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From: "Gao, Zhichao" <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
To: "devel@edk2.groups.io" <devel@edk2.groups.io>,
	"Bi, Dandan" <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: "Wang, Jian J" <jian.j.wang@intel.com>,
	"Wu, Hao A" <hao.a.wu@intel.com>, "Ni, Ray" <ray.ni@intel.com>,
	"Gao, Liming" <liming.gao@intel.com>,
	"Laszlo Ersek" <lersek@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 05:28:05 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3CE959C139B4C44DBEA1810E3AA6F9000B83B413@SHSMSX101.ccr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190918030557.55256-4-dandan.bi@intel.com>

Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>

Thanks,
Zhichao

> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io [mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io] On Behalf Of
> Dandan Bi
> Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2019 11:06 AM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
> Cc: Wang, Jian J <jian.j.wang@intel.com>; Wu, Hao A <hao.a.wu@intel.com>;
> Ni, Ray <ray.ni@intel.com>; Gao, Zhichao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>; Gao,
> Liming <liming.gao@intel.com>; Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Subject: [edk2-devel] [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager:
> Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> 
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the
> Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
> 
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the
> execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any
> other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> 
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for
> the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the policy to defer the
> execution of the image.
> 
> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
> Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
> Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> ---
>  MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c      |  9 +++++++++
>  .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c         | 11 ++++++++++-
>  MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c      | 11
> ++++++++++-
>  3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> index 952033fc82..760d7647b8 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> @@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot (
>      if (FilePath != NULL) {
>        FreePool (FilePath);
>      }
> 
>      if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +      //
> +      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> +      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> +      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> +      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +      //
> +      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +      }
>        //
>        // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure to
> load boot option
>        //
>        BmReportLoadFailure
> (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status);
>        BootOption->Status = Status;
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> index 07592f8ebd..af47b787d1 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
>  /** @file
>    Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing load
> options.
> 
> -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
>  (C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
>  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> 
>  **/
> 
> @@ -1409,10 +1409,19 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption (
>                      FileSize,
>                      &ImageHandle
>                      );
>      FreePool (FileBuffer);
> 
> +    //
> +    // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> +    // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be
> started right now.
> +    // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image,
> we should
> +    // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +    //
> +    if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +      gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +    }
>      if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
>        Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle,
> &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo);
>        ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
> 
>        ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize = LoadOption->OptionalDataSize; diff --git
> a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> index 6b8fb4d924..833e38c6fe 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
>  /** @file
>    Misc library functions.
> 
> -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
>  (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
>  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> 
>  **/
> 
> @@ -491,10 +491,19 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages (
>          ImageDevicePath,
>          NULL,
>          0,
>          &ImageHandle
>        );
> +      //
> +      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> +      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> +      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> +      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +      //
> +      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +      }
>        if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
>          LoadCount++;
>          //
>          // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for
>          // a 5 Minute period
> --
> 2.18.0.windows.1
> 
> 
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-18  5:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-18  3:05 [patch v2 0/5] Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:27   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 2/5] MdeModulePkg/DxeCapsuleLibFmp: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:23   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:35   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  5:28   ` Gao, Zhichao [this message]
2019-09-24 10:34   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 4/5] MdeModulePkg/PlatformDriOverride: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-18  3:49   ` [edk2-devel] " Wu, Hao A
2019-09-24 10:37   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2019-09-18  3:05 ` [patch v2 5/5] ShellPkg: " Dandan Bi
2019-09-24 10:30   ` [edk2-devel] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
     [not found] ` <15C569713949E871.11658@groups.io>
2019-09-24  1:28   ` [edk2-devel] [patch v2 1/5] EmbeddedPkg: " Dandan Bi

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