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From: "Dandan Bi" <dandan.bi@intel.com>
To: "devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
	"Gao, Liming" <liming.gao@intel.com>,
	"Bi, Dandan" <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 01:28:27 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3C0D5C461C9E904E8F62152F6274C0BB40C5EF1F@SHSMSX104.ccr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <15C569713949E871.11658@groups.io>

Hi EmbeddedPkg maintainers ,

Could you help push this patch?


Thanks,
Dandan
> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io [mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io] On Behalf Of
> Dandan Bi
> Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2019 11:06 AM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>; Ard Biesheuvel
> <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>; Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> 
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the
> Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
> 
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the
> execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any
> other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> 
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for
> the callers in EmbeddedPkg which don't have the policy to defer the
> execution of the image.
> 
> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> ---
>  .../AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c         |  9 +++++++++
>  .../Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git
> a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c
> b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c
> index 591afbe7cc..fe05878b4b 100644
> ---
> a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c
> +++
> b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c
> @@ -71,10 +71,19 @@ StartEfiApplication (
> 
>    // Load the image from the device path with Boot Services function
>    Status = gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, ParentImageHandle, DevicePath, NULL, 0,
>                    &ImageHandle);
>    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +    //
> +    // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> +    // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be
> started right now.
> +    // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image,
> we should
> +    // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +    //
> +    if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +      gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +    }
>      return Status;
>    }
> 
>    // Passed LoadOptions to the EFI Application
>    if (LoadOptionsSize != 0) {
> diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c
> b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c
> index d9e7aa7d2b..e1036954ee 100644
> --- a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c
> +++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c
> @@ -439,10 +439,22 @@ AndroidBootImgBoot (
>                                             + KernelSize;
> 
>    Status = gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, gImageHandle,
>                             (EFI_DEVICE_PATH *)&KernelDevicePath,
>                             (VOID*)(UINTN)Kernel, KernelSize, &ImageHandle);
> +  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +    //
> +    // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> +    // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be
> started right now.
> +    // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image,
> we should
> +    // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +    //
> +    if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +      gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +    }
> +    return Status;
> +  }
> 
>    // Set kernel arguments
>    Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle,
> &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid,
>                                  (VOID **) &ImageInfo);
>    ImageInfo->LoadOptions = NewKernelArg;
> --
> 2.18.0.windows.1
> 
> 
> 


      parent reply	other threads:[~2019-09-24  1:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-18  3:05 [patch v2 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:27   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 2/5] MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:23   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:35   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  5:28   ` [edk2-devel] " Gao, Zhichao
2019-09-24 10:34   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:49   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:37   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 5/5] ShellPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:30   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
     [not found] ` <15C569713949E871.11658@groups.io>
2019-09-24  1:28   ` Dandan Bi [this message]

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