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From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: devel@edk2.groups.io
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>,
	Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 12/12] OvfmPkg/VmgExitLib: Validate #VC MMIO is to un-encrypted memory
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2020 14:51:11 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <36dee4fe5bcc0d982b25a429fd37269bce72346e.1608065471.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1608065471.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108

When SEV-ES is active, and MMIO operation will trigger a #VC and the
VmgExitLib exception handler will process this MMIO operation.

A malicious hypervisor could try to extract information from encrypted
memory by setting a reserved bit in the guests nested page tables for
a non-MMIO area. This can result in the encrypted data being copied into
the GHCB shared buffer area and accessed by the hypervisor.

Prevent this by ensuring that the MMIO source/destination is un-encrypted
memory. For the APIC register space, access is allowed in general.

Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc                  |  1 +
 OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                        |  1 +
 .../DxeBaseMemEncryptSevLib.inf               |  2 +-
 OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf  |  1 +
 OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf     |  2 +
 OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
index 3e5a3f648ad5..d0e9d28fc492 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc
@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ [LibraryClasses.common.SEC]
   CpuExceptionHandlerLib|UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/SecPeiCpuExceptionHandlerLib.inf
 !endif
   VmgExitLib|OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf
+  MemEncryptSevLib|OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/SecBaseMemEncryptSevLib.inf
 
 [LibraryClasses.common.PEI_CORE]
   HobLib|MdePkg/Library/PeiHobLib/PeiHobLib.inf
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
index 226b576545a9..2a230888c636 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ [LibraryClasses.common.SEC]
   CpuExceptionHandlerLib|UefiCpuPkg/Library/CpuExceptionHandlerLib/SecPeiCpuExceptionHandlerLib.inf
 !endif
   VmgExitLib|OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf
+  MemEncryptSevLib|OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/SecBaseMemEncryptSevLib.inf
 
 [LibraryClasses.common.PEI_CORE]
   HobLib|MdePkg/Library/PeiHobLib/PeiHobLib.inf
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeBaseMemEncryptSevLib.inf b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeBaseMemEncryptSevLib.inf
index 04728a5dd256..10f794759207 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeBaseMemEncryptSevLib.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/DxeBaseMemEncryptSevLib.inf
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ [Defines]
   FILE_GUID                      = c1594631-3888-4be4-949f-9c630dbc842b
   MODULE_TYPE                    = BASE
   VERSION_STRING                 = 1.0
-  LIBRARY_CLASS                  = MemEncryptSevLib|DXE_DRIVER DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER DXE_SMM_DRIVER UEFI_DRIVER
+  LIBRARY_CLASS                  = MemEncryptSevLib|DXE_CORE DXE_DRIVER DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER DXE_SMM_DRIVER UEFI_DRIVER
 
 #
 # The following information is for reference only and not required by the build
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf b/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf
index df14de3c21bc..9c8de326f3d1 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ [LibraryClasses]
   BaseLib
   BaseMemoryLib
   DebugLib
+  MemEncryptSevLib
   PcdLib
 
 [FixedPcd]
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf b/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf
index b3c3e56ecff8..c66c68726cdb 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf
@@ -35,4 +35,6 @@ [LibraryClasses]
   BaseLib
   BaseMemoryLib
   DebugLib
+  LocalApicLib
+  MemEncryptSevLib
 
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c
index ce577e4677eb..24259060fd65 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <Base.h>
 #include <Uefi.h>
 #include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Library/LocalApicLib.h>
 #include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
 #include <Library/VmgExitLib.h>
 #include <Register/Amd/Msr.h>
@@ -595,6 +596,61 @@ UnsupportedExit (
   return Status;
 }
 
+/**
+  Validate that the MMIO memory access is not to encrypted memory.
+
+  Examine the pagetable entry for the memory specified. MMIO should not be
+  performed against encrypted memory. MMIO to the APIC page is always allowed.
+
+  @param[in] Ghcb           Pointer to the Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block
+  @param[in] MemoryAddress  Memory address to validate
+  @param[in] MemoryLength   Memory length to validate
+
+  @retval 0          Memory is not encrypted
+  @return            New exception value to propogate
+
+**/
+STATIC
+UINT64
+ValidateMmioMemory (
+  IN GHCB   *Ghcb,
+  IN UINTN  MemoryAddress,
+  IN UINTN  MemoryLength
+  )
+{
+  MEM_ENCRYPT_SEV_ADDRESS_RANGE_STATE  State;
+  GHCB_EVENT_INJECTION                 GpEvent;
+  UINTN                                Address;
+
+  //
+  // Allow APIC accesses (which will have the encryption bit set during
+  // SEC and PEI phases).
+  //
+  Address = MemoryAddress & ~(SIZE_4KB - 1);
+  if (Address == GetLocalApicBaseAddress ()) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  State = MemEncryptSevGetAddressRangeState (
+            0,
+            MemoryAddress,
+            MemoryLength
+            );
+  if (State == MemEncryptSevAddressRangeUnencrypted) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  //
+  // Any state other than unencrypted is an error, issue a #GP.
+  //
+  GpEvent.Uint64 = 0;
+  GpEvent.Elements.Vector = GP_EXCEPTION;
+  GpEvent.Elements.Type   = GHCB_EVENT_INJECTION_TYPE_EXCEPTION;
+  GpEvent.Elements.Valid  = 1;
+
+  return GpEvent.Uint64;
+}
+
 /**
   Handle an MMIO event.
 
