From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=missing; spf=pass (domain: redhat.com, ip: 209.132.183.28, mailfrom: lersek@redhat.com) Received: from mx1.redhat.com (mx1.redhat.com [209.132.183.28]) by groups.io with SMTP; Thu, 09 May 2019 10:30:15 -0700 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx02.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E200F308FC5E; Thu, 9 May 2019 17:30:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lacos-laptop-7.usersys.redhat.com (ovpn-120-234.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.120.234]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B335E60CD7; Thu, 9 May 2019 17:30:12 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v2 5/6] CryptoPkg: Upgrade OpenSSL to 1.1.1b From: "Laszlo Ersek" To: devel@edk2.groups.io, xiaoyux.lu@intel.com Cc: Jian J Wang , Ting Ye References: <1557379429-7527-1-git-send-email-xiaoyux.lu@intel.com> <1557379429-7527-5-git-send-email-xiaoyux.lu@intel.com> Message-ID: <38ff9c2f-1d16-4719-18f6-07e84e4d8bf8@redhat.com> Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 19:30:11 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.12 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.43]); Thu, 09 May 2019 17:30:14 +0000 (UTC) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 05/09/19 19:15, Laszlo Ersek wrote: > How about the following: > > - It seems like we cannot convince OpenSSL to *never* call these > functions, under UEFI. > > - We also cannot provide an implementation that is *guaranteed* to be > secure enough, IMO. > > - It seems like these functions *should* never be called in the edk2 > build however, given that we're not trying to do anything "new" with > OpenSSL in edk2 -- we just want to use the new OpenSSL release for the > same old things. > > - So why not just ensure that these functions *never return*? > > (1) Basically implement all of the functions like this: > > ASSERT (FALSE); > CpuDeadLoop (); > // > // if a return value is needed > // > return 0; > > What do you think about this approach? I notice that "rand" is another module in OpenSSL. Can we try adding "no-rand" to our Configure invocation? Perhaps the need for all of the rand_* functions goes away then. Thanks Laszlo