From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web10.8394.1675424380028233003 for ; Fri, 03 Feb 2023 03:39:40 -0800 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=@redhat.com header.s=mimecast20190719 header.b=i1nHIdMc; spf=pass (domain: redhat.com, ip: 170.10.133.124, mailfrom: kraxel@redhat.com) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1675424379; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=PO4LIUImUnhxQmTGvgL7xkMSg4kkd++Kr2//z23dJeA=; b=i1nHIdMc1DqohCmwZjztyCU4uOT3kNItGgLIty5v/o2rXg9Sr2JhpmoK0RcYzx7nXw+zIG 9rz+27foTz5ewwHGu7t6qNBRKGQTwNoRoCPM4CitTqNMCtAhd207oPNdnDdg4cWTHXpMlh KCXRLF0x66jkBoH6h8TXr3vGvd9m6EI= Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mx3-rdu2.redhat.com [66.187.233.73]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-426-2flqdwHtP0u7On9Z3jM3GQ-1; Fri, 03 Feb 2023 06:39:38 -0500 X-MC-Unique: 2flqdwHtP0u7On9Z3jM3GQ-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx09.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.9]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8EA203C02535; Fri, 3 Feb 2023 11:39:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from sirius.home.kraxel.org (unknown [10.39.192.85]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 541FF492C14; Fri, 3 Feb 2023 11:39:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by sirius.home.kraxel.org (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 00692180060E; Fri, 3 Feb 2023 12:39:35 +0100 (CET) Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 12:39:35 +0100 From: "Gerd Hoffmann" To: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Jan Bobek , devel@edk2.groups.io, Laszlo Ersek , Jiewen Yao , Ard Biesheuvel , Leif Lindholm , Sami Mujawar Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/4] ArmVirtPkg: require self-signed PK when secure boot is enabled Message-ID: <20230203113935.6xyt62ii75xvqutz@sirius.home.kraxel.org> References: <20230120225835.42733-1-jbobek@nvidia.com> <20230120225835.42733-4-jbobek@nvidia.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.9 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline On Fri, Feb 03, 2023 at 11:49:07AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Fri, 20 Jan 2023 at 23:59, Jan Bobek wrote: > > > > REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2506 > > > > In all DSC files that define SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE, opt-in into requiring > > self-signed PK when SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE is TRUE. > > > > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel > > Cc: Leif Lindholm > > Cc: Sami Mujawar > > Cc: Gerd Hoffmann > > Signed-off-by: Jan Bobek > > I have no problems with this patch, but I wonder if we need it. I > suppose this is intended to retain the previous behavior, but i don't > think that makes sense at all. Secure boot support in ArmVirtPkg is > not production quality in any case, and self-signed PKs are rather > pointless too, so I think we should just go with the new default > behavior of allowing unsigned PKs. Hmm, reading this (and the bugzilla entry) I'm wondering what the point in requiring a self-signed PK is. I can't think of a case where this brings a benefit. Shouldn't we just relax the requirement everywhere, especially given that this is what the spec asks for? take care, Gerd