@@ -653,6 +709,11 @@ MmioExit (
       return UnsupportedExit (Ghcb, Regs, InstructionData);
     }
 
+    Status = ValidateMmioMemory (Ghcb, InstructionData->Ext.RmData, Bytes);
+    if (Status != 0) {
+      return Status;
+    }
+
     ExitInfo1 = InstructionData->Ext.RmData;
     ExitInfo2 = Bytes;
     CopyMem (Ghcb->SharedBuffer, &InstructionData->Ext.RegData, Bytes);
@@ -683,6 +744,11 @@ MmioExit (
     InstructionData->ImmediateSize = Bytes;
     InstructionData->End += Bytes;
 
+    Status = ValidateMmioMemory (Ghcb, InstructionData->Ext.RmData, Bytes);
+    if (Status != 0) {
+      return Status;
+    }
+
     ExitInfo1 = InstructionData->Ext.RmData;
     ExitInfo2 = Bytes;
     CopyMem (Ghcb->SharedBuffer, InstructionData->Immediate, Bytes);
@@ -717,6 +783,11 @@ MmioExit (
       return UnsupportedExit (Ghcb, Regs, InstructionData);
     }
 
+    Status = ValidateMmioMemory (Ghcb, InstructionData->Ext.RmData, Bytes);
+    if (Status != 0) {
+      return Status;
+    }
+
     ExitInfo1 = InstructionData->Ext.RmData;
     ExitInfo2 = Bytes;
 
@@ -748,6 +819,11 @@ MmioExit (
   case 0xB7:
     Bytes = (Bytes != 0) ? Bytes : 2;
 
+    Status = ValidateMmioMemory (Ghcb, InstructionData->Ext.RmData, Bytes);
+    if (Status != 0) {
+      return Status;
+    }
+
     ExitInfo1 = InstructionData->Ext.RmData;
     ExitInfo2 = Bytes;
 
@@ -774,6 +850,11 @@ MmioExit (
   case 0xBF:
     Bytes = (Bytes != 0) ? Bytes : 2;
 
+    Status = ValidateMmioMemory (Ghcb, InstructionData->Ext.RmData, Bytes);
+    if (Status != 0) {
+      return Status;
+    }
+
     ExitInfo1 = InstructionData->Ext.RmData;
     ExitInfo2 = Bytes;
 
-- 
2.28.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-12-15 20:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-15 20:50 [PATCH 00/12] SEV-ES security mitigations Lendacky, Thomas
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 01/12] Ovmf/ResetVector: Simplify and consolidate the SEV features checks Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-04 18:58   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 02/12] OvmfPkg/Sec: Move SEV-ES SEC workarea definition to common header file Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-04 19:02   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 03/12] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Validate the encryption bit position for SEV/SEV-ES Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-04 19:59   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-04 20:45     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 04/12] OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Perform a simple SEV-ES sanity check Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-04 20:00   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-04 20:48     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 05/12] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add an interface to retrieve the encryption mask Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-04 20:34   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-04 21:09     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 06/12] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Clear encryption bit on PCIe MMCONFIG range Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-04 21:04   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-05 22:48     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-06 15:38       ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 07/12] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Check for an explicit DR7 cached value Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-04 21:05   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 08/12] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Make the MemEncryptSevLib available for SEC Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-05  9:40   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-05 14:34     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-05 15:38       ` Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-06 14:22         ` Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-06 14:21       ` Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 09/12] OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Address range encryption state interface Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-05  9:48   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 10/12] OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Support nested #VCs Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-05 10:08   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-15 20:51 ` [PATCH 11/12] OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Reserve GHCB backup pages if S3 is supported Lendacky, Thomas
2021-01-05 10:13   ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-05 14:40     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2020-12-15 20:51 ` Lendacky, Thomas [this message]
2021-01-05 10:28   ` [edk2-devel] [PATCH 12/12] OvfmPkg/VmgExitLib: Validate #VC MMIO is to un-encrypted memory Laszlo Ersek
2021-01-05 14:45     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2020-12-17 14:23 ` [PATCH 00/12] SEV-ES security mitigations Laszlo Ersek
2020-12-21 15:02 ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek

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