From: "Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io, jejb@linux.ibm.com
Cc: dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Dov.Murik1@il.ibm.com,
ashish.kalra@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, tobin@ibm.com,
david.kaplan@amd.com, jon.grimm@amd.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
frankeh@us.ibm.com,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v3 4/6] OvmfPkg: create a SEV secret area in the AmdSev memfd
Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 09:42:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2f746858-13ba-103f-4db0-845b5c6272eb@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201130202819.3910-5-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
On 11/30/20 21:28, James Bottomley wrote:
> SEV needs an area to place an injected secret where OVMF can find it
> and pass it up as a ConfigurationTable. This patch implements the
> area itself as an addition to the SEV enhanced reset vector table using
> an additional guid (4c2eb361-7d9b-4cc3-8081-127c90d3d294).
>
> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
>
> ---
>
> v2: move guid to OVMF token space, separate patches
> v3: comment rewording
>
> SEV Secret
> ---
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 6 ++++++
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 4 ++++
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 2 ++
> 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
> index 3fbf7a0ee1a4..7d27f8e16040 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
> @@ -304,6 +304,12 @@ [PcdsFixedAtBuild]
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase|0|UINT32|0x40
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbSize|0|UINT32|0x41
>
> + ## The base address and size of the SEV Launch Secret Area provisioned
> + # after remote attestation. If this is set in the .fdf, the platform
> + # is responsible for protecting the area from DXE phase overwrites.
> + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase|0x0|UINT32|0x42
> + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize|0x0|UINT32|0x43
> +
> [PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx]
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEmuVariableEvent|0|UINT64|2
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfFlashVariablesEnable|FALSE|BOOLEAN|0x10
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
> index a53ae6c194ae..dc38f68919cd 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
> @@ -43,3 +43,7 @@ [Pcd]
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPageTablesSize
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
> +
> +[FixedPcd]
> + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase
> + gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
> index 9e0a74fddfc1..5c6df5ee1a31 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
> @@ -47,6 +47,25 @@ TIMES (15 - ((guidedStructureEnd - guidedStructureStart + 15) % 16)) DB 0
> ;
> guidedStructureStart:
>
> +;
> +; SEV Secret block
> +;
> +; This describes the guest ram area where the hypervisor may should
> +; inject the secret. The data format is:
> +;
> +; base physical address (32 bit word)
> +; table length (32 bit word)
> +;
> +; GUID (SEV secret block): 4c2eb361-7d9b-4cc3-8081-127c90d3d294
> +;
(1) s/may should/should/, but we can fix this up at merge.
The syntax updates look great otherwise, so my R-b stands.
Thanks!
Laszlo
> +sevSecretBlockStart:
> + DD SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET_BASE
> + DD SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET_SIZE
> + DW sevSecretBlockEnd - sevSecretBlockStart
> + DB 0x61, 0xB3, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0x9B, 0x7D, 0xC3, 0x4C
> + DB 0x80, 0x81, 0x12, 0x7C, 0x90, 0xD3, 0xD2, 0x94
> +sevSecretBlockEnd:
> +
> ;
> ; SEV-ES Processor Reset support
> ;
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
> index 4913b379a993..c5e0fe93abf4 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb
> @@ -83,5 +83,7 @@
> %include "Main.asm"
>
> %define SEV_ES_AP_RESET_IP FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase)
> + %define SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET_BASE FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase)
> + %define SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET_SIZE FixedPcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretSize)
> %include "Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm"
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-03 8:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-30 20:28 [PATCH v3 0/6] SEV Encrypted Boot for Ovmf James Bottomley
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: convert SEV-ES Reset Block structure to be GUIDed James Bottomley
2020-12-03 8:10 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF James Bottomley
2020-12-03 8:20 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: add Grub Firmware Volume Package James Bottomley
2020-12-03 8:39 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] OvmfPkg: create a SEV secret area in the AmdSev memfd James Bottomley
2020-12-03 8:42 ` Laszlo Ersek [this message]
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: assign and protect the Sev Secret area James Bottomley
2020-12-01 7:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-12-01 18:36 ` [edk2-devel] " James Bottomley
2020-11-30 20:28 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table James Bottomley
2020-12-03 8:46 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-09 12:02 ` Yao, Jiewen
2020-12-09 15:46 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-09 15:54 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-09 16:33 ` Yao, Jiewen
2020-12-09 16:38 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-09 16:51 ` Yao, Jiewen
2020-12-09 17:04 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-10 9:12 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-10 9:27 ` Yao, Jiewen
2020-12-01 8:05 ` [PATCH v3 0/6] SEV Encrypted Boot for Ovmf Ard Biesheuvel
2020-12-01 8:13 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-01 15:26 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-01 8:05 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-03 12:26 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-03 14:27 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-04 0:46 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-04 1:05 ` James Bottomley
2020-12-04 1:55 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-04 2:01 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-14 19:57 ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-21 15:00 ` Laszlo Ersek
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