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From: "Gao, Zhichao" <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
To: "Bi, Dandan" <dandan.bi@intel.com>,
	"devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>
Cc: "Ni, Ray" <ray.ni@intel.com>, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 3/3] ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 02:20:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3CE959C139B4C44DBEA1810E3AA6F9000B836659@SHSMSX101.ccr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190904082555.35424-4-dandan.bi@intel.com>

Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bi, Dandan
> Sent: Wednesday, September 4, 2019 4:26 PM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
> Cc: Ni, Ray <ray.ni@intel.com>; Gao, Zhichao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>;
> Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Subject: [patch 3/3] ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> 
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the
> Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
> 
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the
> execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any
> other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> 
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for
> the callers in ShellPkg which don't have the policy to defer the execution of
> the image.
> 
> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
> Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> ---
>  ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c           |  9 +++++++++
>  .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c   | 11 ++++++++++-
>  ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c    | 11 ++++++++++-
>  3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> index 6909f29441..e5f97bbb11 100644
> --- a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> +++ b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> @@ -643,10 +643,19 @@ ProcessManFile(
>        goto Done;
>      }
>      DevPath = ShellInfoObject.NewEfiShellProtocol-
> >GetDevicePathFromFilePath(CmdFilePathName);
>      Status      = gBS->LoadImage(FALSE, gImageHandle, DevPath, NULL, 0,
> &CmdFileImgHandle);
>      if(EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
> +      //
> +      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> +      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> +      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> +      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid the resource
> leak.
> +      //
> +      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +        gBS->UnloadImage (CmdFileImgHandle);
> +      }
>        *HelpText = NULL;
>        goto Done;
>      }
>      Status = gBS->OpenProtocol(
>                      CmdFileImgHandle,
> diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> index 1b169d0d3c..f91e3eb6e7 100644
> --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
>  /** @file
>    Main file for LoadPciRom shell Debug1 function.
> 
>    (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
> -  Copyright (c) 2005 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +  Copyright (c) 2005 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights
> + reserved.<BR>
>    SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> 
>  **/
> 
>  #include "UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib.h"
> @@ -332,10 +332,19 @@ LoadEfiDriversFromRomImage (
>                          ImageBuffer,
>                          ImageLength,
>                          &ImageHandle
>                         );
>            if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +            //
> +            // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and
> an ImageHandle was created
> +            // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can
> not be started right now.
> +            // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> +            // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> +            //
> +            if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +              gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +            }
>              ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN
> (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_FAIL), gShellDebug1HiiHandle, L"loadpcirom",
> FileName, ImageIndex);
>  //            PrintToken (STRING_TOKEN
> (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_IMAGE_ERROR), HiiHandle, ImageIndex, Status);
>            } else {
>              Status = gBS->StartImage (ImageHandle, NULL, NULL);
>              if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> index 6a94b48c86..a13e1bda2d 100644
> --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
>  /** @file
>    Main file for attrib shell level 2 function.
> 
>    (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
> -  Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +  Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights
> + reserved.<BR>
>    SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> 
>  **/
> 
>  #include "UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib.h"
> @@ -110,10 +110,19 @@ LoadDriver(
>      NULL,
>      0,
>      &LoadedDriverHandle);
> 
>    if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
> +    //
> +    // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> +    // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be
> started right now.
> +    // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image,
> we should
> +    // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +    //
> +    if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +      gBS->UnloadImage (LoadedDriverHandle);
> +    }
>      ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOAD_NOT_IMAGE),
> gShellLevel2HiiHandle, FileName, Status);
>    } else {
>      //
>      // Make sure it is a driver image
>      //
> --
> 2.18.0.windows.1


      reply	other threads:[~2019-09-05  2:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-04  8:25 [patch 0/3] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-04  8:25 ` [patch 1/3] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-04 17:24   ` [edk2-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-09-05 18:50   ` Laszlo Ersek
2019-09-04  8:25 ` [patch 2/3] MdeModulePkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-05  5:37   ` Wu, Hao A
2019-09-05  6:23     ` Dandan Bi
2019-09-05  8:35       ` Wu, Hao A
2019-09-10  3:37         ` Dandan Bi
2019-09-05 19:01       ` [edk2-devel] " Laszlo Ersek
2019-09-04  8:25 ` [patch 3/3] ShellPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-05  2:20   ` Gao, Zhichao [this message]

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