From: "Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
To: Vijayenthiran Subramaniam <vijayenthiran.subramaniam@arm.com>,
devel@edk2.groups.io, leif@nuviainc.com
Cc: thomas.abraham@arm.com, Sami.Mujawar@arm.com, richard.storer@arm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ArmPkg/ArmSvcLib: prevent speculative execution beyond svc
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 10:05:18 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <315d6865-8943-c360-5f2d-7e9de03d1391@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1591276329-20607-1-git-send-email-vijayenthiran.subramaniam@arm.com>
On 6/4/20 3:12 PM, Vijayenthiran Subramaniam wrote:
> Supervisor Call instruction (SVC) is used by the Arm Standalone MM
> environment to request services from the privileged software (such as
> ARM Trusted Firmware running in EL3) and also return back to the
> non-secure caller via EL3. Some Arm CPUs speculatively executes the
> instructions after the SVC instruction without crossing the privilege
> level (S-EL0). Although the results of this execution are
> architecturally discarded, adversary running on the non-secure side can
> manipulate the contents of the general purpose registers to leak the
> secure work memory through spectre like micro-architectural side channel
> attacks. This behavior is demonstrated by the SafeSide project [1] and
> [2]. Add barrier instructions after SVC to prevent speculative execution
> to mitigate such attacks.
>
> [1]: https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc
> [2]: https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c
>
> Signed-off-by: Vijayenthiran Subramaniam <vijayenthiran.subramaniam@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Merged as #663
Thanks.
> ---
> ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/AArch64/ArmSvc.S | 5 ++++-
> ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/Arm/ArmSvc.S | 5 ++++-
> ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/Arm/ArmSvc.asm | 5 ++++-
> 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/AArch64/ArmSvc.S b/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/AArch64/ArmSvc.S
> index 7c94db3451f0..ee265f94b960 100644
> --- a/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/AArch64/ArmSvc.S
> +++ b/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/AArch64/ArmSvc.S
> @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
> //
> -// Copyright (c) 2012 - 2017, ARM Limited. All rights reserved.
> +// Copyright (c) 2012 - 2020, ARM Limited. All rights reserved.
> //
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> //
> @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ ASM_PFX(ArmCallSvc):
> ldp x0, x1, [x0, #0]
>
> svc #0
> + // Prevent speculative execution beyond svc instruction
> + dsb nsh
> + isb
>
> // Pop the ARM_SVC_ARGS structure address from the stack into x9
> ldr x9, [sp, #16]
> diff --git a/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/Arm/ArmSvc.S b/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/Arm/ArmSvc.S
> index fc2886b6b53e..e81eb88f2e87 100644
> --- a/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/Arm/ArmSvc.S
> +++ b/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/Arm/ArmSvc.S
> @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
> //
> -// Copyright (c) 2016 - 2017, ARM Limited. All rights reserved.
> +// Copyright (c) 2016 - 2020, ARM Limited. All rights reserved.
> //
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> //
> @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ ASM_PFX(ArmCallSvc):
> ldm r0, {r0-r7}
>
> svc #0
> + // Prevent speculative execution beyond svc instruction
> + dsb nsh
> + isb
>
> // Load the ARM_SVC_ARGS structure address from the stack into r8
> ldr r8, [sp]
> diff --git a/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/Arm/ArmSvc.asm b/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/Arm/ArmSvc.asm
> index 82d10c023ae3..d1751488b2b1 100644
> --- a/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/Arm/ArmSvc.asm
> +++ b/ArmPkg/Library/ArmSvcLib/Arm/ArmSvc.asm
> @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
> //
> -// Copyright (c) 2016 - 2017, ARM Limited. All rights reserved.
> +// Copyright (c) 2016 - 2020, ARM Limited. All rights reserved.
> //
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> //
> @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
> ldm r0, {r0-r7}
>
> svc #0
> + // Prevent speculative execution beyond svc instruction
> + dsb nsh
> + isb
>
> // Load the ARM_SVC_ARGS structure address from the stack into r8
> ldr r8, [sp]
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-05 8:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-04 13:12 [PATCH] ArmPkg/ArmSvcLib: prevent speculative execution beyond svc Vijayenthiran Subramaniam
2020-06-05 8:05 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
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