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From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>, devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>,
	Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>,
	Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate SEC's GHCB page
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2022 13:29:43 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <26702644-9685-e7ab-6e0e-dfd66ddd07e1@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <fc4bf097311f2192611042c176092df98f24ad08.1670616875.git.acdunlap@google.com>

On 12/9/22 15:04, Adam Dunlap wrote:
> When running under SEV-ES, a page of shared memory is allocated for the
> GHCB during the SEC phase at address 0x809000. This page of memory is
> eventually passed to the OS as EfiConventionalMemory. When running
> SEV-SNP, this page is not PVALIDATE'd in the RMP table, meaning that if
> the guest OS tries to access the page, it will think that the host has
> voilated the security guarantees and will likely crash.
> 
> This patch validates this page immediately after EDK2 switches to using
> the GHCB page allocated for the PEI phase.
> 
> This was tested by writing a UEFI application that reads to and writes
> from one byte of each page of memory and checks to see if a #VC
> exception is generated indicating that the page was not validated.
> 
> Fixes: 6995a1b79bab ("OvmfPkg: Create a GHCB page for use during Sec phase")
> 
> Signed-off-by: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

> ---
> 
> Removed the PcdStatus variable and just use Status for all statuses in
> this function. Use uncrustify to fix some formatting errors.
> 
>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
>   1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
> index e1b9fd9b7f..b2f2f3ac26 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
> @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ AmdSevEsInitialize (
>     UINTN                GhcbBackupPageCount;
>     SEV_ES_PER_CPU_DATA  *SevEsData;
>     UINTN                PageCount;
> -  RETURN_STATUS        PcdStatus, DecryptStatus;
> +  RETURN_STATUS        Status;
>     IA32_DESCRIPTOR      Gdtr;
>     VOID                 *Gdt;
>   
> @@ -220,8 +220,8 @@ AmdSevEsInitialize (
>       return;
>     }
>   
> -  PcdStatus = PcdSetBoolS (PcdSevEsIsEnabled, TRUE);
> -  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
> +  Status = PcdSetBoolS (PcdSevEsIsEnabled, TRUE);
> +  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
>   
>     //
>     // Allocate GHCB and per-CPU variable pages.
> @@ -240,20 +240,20 @@ AmdSevEsInitialize (
>     // only clear the encryption mask for the GHCB pages.
>     //
>     for (PageCount = 0; PageCount < GhcbPageCount; PageCount += 2) {
> -    DecryptStatus = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask (
> -                      0,
> -                      GhcbBasePa + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (PageCount),
> -                      1
> -                      );
> -    ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (DecryptStatus);
> +    Status = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask (
> +               0,
> +               GhcbBasePa + EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (PageCount),
> +               1
> +               );
> +    ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
>     }
>   
>     ZeroMem (GhcbBase, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (GhcbPageCount));
>   
> -  PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbBase, GhcbBasePa);
> -  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
> -  PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbSize, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (GhcbPageCount));
> -  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
> +  Status = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbBase, GhcbBasePa);
> +  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
> +  Status = PcdSet64S (PcdGhcbSize, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (GhcbPageCount));
> +  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
>   
>     DEBUG ((
>       DEBUG_INFO,
> @@ -295,6 +295,20 @@ AmdSevEsInitialize (
>   
>     AsmWriteMsr64 (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB, GhcbBasePa);
>   
> +  //
> +  // Now that the PEI GHCB is set up, the SEC GHCB page is no longer necessary
> +  // to keep shared. Later, it is exposed to the OS as EfiConventionalMemory, so
> +  // it needs to be marked private. The size of the region is hardcoded in
> +  // OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb in the definition of
> +  // SNP_SEC_MEM_BASE_DESC_2.
> +  //
> +  Status = MemEncryptSevSetPageEncMask (
> +             0,                                  // Cr3 -- use system Cr3
> +             FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase), // BaseAddress
> +             1                                   // NumPages
> +             );
> +  ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
> +
>     //
>     // The SEV support will clear the C-bit from non-RAM areas.  The early GDT
>     // lives in a non-RAM area, so when an exception occurs (like a #VC) the GDT

  reply	other threads:[~2022-12-12 19:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-09 21:04 [PATCH v3] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate SEC's GHCB page Adam Dunlap
2022-12-12 19:29 ` Lendacky, Thomas [this message]
2022-12-15  8:10   ` Yao, Jiewen

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