } else if (ConfidentialComputingGuestHas (CCAttrAmdSevEs)) {
//
// Next SEV-ES wakeup buffer allocation must be below this allocation
//
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c
index 34555c069331..64fddb497e1e 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ GetApLoopMode (
ApLoopMode = ApInHltLoop;
}
- if (PcdGetBool (PcdSevEsIsEnabled)) {
+ if (ConfidentialComputingGuestHas (CCAttrAmdSevEs)) {
//
// For SEV-ES, force AP in Hlt-loop mode in order to use the GHCB
// protocol for starting APs
@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ AllocateResetVector (
// The AP reset stack is only used by SEV-ES guests. Do not allocate it
// if SEV-ES is not enabled.
//
- if (PcdGetBool (PcdSevEsIsEnabled)) {
+ if (ConfidentialComputingGuestHas (CCAttrAmdSevEs)) {
//
// Stack location is based on ProcessorNumber, so use the total number
// of processors for calculating the total stack area.
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ MpInitLibInitialize (
CpuMpData->CpuData = (CPU_AP_DATA *)(CpuMpData + 1);
CpuMpData->CpuInfoInHob = (UINT64)(UINTN)(CpuMpData->CpuData + MaxLogicalProcessorNumber);
InitializeSpinLock (&CpuMpData->MpLock);
- CpuMpData->SevEsIsEnabled = PcdGetBool (PcdSevEsIsEnabled);
+ CpuMpData->SevEsIsEnabled = ConfidentialComputingGuestHas (CCAttrAmdSevEs);
CpuMpData->SevEsAPBuffer = (UINTN)-1;
CpuMpData->GhcbBase = PcdGet64 (PcdGhcbBase);
@@ -2755,3 +2755,70 @@ MpInitLibStartupAllCPUs (
NULL
);
}
+
+/**
+ The function check if the specified Attr is set.
+
+ @param[in] CurrentAttr The current attribute.
+ @param[in] Attr The attribute to check.
+
+ @retval TRUE The specified Attr is set.
+ @retval FALSE The specified Attr is not set.
+
+**/
+STATIC
+BOOLEAN
+AmdMemEncryptionAttrCheck (
+ IN UINT64 CurrentAttr,
+ IN CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_GUEST_ATTR Attr
+ )
+{
+ switch (Attr) {
+ case CCAttrAmdSev:
+ //
+ // SEV is automatically enabled if SEV-ES or SEV-SNP is active.
+ //
+ return CurrentAttr >= CCAttrAmdSev;
+ case CCAttrAmdSevEs:
+ //
+ // SEV-ES is automatically enabled if SEV-SNP is active.
+ //
+ return CurrentAttr >= CCAttrAmdSevEs;
+ case CCAttrAmdSevSnp:
+ return CurrentAttr == CCAttrAmdSevSnp;
+ default:
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Check if the specified confidential computing attribute is active.
+
+ @param[in] Attr The attribute to check.
+
+ @retval TRUE The specified Attr is active.
+ @retval FALSE The specified Attr is not active.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+EFIAPI
+ConfidentialComputingGuestHas (
+ IN CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_GUEST_ATTR Attr
+ )
+{
+ UINT64 CurrentAttr;
+
+ //
+ // Get the current CC attribute.
+ //
+ CurrentAttr = PcdGet64 (PcdConfidentialComputingGuestAttr);
+
+ //
+ // If attr is for the AMD group then call AMD specific checks.
+ //
+ if (((RShiftU64 (CurrentAttr, 8)) & 0xff) == 1) {
+ return AmdMemEncryptionAttrCheck (CurrentAttr, Attr);
+ }
+
+ return (CurrentAttr == Attr);
+}
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c
index ab79360bb935..efce5747277a 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ GetWakeupBuffer (
// Need memory under 1MB to be collected here
//
WakeupBufferEnd = Hob.ResourceDescriptor->PhysicalStart + Hob.ResourceDescriptor->ResourceLength;
- if (PcdGetBool (PcdSevEsIsEnabled) &&
+ if (ConfidentialComputingGuestHas (CCAttrAmdSevEs) &&
(WakeupBufferEnd > mSevEsPeiWakeupBuffer))
{
//
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ GetWakeupBuffer (
WakeupBufferSize
));
- if (PcdGetBool (PcdSevEsIsEnabled)) {
+ if (ConfidentialComputingGuestHas (CCAttrAmdSevEs)) {
//
// Next SEV-ES wakeup buffer allocation must be below this
// allocation
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-09 3:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-09 3:27 [PATCH v14 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 01/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 02/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: " Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 03/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 04/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 05/32] OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 06/32] OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 07/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 08/32] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 09/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled() Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 10/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 11/32] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 12/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 13/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 14/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 15/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0 Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 16/32] OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 17/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 18/32] OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 19/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 20/32] MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 21/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 23/32] UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 24/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 25/32] MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 26/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 27/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 28/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 29/32] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 30/32] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:27 ` [PATCH v14 31/32] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 3:28 ` [PATCH v14 32/32] UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs Brijesh Singh
2021-12-09 6:30 ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH v14 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support Yao, Jiewen
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