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Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 11:14:16 +0200
From: "Gerd Hoffmann" <kraxel@redhat.com>
To: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: devel@edk2.groups.io, Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 5/8] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Update ReserveEmuVariableNvStore
Message-ID: <20220627091416.7jun2rh4wy4e54h5@sirius.home.kraxel.org>
References: <cover.1656210686.git.min.m.xu@intel.com>
 <93072b2c22fbd173b6732baaf0dee9d22a3e5db8.1656210686.git.min.m.xu@intel.com>
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  Hi,

> + #ifdef SECURE_BOOT_FEATURE_ENABLED
> +  PlatformInitEmuVariableNvStore ((VOID *)(UINTN)VariableStore);
> + #endif

OvmfPkg/Library/NvVarsFileLib/ allows loading variables into emulated
varstore from a on-disk NvVars file.  We can't allow that when secure
boot is active.  I think we need a simliar check there.  Shortcutting
the ConnectNvVarsToFileSystem() function with a

#ifdef SECURE_BOOT_FEATURE_ENABLED
	return EFI_NOT_SUPPORTED;
#endif

should do the trick I think.

thanks,
  Gerd